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ABSTRACT
Four phenomena can be observed in China’s housing market in the past 16
years.

First, the vacancy rate of new condominium properties has increased

significantly. Second, housing prices have been increasing very rapidly. In fact, the
prices have rarely decreased even when strict housing policies have been mandated.
Third, housing transactions are active, as indicated by the new condominiums that
have been recently developed and have been sold very quickly. Finally, new
construction/development had also been very active. Phenomena 2, 3, and 4 are
inherently consistent, but the coexistence of phenomena 2, 3, and 4 with phenomenon
1 is very perplexing. Thus, the following research questions can be raised. 1. How
can housing prices keep increasing despite high vacancy rates? 2. How can new
condominiums be sold quickly when vacancy rates are high? 3. How can construction
activities continue when vacancy rates are high? This is a puzzle.
This puzzle is connected with another puzzle, the excessive liquidity in
China’s housing market has been oddly coexisting with insufficient demand in
China’s consumer market over the past 16 years. The second puzzle can is easily
observed even though it has been largely ignored over past 16 years.
The following hypotheses are put forward: Hypothesis 1: At a certain time
point, higher-income households will spend a lower proportion of their income on
consumption compared with lower-income households. If this hypothesis can be
verified, then severe income inequality will lead to an overly-high aggregate savings
rate and an extremely low aggregate consumption rate; Hypothesis 2: Overly-high
aggregate savings rates and extremely low aggregate consumption rates caused by
severe income inequality will induce high investment demand in the virtual sector
rather than the real sector. As a result, the virtual sector will boom while the real
sector will decline. Hypothesis 3: Given a declining real sector, investors will prefer
houses as investments as opposed to other assets in the virtual sector due to their
unique features. This leads to rapidly rising housing prices and overdevelopment.
Testing the three hypotheses above is a big challenge because the typical
measure for income inequality for a country, the Gini Coefficient, announced by
China’s government is not trustworthy. The data about GDP and per capita disposable
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income are also not reliable. For this research, a significant amount of effort was
exerted to collect primary data on these variables. These efforts include establishing
rapport with officials in the National Bureau of Statistics of China, obtaining special
access to the database of academic and non-profit research institutes and buying data
from private institutes in China. Through these efforts, improved quarterly data of
GDP, housing policy, and monetary supply for 70 cities from 2000 to 2016 were
obtained.
The theoretical work in this study includes:
First, the economic relationship between income levels and consumption rates,
that is, higher-income households will spend a lower proportion of their income on
consumption compared with lower-income households, is confirmed by economic
data. Moreover, the new economic relationship is explained using Modern Portfolio
Theory and information cost.
Second, by mathematical proof, it is shown that a more severe income
inequality will lead to a higher aggregate savings rate as well as a lower aggregate
consumption rate under this economic relationship.
Third, a theoretical model further shows that the aggregate savings rate caused
by income equality will result in investor’s preference for virtual assets rather than
real assets or consumption goods.
Fourth, unique feature of houses is found, which can be used to explain why
houses are preferred over other virtual assets and why housing bubbles can last longer
than speculative bubbles of other virtual assets, such as commercial properties, stocks
and mutual funds. The unique feature of housing is that the utility an owner obtains
from living in his own house is greater than the utility a tenant gets from living in the
same house if it was leased. Therefore, market rents, which are the “price” of the
utility a tenant get, does not fully reflect the market fundamentals of a house due to
the existence of non-rent utility. As a result, house prices lose the signal for market
fundamentals and, in the case of China, have continuously increased in the long term.
This is the reason why houses are preferred by investors.
Finally, a new measure which we call the Ratio of Gross Domestic Income to
Gross Domestic Product (RGG) is built to replace of the Gini coefficient as a measure
of income equality. Since, the official data are not trustworthy due to the absence of
iii

unreported income a, a better measure for income inequality can be obtained. The
following is the problem-solving process used to create the new measure. First it is
basic fact that the high income level families possess nearly all of the unreported
income in China. Therefore, a high proportion of unreported income in total income
implies a severe income inequality. Step 2, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) should be
equal to Gross Domestic Income (GDI). Hence, when GDI is less than the GDP, the
gap between the two statistics represents the unreported income in an economy. As a
result, a high Ratio of GDI to GDP (RGG) indicates a severe income inequality. In
this way, a new index RGG is built to be used to measure inequality.
The empirical study is conducted after the theoretical work and the results
show the following:
First, for all of the econometric models and for all of the groupings of the 70
Chinese cities, the coefficient of RGG, or our measure for income inequality, is
consistently negative. Since a high RGG implies severe income inequality, the
negative coefficient shows that the correlation between income inequality and housing
prices is positive. In other words, the more severe the income inequality the higher the
housing prices will be.
Second, for all of the econometric models and for all of the groupings of the
70 Chinese cities, the housing prices are always significantly affected by RGG. The
positive correlation between the income inequality and the housing prices is
confirmed statistically.
Third, in order to show how important income inequality is to the
determination of housing prices, the degree of fit (R2) is checked after the
independent variables are removed one by one from the econometric models. In all
models, we find that the goodness of fit drops the most when the RGG variable is
removed. This again shows that income inequality plays the most important role in
housing prices.
Finally, the coefficient of Housing Policies（X3）is positive, which means
the enactment of housing policies is correlated with the high housing prices. This
result is counterintuitive because the purpose of restrictive housing policies is to
suppress rapidly rising housing prices. But this result is reasonable. On one hand, it is
the fact that all housing policies could rarely suppress housing prices in past 16 years
iv

in China. On the other hand, releasing the housing policies was actually a reaction to
the rapidly rising housing prices, and terminating the housing policies is a response to
the stagnant or slightly decreasing housing prices. In other words, when housing
prices increased rapidly, the housing policies were enacted but rarely served to stop
the increasing housing prices.

And, when the housing prices were stagnant or

decreasing slightly for some reason, the restrictive housing policies were not enacted
or were terminated and as a result, the relationship between housing prices and
housing policies is was found to be positive in the models.
Then the following conclusions are drawn based on the theoretical models and
the empirical evidences.
1. At a given point in time, a high-income family will spend a lower
proportion of their income on consumption compared with a low-income
family. As a result, severe income inequality will lead to very -high
aggregate savings rate and very low aggregate consumption rate.
2. Very high aggregate savings rate and very low aggregate consumption rate
caused by severe income inequality will induce high investment demand in
the virtual sector and weak demand in the real sector. As a result, the
virtual sector will progress, whereas the real sector will decline.
3. In the context of a declining real sector, investors prefer houses to other
types of assets in the virtual sector owing to the unique features of houses.
Thus, housing prices will increase even though there is a high vacant rate,
increased

new construction and the high transaction volume for the

housing construction. Those phenomena are “weird” but can be observed
everywhere in China in 2017.
The theoretical innovations of this study include: (1) illustrating the new
relationship between income level and consumption rate which can bridge income
inequality and the aggregate savings rate; (2) establishing RGG as a new measure for
income inequality that can be a substitute for the Gini coefficient when there is a large
amount of unreported income in an economy; (3) determining the unique feature of
house which can explain why investors prefer houses to the other assets in the virtual
market.
As a result, the study has the following theoretical contributions: (1) it
v

provides empirical evidence that rapidly increasing housing prices are positively
related to income inequality; (2) it adds a new explanation for housing bubbles by
revealing the linkage between income inequality to the housing bubble; (3) it details a
new channel through which income inequality can damage the sustainability of
economic growth in a developing country, thus enhancing the importance of income
inequality issue in economics.
At least two implications which are of great significance to developing
countries can be drawn from this study. First, severe income distribution inequality
gives rise to the abnormal coexistence of excess liquidity and insufficient demand,
further deepening a recession found in the real sector, as well as the an increasing
prosperity within

the virtual sector of an economy. Secondly, an increasingly

overheated virtual economy can bring a significant amount of risk to the whole
financial system of a country. A dwindling economy gradually deteriorates
employment and further threatens the long-term economic growth potential of a
developing country and also weakens their competitive advantage in the global
economy.
Since many countries, including the U.S., have also been experiencing
increasing income inequality and real estate bubbles, this research will ultimately
remind policy-makers to take income inequality into account when they make policies
to deal with both housing bubbles and the overdevelopment of the housing sector
fueled by the increased interest in the virtual economy, in particular the housing
market.

This can lead to instability in the financial markets and unsustainable

economic growth in both developing countries and developed countries.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
In many cities in China, a significant number of newly developed condominiums
have been sold but have remained vacant for several years. For example, from 2006–
2015, condominiums covering more than 18 million square meters were built in a 63.9square-kilometer beach area in Rushan Yintan, Weihai, Shangdong Province, China.
However, over 85% of these condominiums have remained vacant since their
completion 1.
Similar cases can be observed in other cities in China, such as Ordos, Inner
Mongolia; Fangchenggang, Guangxi; Chenggong, Yunnan; Shiyan, Hubei; Changzhou,
Jiangsu; Jiaxing, Zhejiang; Lanzhou New District, Gansu; and Zhumadian, Henan. In
fact, there are so many vacant condominiums in those cities that those cities are called
“ghost cities”. In fact, in 2015 a Chinese institute identified the top 50 “ghost cities” in
China (see Table 1.1). Although this ranking may not be trustworthy, the cities on the list
are all identified as “ghost cities” by the data from the Statistical Yearbook of those cities.

1

http://jingji.cntv.cn/2015/12/20/VIDE1450621076642271.shtml April.2nd, 2017
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Table 1.1 Top 50 Ghost Cities in China (2015)
Rank

City

Rank

City

Index

1

Erenhot

0.2692

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Alaer
Beitun
Aletai
Zhangye
Suifenhe
Qinzhou
Jiayuguan
Yumen
Shigatse
Golmud
Ruili
Turpan
Mishan
Weihai
Changshu
Wuzhong

0.2726
0.2825
0.2906
0.2983
0.3232
0.3524
0.3591
0.3594
0.3843
0.3933
0.4004
0.4172
0.4214
0.4231
0.4267
0.4296

Inner
Mongolia
Xinjiang
Xinjiang
Xinjiang
Gansu
Heilongjiang
Guangxi
Gansu
Gansu
Tibet
Qinghai
Yunnan
Xinjiang
Heilongjiang
Shandong
Jiangsu
Ningxia

26

Xilinhot

0.4719

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Jinchang
Chengde
Taicang
Zhoukou
Dehui
Laiwu
Quzhou
Chongzhou
Donggang
Heshan
Shulan
Yantai
Korla
Kashgar
Sanya

0.4731
0.4737
0.4773
0.4885
0.4914
0.4918
0.4997
0.5023
0.5037
0.5139
0.5173
0.5201
0.5268
0.5294
0.5349
0.5369

18

Kaiping

0.4393

Guangdong

43

Ordos

0.5372

19

Fukang

0.4507

Xinjiang

44

Hulunbeier

0.5372

20
21
22
23
24

Guixi
Yichun
Shizuishan
Chuzhou
Haining

0.4577
0.4579
0.4621
0.4628
0.4689

Jiangxi
Heilongjiang
Ningxia
Anhui
Zhejiang

45
46
47
48
49

Taian
Yichang
Xianning
Lasa
Lianyungang

0.5388
0.5441
0.5441
0.5498
0.5522

25

Maoming

0.4717

Guangdong

50

Huoerguole

0.5529

Index*

Province

Fangchenggang

Province
Inner
Mongolia
Gansu
Guangxi
Hebei
Jiangsu
Henan
Jilin
Shandong
Zhejiang
Sichuan
Liaoning
Canton

Jilin
Shandong
Xinjiang
Xinjiang
Hainan
Inner
Mongolia
Inner
Mongolia
Shandong
Hubei
Hubei
Tibet
Jiangsu
Inner
Mogolia

* The index refers to the population per square kilometers in housing
communities. Population is measured by 10 thousand. For example, 0.2692 means
there are living 2692 residents per square kilometers in the housing communities
Source:
http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20151117/223123790511.shtml Nov. 17, 2015

High vacancy rates typically translate to low rents. Theoretically, low rents should

2

result in low housing prices. However, even though the vacancy rates in these cities are
high, housing prices continue to soar. For example, the average housing price in Sanya,
China (# 42 in Table 1.1) in 2016 is over 13 times higher than that in 2003, although the
vacancy rate remained over 40% from 2003 to 2016 2.
Furthermore, newly developed condominiums can always be sold quickly despite the
high vacancy rates. From 2003–2016, an average of more than 93% of the condominiums
built in China were sold within three months of their completion 3.

1.2 A Puzzle
There are four phenomena that can be observed in China’s housing market over the
past 16 years:
1. The vacancy rate of new condominiums projects has been increasing.
2. Housing prices keep increasing at a rapid rate. In fact, prices have rarely
decreased even when strict housing policies are mandated.
3. Housing transaction volume is high as evidenced by the low average days on
market.
4. And, finally, new construction activities have also been very active.
When housing prices are increasing rapidly, investors can profit substantially from
purchasing and selling home units. In this kind of seller’s market, new and second-hand
condominiums sell quickly. When properties trade quickly and money is made, housing
developers will strive to build more houses. Thus, phenomena 2, 3, and 4 are inherently
consistent.
2
3

Hainan Statistical Yearbook, 2003 and Sanya Statistical Yearbook, 2016.
China Statistical Yearbook (2003–2012).
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The coexistence of phenomena 2, 3, and 4 with phenomenon 1 is very perplexing.
Thus, the following research questions, although essentially the same, can be raised:
1. How can housing prices keep increasing despite high vacancy rates?
2. How can new condominiums be sold very quickly when vacancy rates are
high?
3. How can construction activities keep being very active when vacancy rates are
high?
In this study, we attempt to answer these questions in a systematic manner.

1.3 Exploration
1.3.1. What Factors Influence the Rapid Increase in House Prices?
1. Factors Relevant to Houses
Factors relevant to the value of houses include such things as location, age, floor area
ratio and water view. These factors certainly influence housing prices. Nevertheless, this
dissertation focuses on the factors that influence the price dynamics of the entire housing
market and not on those that affect the price variations of a specific condominium. More
precisely, the housing prices discussed in this dissertation pertain to housing prices at the
market level, namely, the average price of all condominiums in a housing market.
Springer and Worzala (2013) 4 contend that, at the market level, aggregated data
obscure any effect induced by individual properties, thereby isolating the market
influences on transaction volume. Given the association of property transaction prices

4
Springer T. and E. Worzala (2013). “Time-on-the-market as an Indicator of Housing Market Conditions
Using a Varying Coefficient Model,” The Journal of the Center for Real Estate Studies, Realtor®
University, 1:2, 2013
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with transaction volume, at the market level, the aggregated data may obscure any
influence of individual properties. Hence, when we consider the market as a whole,
individual factors are negligible.
2. Market Fundamentals
Many fundamental factors in the market, like Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
disposable income per capita and migration of the population from the countryside to
cities are all factors that could drive the housing prices up or down. However, almost all
studies of the Chinese housing market show that these fundamental factors do not fully
explain the quickly rising housing prices (Kuang, 2008 5; Wu et al., 2010 6; Lu, 2010 7).
This finding is consistent with a snap shot view of the data. Housing prices in China
have increased by 25.3% per year on the average in the first 16 years of the 21st century,
whereas the average growth rates of GDP and household disposable income were only
7.5% and 3.7%, respectively, during the same period 8.
3.Housing Policies in China
Housing policies include housing-related tax policies, land supply Policies, home
loan restriction Policies, and home purchase restriction policies. Studies have shown that
housing-related taxes, including contract tax, income tax, and value-added tax, property
tax all can play an important role in the fluctuation of housing prices (Poterba, 1991 9;
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Kuang, Z. (2008). “Does There Exist Bubble in China’s Housing Market?”, World Economy (Chinese),
Issue 12. 2008.
6
Wu, J., J. Gyourko, and Y. Deng (2012). “Evaluating Conditions in Major Chinese Housing Markets”,
Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3).
7
Lu J. (2010). “Measuring the Bubble in China’s Housing Market”. Economic Review. Issue 6, 2010.
8
China Statistical Yearbook. (2000–2010)
9
Poterba. J.M. (1991). House Price Dynamics: The Role of Tax Policy and Demography. Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, Vol. 22, Issue 2 pp. 143–183 and 200–203, (1991) Brookings Papers on Economic
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Harris, 2010 10; Harris, 2013 11). Land supply restriction policies may also drive housing
prices to go up. When land supply constraint policies are enacted, the land supply will be
reduced and the supply elasticity of the housing market will decrease. Glaeser, Gyourko,
and Saiz (2008) 12 show that cities with a low elasticity housing of supply have higher and
longer housing bubbles than cities with a high elasticity. Meanwhile, cities with a high
elasticity of housing supply have fewer and shorter housing bubbles than cities with low
elasticity. As to China, however, housing-related tax policies and land supply restriction
policies do not have significant influences on housing markets (Zheng and Zhang,
2013 13; Bai, Li and Quyang, 2014 14).
Unlike housing-related tax policies and land supply restriction policies, home loan
restriction policies and home purchase restriction policies play an important role in
housing markets. Xu and Chen (2012) 15 find that China’s home loan constraint policies
are one important factor behind the dynamics of housing markets. Sun et al. (2016) 16 find
that home purchase restrictions greatly influenced housing prices and housing transaction
volumes in Beijing, China. “Beijing’s HPR policy triggered a 17%–32% decrease in

Activity, no.n2, 1991 Fall, p143(61) (ISSN: 0007-2303)
10
Harris B. H. (2010). The Effect of Proposed Tax Reforms on Metropolitan Housing Prices. Washington,
DC: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Centre.
11
Harris B. H. (2013). Tax Reform, Transaction Costs, and Metropolitan Housing in the United States.
Washington, DC: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Centre.
12
Glaeser, E. L. and Gyourko, Joseph and Saiz, Albert,2008. Housing Supply and Housing Bubbles.
Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 198-217, September
13
Zheng H. and Zhang Q. (2013). Property Tax in China: Is It Effective in Curbing Housing Price?
Economics Bulletin. Volume: 33 (2013). Issue: 4. Pages: 2465–2474
14
Bai C., Q. Li, M. Ouyang (2014). Property Taxes and Home Prices: A Tale of Two Cities. Journal of
Econometrics Volume 180, Issue 1, May 2014, Pages 1–15.
15
Xu, X. and T. Chen (2012). The Effect of Monetary Policy on Real Estate Price Growth in China.
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal. Volume 20, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 62–77
16
Sun, Weizeng; Zheng, Siqi; Geltner, David; Wang, Rui (2016). “The Housing Market Effects of Local
Home Purchase Restrictions: Evidence from Beijing”. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics.
Volume 53, issue 3, 364-367
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resale price, a drop in the price-to-rent ratio of about a quarter of its mean value, and a
deep (50-75%) reduction in the transaction volume of the for-sale 17 market, with no
significant change in the rent or the transaction volume of rental units.”
The studies above shows that home loan and home purchase restriction policies have
significant influences in housing prices and transactions, so the termination of those
policies might be one important reason why housing prices increases so rapidly.
However, the significant influences on housing prices are only “true” in very short
period, long-term data on house prices in China indicates otherwise. Since 2005, the
Chinese government has been issuing various housing policies to slow down the rapid
increase of housing prices. Although these policies were effective within a short period
(3–12 months) after they were enacted, they did not significantly change the rapidly
increasing housing prices since 2000. In fact, housing prices have been increasing rapidly
in the whole period of 2005-2016, expect for very short period, such as Oct. 2007-May,
2008 and Mar. 2010-May. 2010. Therefore, it is not the termination of housing policies
that boosts the housing prices in China over the past 16 years. Thus, the question still
remains: What is the essential reason for rapidly increasing housing prices in China?
4. Rational Expectations and Psychological Factors
Muth (1961) 18 proposes the concept of “rational expectations.” Information is scarce,
and the market generally does not waste information. The pricing of a market based on
the expectations that everyone gets and acts on accurate market information is called
17

“For-sale market” here is used in this article (Sun et al., 2016) , which refers to the market where houses
are sold or bought. It is distinguished from the rental housing market, where houses are leased or rented.
18
Muth J. F. (1961) "Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements" reprinted in The New
Classical Macroeconomics. Volume 1. (1992): 3–23 (International Library of Critical Writings in
Economics, vol. 19. Aldershot, UK: Elgar.)
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rational expectation.
Lucas (1972) 19 develops this concept and contends that market participants will
utilize all available information to make predictions about the performance of the
investment. In the long run, investment decisions are always accurate or approximately
accurate, although bias and error can happen in the short run.
Rational expectation models have been popular in economics since the 1970s. Recent
studies still show that rational expectations can effectively explain some housing bubbles.
Granziera and Kozicki (2012) 20 demonstrate that a rational expectations asset pricing
model effectively describes and emulates the run-up in US house prices from 2000 to
2006. Gelain et al (2013) 21 investigate the behavior of the equilibrium price–rent ratio for
housing in a standard asset pricing model, which is shown to be capable of approximately
matching the price–rent ratio volatility if market agents are almost rational.
Although rational expectation models are widely accepted in economics, few
researchers in the real estate field believe that the models can sufficiently account for the
volatility of housing prices. Hamilton and Schwab (1985) 22 , Case and Shiller (1988,
1989) 23 , Mankiw and Weil (1989) 24 , Hosios and Pesando (1991) 25 , and Meese and

19

Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103–124, April.
20
Granziera, E. and S. Kozicki (2012). House price dynamics: Fundamentals and expectations, Journal of
Economic Dynamics & Control, v.60, 2015 Nov, p.152(14) (ISSN: 0165-1889)
21
Paolo Gelain, Kevin J. Lansing and Caterina Mendicino, 2013. "House Prices, Credit Growth, and
Excess Volatility: Implications for Monetary and Macroprudential Policy," International Journal of Central
Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 9(2), pages 219–276, June.
22
Hamilton, B. W. and R. Schwab1985. "Expected Appreciation in Urban Housing Markets" Journal of
Urban Economics, Volume 18, Issue 1, July 1985, Pages 103–118
23
Karl E. Case & Robert J. Shiller, 1988. "The behavior of home buyers in boom and post-boom markets,"
New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Nov, pages 29-46.
Case, Karl E & Shiller, Robert J, 1989. "The Efficiency of the Market for Single-Family Homes," American
Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), 125-137, March
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Wallace (1994) 26 report that housing price movements are often positively self-correlated
over a considerably long period. Hence, investors often make expectations based on a
previous price movement and do not make decisions based on all available information.
Investors do not always make rational expectations even in the long term. They conclude
that irrational expectations and psychological factors can significantly influence housing
price dynamics.
Clayton (1996) 27 asserts and tests an asset-based housing price model that explicitly
incorporates the hypothesis of rational house price expectations. The model fails to fully
capture observed house price dynamics. Granziera and Kozicki (2012) 28 also recognize
that their rational models cannot emulate the sharp decrease or increase unless “limitedrational expectation” (e.g., backward-looking expectations (adaptive expectations) and
extrapolative-type expectations) are integrated into those models.
Numerous scholars integrated irrational expectations in their theoretical or empirical
models. Huh and Lansing (2000) 29 illustrate a model with backward-looking expectations
that explains the fluctuation of housing prices to some extent. Evans and Ramey (2006) 30,

24

Mankiw, N. Gregory and Weil, David N. 1989. “The Baby Boom, the Baby Bust, and the Housing
Market”, Regional Science and Urban Economics 19, 235–258.
25
Hosios, A. J and J. E Pesando. 1991. “Measuring Prices in Resale Housing Markets in Canada: Evidence
and Implications”. Journal of Housing Economics 1: 303–317.
26
Meese, R., and N. Wallace. 1994. “Testing the Present Value Relation for Housing Prices: Should I Leave
My House in San Francisco?” Journal of Urban Economics 35, pp. 245–266.
27
Jim Clayton(1996).Rational Expectations, Market Fundamentals and Housing Price Volatility. Real
Estate Economics, Vol. 24 No. 4 Winter 1996
28
Granziera, E. and S. Kozicki(2012). House price dynamics: Fundamentals and expectations, Journal of
Economic Dynamics & Control, v.60, 2015 Nov, p.152(14) (ISSN: 0165-1889)
29
Huh, C.G. and K.J. Lansing (2000). Expectations, credibility and disinflation in a small macroeconomic
model, Journal of Economics and Business 52, 51–86.
30
Evans, G.W. and G. Ramey( 2006). Adaptive expectations, underparameterization, and the Lucas
critique, Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 249–264.
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Lansing (2006, 2009) 31, and Huang et al. (2009) 32 also incorporate adaptive expectations
into their empirical models. The researchers find that this model can describe the price
dynamics in the housing market for specific time intervals.
Rational and irrational models can explain quickly rising housing prices for some
time intervals but they cannot explain them in the long run. Moreover, both models share
the assumption that investors can borrow money without limitation, which holds only for
partial equilibrium analysis. When the entire market is considered, the money available
for investment, which comes from the total savings of an economy, is always limited and
scarce. As the difference between Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross Domestic
Consumption (GDC), Gross Domestic Savings (GDS) are always limited and scarce.
Hence, at the market level, the expectation that housing prices will increase in the
future will not necessarily lead to an actual increase in housing prices unless the money
available for investment is sufficient. Hence, neither rational nor irrational expectations
alone can result in increasing housing prices without sufficient capital. The following
question should be asked: Where does the substantial capital (investment fund) come
from?
1.3.2 How Can Housing Prices Increase very Rapidly When the Housing Rent is
very Low?
Although the various studies aforementioned do not perfectly explain the reason for

31

Lansing K.J. (2006). Lock-in of extrapolative expectations in an asset pricing model, Macroeconomic
Dynamics 10, 317–348.
Lansing, K.J. (2009). Time-varying U.S. inflation dynamics and the New Keynesian Phillips curve, Review
of Economic Dynamics 12, 304–326.
32
Huang, K., Z. Liu, and T. Zha (2009). Learning, adaptive expectations, and technology shocks, Economic
Journal 119, 377–405.
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the quickly rising housing prices, they do provide very reasonable explanations.
However, they fail to answer one question: How can housing prices continue to increase
rapidly when housing rents are low?
Irrational expectations may explain this issue by assuming that the anomaly only
occurs because people are irrational or have bias and errors. However, high house prices
and low rent have coexisted in China for the past 16 years. Investors are unlikely to have
holding bias or errors for 16 years because irrational behaviors can only occur in the short
or middle run. As a result, investors must have rational reasons to continuously buy
vacant houses. The following conclusions can be drawn based on their behaviors.
First, investors appear to continuously purchase vacant but expensive houses
because they believe they can make higher returns by investing money on these houses
than on other assets. Given the low rent, the investors must be anticipating considerable
profits from the sale. In other words, investors can profit by investing money on vacant
houses because they expect housing prices to increase. Hence, we return to the original
question: Why would investors believe that housing prices will increase when the
housing rent is low?
A second reason why investors are able to purchase vacant but expensive houses is
because they can afford them. That is, they have cash. Such a fact cannot be neglected:
not only some specific type of houses, but also almost all types of houses have been
experiencing quickly rising-up prices; not only in some specific areas, but almost all
areas on mainland China have been experiencing rapidly increasing housing prices. In
other words, not only some specific individuals, but also almost all the individuals in this
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whole society love buying vacant and expensive houses. It can be concluded that this
society has enough money to afford houses.
The answer to the research question is twofold: 1) capital is substantial, or, sufficient
for many vacant but expensive houses to be purchased. And, 2) capital can make higher
returns by being invested in houses than other alternative assets, even though the housing
rent is low and the vacancy rate is high.
However, other questions are now raised. First, why is capital substantial, or why is
investment so high? Second, how can capital make higher returns from houses than other
investments, even when there are so many vacant houses and the rent is so low?
1.3.3 Why Is the Capital/Investment Money So High?
Based on macroeconomic fundamentals (e.g. Samuelson and Nordhaus(2009) 33 ),
aggregate product (AP) produced by a country at a specific period is always equal to the
aggregate income (AI) in this specific period because each product must be distributed to
someone as income, that is,
AP=AI

(1.1).

Aggregate product (AP) produced by a country at a specific period is called Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), and aggregate income (AI) in this specific period is called
gross domestic income (GDI). So (1.1) can be replaced by:
GDP=GDI

(1.2).

On one hand, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) can be used either for consumption
goods or for investment goods, no other choices than there is no remainder. This means,

33

Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus, Economics (19th Edition). McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2009
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GDP=C+I

(1.3)

where C stands for aggregate consumption and I refers to aggregate investment.
On the other hand, Gross Domestic Income will be used for consumption or will be
saved. This means,
GDI=C+S

(1.4)

Where S stands for aggregate savings.
Substituting (1.3) and (1.4) into (1.2) gives,
C+I=C+S

(1.5)

This gives,
I=S

(1.6)

Equation (1.6) implies that aggregate investment is equal to aggregate savings.
Therefore, if investment is substantially high, then aggregate savings must also be
substantially high.
The reason why investment is so high is because savings is very high. A new
question emerges at once: why is savings so high? This is the first key question for this
study (Question 1).
1.3.4 Why Can Capital Make More Profit from Houses than Other Assets When the
Housing Rent is Low?
High savings is not necessarily “good news” for an economy. High savings could
boost economic growth if it is put into the production processes, namely, being spent on
production factors (land, capital and labor). However, it will retard economic growth if it
is invested in speculative assets.
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China has one of the highest savings rates in the world. Over the last 16 years, many
companies have been suffering from a very weak consumption market, and thus their
profitability has been decreasing rapidly. As a result, many companies went into
bankruptcy. In sharp contrast, asset markets (such as the housing market) have been
experiencing significant growth and substantial returns. To sum up, high savings has
contributed less and less to the Chinese overall economy because it has not been spent on
production factors but it has been invested in speculative assets.
In order to show the relationship between production factors and speculative assets,
two concepts, “real assets” and “virtual assets”, are introduced. This is important because
these asset prices are related to whether or not the high savings can support the economic
growth. Real assets are production factors and virtual assets are speculative assets. Why
are real assets and virtual assets introduced in place of production factors and speculative
assets? The answer is that it is much easier to uncover the relationship between real
assets and virtual assets, but it is very hard to find the relationship between production
factors and speculative assets.
Real assets are the production factors used in the production process, including land,
factories, machines, facilities, and raw materials. As an extension of “real assets,” assets
used for household consumption, such as cars and houses, are also real assets. Although
buyers cannot earn profits from these assets, they can obtain consumption utility from
them and thus save substantial living expenses. For example, owner-occupied housing
allows the owner to save home rent expenses and car owners can save on other
transportation costs. In economics, expenses saved are equivalent to profits earned. Thus,
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an asset used for household consumption implies profits or returns to the owner in the
future. Thus, it is also considered a real asset in this analysis. Therefore, in this
dissertation, real assets refer to the production factors.
Virtual assets are rights to claim returns in the future and include stocks, bonds,
funds, and shares. These assets are not necessarily connected with the production or
consumption process. In other words, as rights to claim returns, benefits, or yields in the
future, they are not production factors or consumption goods. For example, a small
shareholder of Apple Inc. has the right to claim the dividend from Apple Inc., but he/she
cannot use or operate the machines and other facilities in an Apple factory.
Houses are real assets when they are bought for consumption or production. Houses
are virtual assets when they are bought as an investment in order to receive returns in the
future. In a similar manner, asset markets can be divided into two market, real asset
market and virtual asset market.
Real asset investors make profit by producing and selling products. Virtual asset
investors make money from holding period returns (rents, dividends, interest) and capital
gains (the difference between buying and reselling those assets). In other words, virtual
assets are return-oriented capital, but real assets are profit-oriented capital.
If there are no bubbles in the asset markets, namely, the asset prices can always
reflect market fundamentals, the return from virtual assets will be very close to the profit
from real assets. An investor has two ways to invest. In other words, an investor makes
almost the same profits no matter whether he buys the production factors and then creates
a new company, or purchases the stock of this company after other people create it.
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However, the asset prices do not always reflect market fundamentals. In this case,
the return from virtual assets will be different from the profit from real assets. The prices
of real assets are always connected to the profit from them in the future, but the prices of
real assets can deviate very far from its income returns (dividend, rent, or interest). Profit
is the only return for real assets, but income return and the appreciation or capital gain
when the asset is sold are both returns for the virtual assets. When the holding-period
return is very low, the price of virtual assets can be very high as long as the capital gain is
very big. This is the unique feature belonging to virtual assets.
As to houses, when the rent is very low, housing prices can be very high if investors
expect the appreciation or capital gains from houses to be very big in the future. Why can
capital make more profit from houses than from other assets although the housing rent is
low? The answer is as follows: the houses can bring the investors very high capital gains
but other assets cannot.
Capital gain is the difference between the current purchase price and the future resale
price. Large capital gains for houses mean that future resale prices are much higher than
the current purchase prices. In other words, large expected capital gains mean that
housing prices are expected to increase rapidly. What makes housing prices increase
rapidly? First, there is sufficient money available for investment. This is because, as said
before, the savings rate is very high. Second, investors “love” houses so they invest a lot
of money into the housing market. In other words, investors prefer houses to other virtual
assets due to the high expected capital gains. That is, the high savings of the Chinese are
invested into the housing markets and housing prices increase despite low rent.
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Two new questions emerge. Why can’t the real assets bring investors high profits
and then attract the savings? Why don’t the prices of other assets than houses increase
rapidly and bring investors high capital gains, and then attract savings to pour in? In other
words, first, why do investors prefer virtual assets to real assets? Second, why do
investors prefer houses to other virtual assets?
Currently, one possible answer for the first question is that the virtual assets are more
profitable than real assets for some reason. One possible answer for the second question
is that the houses have some unique features that make investors believe that houses will
continue to appreciate.

1.4 Research questions
Now we put the questions discussed above together.
Quesion1: Why are aggregate savings high? This key question will be the focus of
subsequent discussions.
High aggregate savings will not necessarily lead to asset bubbles if high aggregate
savings can come into the real asset market as a productive investment. Thus, we must
also ask: why are high aggregate savings invested in the virtual asset market rather
than the real asset market? This key question will also be answered.
Finally, various types of assets exist in a virtual asset market, such as bonds, stocks,
mutual or hedge funds, houses, and so on. Why do high aggregate savings prefer
houses to other virtual assets in a virtual asset market and potentially causing
housing bubbles? This key question will be discussed.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Consumption and Savings
2.1.1 Neoclassical Economics: Interest Rate Determines Savings and Consumption
In the neoclassical economics framework (Marshall, 1890 34 ; Fisher, 1930 35 ), the
interest rate can adjust capital supply (CS) and capital demand (CD), as well as savings
and consumption.
i
CS
i1
i0

Q
QD1 Q0

QS1

Figure 2.1: Capital Demand and Capital Supply

Figure 2.1 shows that CS exhibits an upward curve, whereas CD is a downward one.
Because CS comes from savings, the capital suppliers or lenders, households must reduce
their consumption to supply the capital given their income. The negative utility of the
capital lenders increases when consumption is reduced. Lenders will ask for a high
34

Marshal A (1890). Principles of Economics (Palgrave Classics in Economics). Palgrave Macmillan; 8th
edition (January 7, 2014)
35
Fisher R. (1930). The Theory of Interest: As Determined by Impatience to Spend Income and
Opportunity to Invest It. Porcupine Press (June 1930).
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interest rate to compensate for their utility loss, which causes the interest rates to
increase. Hence, the CS curve shifts upward. Meanwhile, CD is determined by the
marginal returns of capital. When capital increases, marginal returns of capital will
decrease. Hence, the CD curve goes downwards.
The intersection point of CD and CS (E) is the equilibrium point, where the marginal
return to capital borrowers is equal to the marginal negative utility of capital lenders. In a
similar manner, Q and i are called equilibrium capital quantity and equilibrium capital
price (interest rate), respectively.
What if a distraction from equilibrium occurs, such as when interest rate is currently
at i 1 ? In this case, the current interest rate is higher than the equilibrium interest rate.
Thus, capital supply will increase while capital demand will decrease. Capital is
oversupplied, then the interest rate will drop. Eventually, the interest rate will return to
the equilibrium interest rate i 0 .

i
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ET

CS
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Q
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Figure 2.2: Interest rates and transaction adjustment caused by higher capital demand

If some event, such as strong economic growth, causes investments to be profitable,
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the investment demand for capital will increase and CD will moves to CD N . Capital
supply cannot increase immediately, then the interest rates will increase from the
previous i 0 to i 1 , and the equilibrium will rise from E to E T . When the interest rates
increase, households will reduce their consumption to increase savings, which increases
capital supply. Along with increasing capital supply, the interest rates will decrease
gradually and finally arrive in i 2 , and the equilibrium will drop from E T to E s . In this new
equilibrium, the interest rate and capital quantity are higher than before, as shown in
Figure 2.2. This new equilibrium also means that households save more and consume less
than before because the capital supply is more than before.
To sum up, neo-classical economics holds that interest rate determines household
saving rate and consumption rate. When interest rate goes up, households will save more
and consume less, which means a high saving rate and a low consumption rate.
2.1.2 Keynesian Economics: A Psychological Law (Marginal Propensity to
Consume) Determines Consumption and Savings
However, Keynes (1936) 36 goes in a different direction by considering an important
concept, Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC). MPC refers to how much a household
will consume with $1 added to its income (marginal income). For example, if one
household’s income increases by $100 and this household’s consumption rises by $70,
then the MPC of this family is 0.7.
By this concept, if MPC=0.9, 90% of any increase in the current income will
translate to an immediate increase in consumption. But why does this happen? Namely,
36

Keynes J.M. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest, And Money. Create Space
Independent Publishing Platform (November 15, 2011)
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why does a household always spend 90% of any increase in the current income on
consumption? Keynes attributes it to human being’s psychological structure, that is, a
psychological law. Precisely, it is because of such a psychological law that the household
always spends 90% of any increase in the current income on consumption.
So Keynes argues that it is MPC, not the interest rate that determines the savings and
consumption. The proportion of increased income spent on consumption, represented by
c, is called the MPC. Therefore, (1-c) is called Marginal Propensity to Save (MPS). In
Keynes’s theory, when a person makes decisions between consumption and savings, he
does not consider the interest rate but merely follows the MPC, a psychological law.
2.1.3 Life-cycle Hypothesis (LCH) and Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH): Lifecycle Income or Permanent Income Determines Consumption and Savings
Keynes’ argument about MPC is not convincing for many economists. Then they
subsequently investigated the factors that determine consumption and savings. They
generally draw upon a common theoretical framework by assuming that consumers base
their expenditures on a rational and informed assessment of current and future economic
circumstances. The rational optimization framework provides two main approaches.
Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) 37 posit the Life-cycle Hypothesis and propose that the
spending decisions of households are driven by household members’ assessments of
expenditure needs and income throughout the remainder of their lives. In this approach,
household members consider predictable events, such as a precipitous drop in income

37
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upon retirement. The standard version of the life-cycle model assumes that consumers
prefer to spend all their resources before they die (i.e., a bequest motive is not expected).
Life-cycle hypothesis are most commonly employed by micro-economists to model
household-level data on consumption, income, or wealth.
Macroeconomists tend to use a simplified version of the optimization framework
called the Permanent Income Hypothesis, whose origins can be traced back to Friedman
(1957) 38. The permanent income hypothesis omits the detailed treatment of demographics
and retirement included in the life-cycle model. Instead, it focuses on the aspects that are
essential in macroeconomic analysis, including predictions about the nature of the
consumption function, which relates consumer spending to factors such as income,
wealth, and interest rates, among others.
Both models focus on individuals and their life span, specifically, the factors that
determine their consumption and savings throughout their lives. Modigliani states that an
increase in the total life income of an individual will raise consumption in each period,
while Friedman states that the increase of permanent income elevates consumption.
LCH and PIH are much more convincing that Keynesian MPC theory because they
base their arguments on the individual’s rational, NOT psychological, consumption
decision. Therefore, LCH and PIH are widely employed to model household
consumption behavior.

However, neither LCH nor PIH has ever considered such

question: at a point when people with different income levels have very stable
expectations about their life-cycle income or permanent, will they have the same

38

Friedman M.(1957). Theory of the Consumption Function. Princeton University Press (August 17, 2008).
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propensity to consume? In fact, LCH and PIH both assume the propensity to consume is
homogeneous for households at different income level. But the economic data will show
it is not the fact.

2.2 Savings, Investments and Product
2.2.1 Production Function in Neoclassical Economics: More Savings can Bring out
More Products
Will More Savings can Bring out More Products? Neoclassical economics maintain
the truth in this statement. First, effect capital market will adjust the capital supply
(household savings) to be equal to capital demand (Firm investment), then more savings
can always lead to more investments. Second, more investments, including capital and
labor, can always bring out more products because the partial derivative of products (P)
with respect to capital(K) or labor (L) is positive.
The production function 39 in neoclassical economics is:
P = f ( K , L)

∂P
∂P
>0
>0
∂L
∂K

(2.5)

where P is products, K is capital (includes land), L is labor, and f is the production
function that can also be affected by the technological level.
∂P
∂P
> 0 and
> 0 imply that products are positively correlated with capital and
∂K
∂L

labor. Thus, more savings will result in more products through more investments.
Increased savings will lead to high production by neoclassical production function.
However, it is not always true because the production will not always continue to
39

Samuelson P. and W. Nordhaus (2009). Economics (19th Edition). McGraw-Hill/Irwin

23

increase when savings keep rising. Along with increasing savings, the marginal return
decreases although the total returns increase. After some time, the decreasing marginal
return will finally cause the total return to decrease. This phenomenon is called the “Law
of Diminishing Marginal Returns.” 40
2.2.2 Solow Growth Model:

More Savings does not Necessarily Lead to More

Products due to the Existence of Optimal Savings Rate
Solow (1956, 1957)

41

and Swan (1956) 42 show the existence of an optimal savings

rate. On one hand, when capital stock K increases, output f(k) rises at a diminishing rate.
As a proportion(s) of output, savings sf(k) will also increase at a diminishing rate. On the
other hand, when capital stock K increases, investment depreciation δk , as a proportion of
capital stock K(t), will also increase. The relationship between δk and sf(k) will bring
about three outcomes.
When δk > sf (k ) , capital stock will reduce because the newly added capital is less
than the lost capital.
When δk < sf (k ) , capital stock will increase because the newly added capital is
more than the capital loss because of depreciation.
When δk = sf (k ) ，the capital stock will be stable because the newly added capital
40

See Footnote 42.
This model was introduces developed in the following several papers.
Solow R.M.(1956). A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 70, No. 1. pp. 65–94 Solow, Robert M. (1957). "Technical change and the aggregate
production function". Review of Economics and Statistics. The MIT Press. 39 (3): 312–320.
Swan, Trevor W. (November 1956). "Economic growth and capital accumulation". Economic Record.
Wiley. 32 (2): 334–361.
Solow, Robert M. (1957). "Technical change and the aggregate production function". Review of
Economics and Statistics. The MIT Press. 39 (3): 312–320.
42
Swan, Trevor W. (November 1956). "Economic growth and capital accumulation". Economic Record.
Wiley. 32 (2): 334–361
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is equal to the capital loss due to depreciation
The aggregate consumption should be maximized in order to realize the maximal
welfare. That is,

Max{ f (k ) − sf (k )}

(2.6)

Sustainable capital stock sf (k ) is always equal to δf (k ) . Thus, the problem above
becomes:

Max{ f (k ) − δk}

(2.7)

Its first-order condition is:

δf ( L)
=δ
δk

(2.8)

Let k ∗ be solution of this equation, k ∗ be the optimal capital stock, f (k ∗ ) be the
optimal Output, sf (k ∗ ) be the optimal savings, and s is the optimal savings rate.
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Figure 2.3: Solow-Swan Growth Model
where

k (t )

Capital stock,

S,

savings rate,

δ

Depreciation rate,

f (k ∗ )

Optimal output,

f(k(t))

output,

sf(k(t))

savings (investments),

k∗

Optimal capital stock, and

sf (k ∗ )

Optimal savings (investments).

Sources: Acemoglu, Daron (2009). "The Solow Growth Model". Introduction to
Modern Economic Growth. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 26–76.
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The Solow–Swan growth model (Figure 2.3) shows that an optimal savings rate
exists. If an economy’s savings rate is higher than this optimal level, the output will also
be high. However, the output increases slower than the investments and the aggregate
consumption of the economy will drop. This economy does not maximize aggregate
consumption, which is supposed to be the welfare target of the economy.
Furthermore, when the savings rate is too high, substantial social resources will be
wasted because a high savings rate means high investments or excessive input of land,
raw materials, machine and facilities, and labor. Due to the very low output or zero
output, all those social resources are wasted.
2.2.3 The Consequences of Overly-high Savings Rate
The analysis can be extended further. Aside from all the consequences above, an
overly-high savings rate gives rise to other consequences for the entire economy both at
the micro- and macro-levels. When the savings rate is high, the consumption rate is low
and the money available for consumption funds will be less. Therefore, the demand for
commodities will weaken and a high savings rate will lead to high profits in the asset
markets because the demand for the assets is strong. Meanwhile, a high savings rate will
result in low profits in the consumption market because the demand for consumption
becomes weaker and weaker. Consequently, the asset markets will be increasingly
prosperous while the consumption markets will become more and more recessive. Since
the demand for production factors (machine, facilities, raw materials, factories) are driven
by the demand for consumption goods, the production factor markets will also be
recessive.

In other words, the virtual economy (the virtual asset market) will be
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prosperous, but the real economy (the consumption market plus the asset market) will be
recessive.
Prosperous asset markets and recessive consumption markets will bring out further
consequences. First, through time, firms in the consumption market will not be interested
in the products they specialize in as they transfer their money to the housing market. The
asset market will become more prosperous while consumption markets become more
recessive. Second, the core competency of a country lies in its manufacturing, hightechnology, and other modern service industries, all of which can be considered
fundamental industries. If the fundamental industries grow weaker in time, the core
competency of the country will considerably falter.
As stated before, an economy is divided into the asset market and the consumption
market. The former includes monetary, exchange, financial derivative markets, and
mutual and hedge funds, among others. The latter includes all the markets of various
types of products and the services that different industries, such as manufacturing, hightechnology, entertainment, and medical industries, provide for people’s consumption or
other firms’ production.
Theoretically, asset markets are supposed to be channels through which firms
(including project initiators) can borrow money to finance their projects. For example,
firms can borrow money from the stock market. When a considerable amount of money
pours into an overly-heated asset market, will the money finally go to firms that produce
products or provide services for society in the consumption market? If so, an overlyheated asset market is not entirely a negative phenomenon because substantial capital can
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be brought into the consumption market.
However, this situation does not occur in actual settings. A high savings rate means a
low consumption rate, so the high demand for assets is always accompanied by the low
demand for consumption goods. High demand for assets will lead to high profit in the
asset market, while low demand for consumption goods will result in low profit in
consumption market and the production factor market. So the money placed into the
consumption market or production can only earn low profits and even suffer losses.
Consequently, investors become unwilling to invest their money into the real assets in the
consumption markets and production factor market.
Furthermore, they are reluctant to buy any virtual assets whose returns closely
depend on the operating performance of the companies in the consumption markets or the
production markets. For example, they would shy away from buying the stock of a
manufacturing company. First, the dividend from this company will not be considerable
due to the poor performance of this company. Second, the stock price of this company
cannot increase in the long run for the same reason, which means the capital gains from
an investment in this company would not be considerable, either. So, the overall return
from the stock of this company will low. The virtual assets, whose returns depend on the
operational performance in the consumption market or the production factor market, can
be called “normal assets” because those assets are consistent with popular economic
theories.
What types of assets do investors prefer over “normal assets”? The answer is they
prefer “abnormal” assets, or those whose returns primarily come from appreciation (buy–
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sell–price difference or capital gains) and not from regular dividends. “Abnormal” assets
have limited correlations to a firm’s performance in the consumption market. In this
research, we will call this type of asset a “virtual” or speculative asset. When a
prosperous asset market coexists with a recessive consumption market we propose
investors will choose speculative assets, which means that investment funds (or savings)
will not go into real economies or the industries in consumption markets but will be
invested into other assets that are speculative.

2.3 Income Inequality and Aggregate Savings
The basic argument in this study is that income inequality will affect asset prices
through aggregate saving rate, so the studies about the relationship between income
inequality and aggregate savings be reviewed.
2.3.1 Income Level and Household’s Savings Rate
Venieris and Gupta (1986) 43 find that poorer households have the lowest savings
propensities from aggregate data for 49 countries. Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2004) 44
employ new empirical methods applied to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the
Survey of Consumer Finances, and the Consumer Expenditure Survey in the US. They
find a strong positive relationship between savings rates and lifetime income and a
weaker but still positive relationship between the marginal propensity to save and lifetime
income. Those studies show that the families with high lifetime income will save more
than the families with low lifetime income.
43

Venieris and Gupta (1986). Income distribution and sociopolitical instability as determinants of savings:
a cross-sectional model. Journal of Political Economy 94, 873–883
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Dynan, Skinner, Zeldes (2004). Do the Rich Save More? Journal of Political Economy, 2004, vol. 112,
no.2
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Gan（2013） 45 conducts a survey in 2011 with a sample of 8,438 households and
29.450 individuals. This study reports that Savings rates across income levels differ. The
Top5 percent income households (the highest income level group) have an average
savings rate of 73.5 percent in 2010, which is the highest saving rate among all the
income-level groups. In fact, about 45 percent of households saved nothing in 2010. This
study based on China’s data draw similar conclusion that high income level household
saves more than low income level households.
The findings in the above studies are significant. They show that the relationship
between savings and income of the households at different income levels at the same
point in time, and they show that households at different income levels have different
propensities to consume. Results from these studies are in contrast to the assumptions in
the Keynesian’s MPC theory, LCH and PIH, where households are assumed to have the
same propensity to consume at different income levels. However, the researchers do not
provide a convincing explanation for this phenomenon.
2.3.2 The Relationship between the Income Level and the Aggregate Savings Rate
1. Significantly Positive Relationship
Brady and Friedman (1947) 46 argue that the percentage of income saved at each
income level turns out to be closely related to the income distribution throughout the data
from all the recent sample surveys. They conclude that “In general, the smaller the
percentage of families in the higher income brackets, the greater the percentage of
45

Li Gan. Income Inequality and Consumptions in China.
https://international.uiowa.edu/sites/international.uiowa.edu/files/file_uploads/incomeinequalityinchina.pdf
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in Income and Wealth, pages 247-265 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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income saved.”(p248) The smaller percentage of families in the higher income brackets
indicated more severe income inequality, so this study shows that the more equal the
income distribution, the greater the aggregate savings rate.
Based on data on 65 industrial and developing countries for the year 1975, Sohota
(1993) 47

finds a positive relation between the aggregate savings rate and the Gini

coefficient. 48 Cook (1995) 49 uses several inequality measures and tests the relationships
of these measures to the savings rate (GDS/GDP) in the 1970’s in 49 less developed
countries. He reports that inequality has a positive and significant impact on the savings
rate.
Bunting(1991) 50 uses 1984 Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CES) data with 9,401
households to estimates marginal propensities and shows that the propensity to save
increases when the quintile income share of highest income groups increases. He
concludes, “Aggregate savings statistics do not accurately measure household savings
behavior. They implicitly reflect the distribution of income and largely describe the
economic behavior of the highest income groups”.(p157) The increasing quintile share of
income indicates more higher saving rate.
Smith (2001) 51 conducts a cross-sectional and panel regression and shows that
47

Sahota, G., 1993. Savings and distribution. In: Gapinski, J.H. Ed.., The Economics of Savings.
KluwerAcademic Publishers, Boston.
48
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income inequality has a robust, positive effect on private savings rates that depends on
financial market development and the quality of credit available to the private sector. In
other words, credit market imperfections are the likely reason for the income inequality
and the private savings positive correlation.
Li and Zou (2004) 52 employ a panel data of 49 industrial and developing
countries to examine the relationship between savings and income inequality. Their
empirical examination renders weak support for a very weak negative association
between them. But, subsamples of OECD countries and Asian countries show that
income inequality and the savings rate can be very

positively and significantly

associated.
Scheuermeyer and Bofinger (2014) 53 provide a new understanding about the
relationship between savings rates and income inequality. Using panel data from 21
developed economies from 1970-2007, the authors show that while the marginal impact
of income inequality is positive at low levels of inequality, the relationship becomes
negative after some point of time. This study argues that the positive relationship between
income inequality and aggregate savings might only exist in some specific time interval.
2. Insignificant Relationship
There are also studies showing that the relationship between income inequality
and aggregate savings is uncertain. Schmit-Hebbel and Serven (2000) 54 provide no

Private Savings Rates. Journal of Development Economics. Vol. 64 2001. 103–127
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support for the notion that income inequality has any systematic effect on aggregate
savings. Della Valle and Oguchi (1976) 55 and Musgrove (1980) 56 find that the effect of
income distribution on savings is not statistically significant using a cross country
dataset. Edwards (1996) 57 reaches similar conclusions from a panel data of developing
countries and OECD countries for the years 1970-1992. Using the data from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey, Kruger and Perri (2006) 58 contend that the increase in
income inequality in the United States has not been accompanied by a corresponding rise
in consumption inequality. In their opinion, this means the relationship between income
inequality and aggregate consumption is insignificant. But their explanation for a
negative relationship is not clear. Why is the relationship insignificant? Preliminary test
shows there might be problems with the selection of control variables.
Although some studies show that the relationship between income inequality and
saving rate is insignificant, most studies above shows that the positive impacts of income
inequality on the aggregate savings rate exist. However, those studies do not give a
reasonable explanation for this positive relation.

of Development Economics. Vol. 61. 417–446. They have drawn those conclusion in 1996, see Klaus
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2.4 Income Inequality, Asset Prices and Economic Growth
After the studies on the relationship between income inequality and saving rate
are reviewed, the next is to review the studies and income inequality and asset prices. As
an extension of this sector, the studies between income inequality and economic growth
are reviewed.
2.4.1 Income Inequality and Asset Prices
1. Positive Relationship
Zhang (2013) 59 builds a model based on the hypothesis that a market with high
income inequality will imply that only the top small percentage of the population (the
1%) can buy stocks. This underpins the ability of investors to hedge risks. The trading
illiquidity of the securities then increases the risk of making a stock investment and will
also increase the return. Zhang measures the stock market aggregate performance using
the market average Price/Dividend (P/D) ratio and predicts that the rate of return on
stocks in a highly unequal society would be higher due to a lower rate of market
participation. This research was based on panel data from 154 countries from 1950 to
2008. Zhang found that a rise in the Gini coefficient of 0.01 is associated with up to a 2%
lower stock price/dividend ratio. This finding suggests that an increase in income
inequality increases the rate of return in the stock market due to a lower overall price
level. The author also shows that the risk-free rate of a country is positively related to the
income inequality variable. Each additional unit of income inequality is accompanied by
a 0.18% increase in the risk-free rate.
59

Zhang, Yilin, Income Inequality and Asset Prices: A Cross-Country Study (August 1, 2013). Available at
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Nguyen (2013) 60 measures income inequality by the share of national income
going to the wealthiest 10% of the nation in the U.S.. He tests the relationship between
income inequality and stock market returns in the U.S. from 1927 to 2012. By utilizing
the Fama-French three factor model, 61 he obtains the inequality beta coefficient and the
inequality risk premium. He finds that the income inequality factor is correlated with the
rate of market participation which in turn increases returns on the stock market.
2. Uncertain Relationship
Johnson (2012) 62 argues that the relationship between income inequality and asset
prices can be either positive, negative or zero. According to his model, the asset (A1) that
the rich prefer is different from asset (A2) that the poor prefer. The increase in the price
of A1 will bring about higher income inequality and an increase in the price of A2 will
lead to a lower income inequality.
3. Negative Relationship
Määttänena and Terviöc (2014) 63 build an assignment model to investigate the
relationship between the distributions of income and house. In this model, households are
heterogeneous by incomes and houses by quality. Each household is potentially both a
60

Nguyen (2013). Income Inequality and Stock Pricing in The U.S. Market. LAP LAMBERT Academic
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61
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buyer and a seller because everyone owns one house and wishes to live in one house.
This model tries to show how the impact of more severe income inequality on housing
prices depends on the shapes of the distributions. The empirical study shows that income
inequality between 1998 and 2007 is negatively correlated with average house prices in
six US metropolitan areas.
Although some studies draw a different conclusion, like Johnson (2012) and
Määttänena and Terviöc(2014), most studies show that the income inequality has positive
influences on asset prices. But Johnson(2012) shows that the relationship is not clear.
2.4.2 Income Inequality and Economic Growth
Treeck and Sturn (2012) 64 try to find the relationship between income equality
and the Great Recession. They discuss the macroeconomic effects of income distribution
in China and Germany. In their opinion, both China and Germany experienced
pronounced declines in the share of wages and household income in national income,
strong increases in income inequality, rising savings rates, weak private consumption
demand and strong improvements in the current account before the Great Recession. In
other words, severe income inequality, high savings rates and weak consumption are all
positively correlated. Furthermore, all the conditions are a signal for an economic
recession. They finally conclude that reducing income inequality is of great importance to
overcoming macroeconomic instabilities.
Goda and Lysandrou (2014) 65 investigated the relationship between income
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inequality and crisis by comparing Marxian, Post Keynesian and Mainstream Crisis
Theories. Marxist theory focuses on overproduction. Capitalists try to make the most
profit by producing more and paying the workers less. Accumulating output will finally
become “product excess” due to the declining demand resulting from the wage reduction,
thus the economic crisis will emerge.
Conclusions in the two studies above are very insightful, thus are highly valued
by this study. Both of them points out that severe income inequality will result in weak
consumption while leading to high savings, as a result, severe income inequality, high
savings rates and weak consumption are all positively correlated. However, those studies
have not given an explanation why this phenomenon can happen.

2.5 Real Estate Asset Market and Real Estate Consumption
Market
Is the housing market an asset or a consumption market? DiPasquale and Wheaton
(1992) 66 argue that the real estate market is a consumption market when properties are
rented. It is an asset market when properties are bought or sold. These two markets are
closely connected. Their interactions can be described in one model.
1) The demand for space and the stock of real estate R determine the rent R. Hence,
rent is determined in a real estate consumption market, R = f (S ) (Quadrant I).
2) Rent R and discount rate i in a real estate asset market determine the real estate price

quantitative estimation. Cambridge Journal of Economics 38(2):301-327 • March 2014
66
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P. Hence, price is determined in the real estate asset market, P =

R
(Quadrant II).
i

3) Given the construction supply functions, real estate price P determines new
construction C, C = g (P) (Quadrant III).
4) New construction C and the depreciation rate determine the stock of real estate,
which can be stable only if the newly developed real estate C is equal to the depreciation
( δS , where δ is the depreciation rate) of the real estate stock. As δS = C , we then have

S=

C

δ

(Quadrant IV).

The relationship above is shown in Figure 2.4.
Rent: R

Space Market

Asset Market

II

I

Stock: S

Price: P

III

IV

New Construction: C

δ: Depreciation Rate

Figure 2.4: DiPasquale-Wheaton Four-Quadrant Model of Real Estate Market

The four-quadrant model is an insightful model in real estate because it uncovers the
basic operating mechanisms of real estate markets. This model combines the real estate
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consumption market with the real estate asset market in the history of real estate studies.
This model also has some limitations because of its strict assumptions. For example,
the rent and discount rate determine the prices in commercial property. However, this
condition does not apply for houses. Rent reflects all the utility users receive from
commercial properties, but it does not fully reflect all the utility that users receive from
housing properties. In addition to the rent and discount rate, other factors, such as
expected capital gains, also influence housing prices.
Nonetheless, the four-quadrant model clearly shows that real estate has the features
of consumption goods as well as assets (investments).

2.6 Explanations for Asset Bubbles and Housing Bubbles
By Thornton (2006) 67, there exist three basic views of bubbles that are held by
economists. The first view, held by the Chicago school and the proponents of Supply-side
economics, is to deny the existence of bubbles. Keynesians and the proponents of
Behavioral Finance advocate the second view that psychological factors lead to bubbles.
The third view is espoused by the Austrian school, which sees bubbles as consisting of
real and psychological changes caused by manipulations of monetary policy. The second
theory and the third theory are essentially the same, so they could be put into one type. In
addition, there also exists a fourth view, which is the rational bubble (Blanchard and
Watson,1982) 68
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2.6.1 No Asset Bubbles
Chicago school economists contend that the assertion of the existence of a bubble
is a violation to the rationality of “economic man”. Even if it exists for some irrational
factors, it will be ruled out very quickly because rational market agents could profit by
arbitrage activities (Hülsmann, 1998). 69
As the former Chairman of Federal Reserve, Greenspan (2002) 70 argues that
housing bubbles rarely happen due to the unique features of real estate. “The analogy
often made to the building and bursting of a stock price bubble is imperfect. First, unlike
in the stock market, sales in the housing market incur substantial transactions costs and,
when most homes are sold, the seller must physically move out. ……Thus, while stock
market turnover is more than 100 percent annually, the turnover of home ownership is
less than 10 percent annually--scarcely tinder for speculative conflagration. Second,
arbitrage opportunities are much more limited in housing markets than in securities
markets. ……the housing market is better understood as a collection of small, local
housing markets. These factors certainly do not mean that bubbles cannot develop in
housing markets and that home prices cannot decline……. But because the turnover of
homes is so much smaller than that of stocks and because the underlying demand for
living space tends to be revised very gradually, the speed and magnitude of price rises
and declines often observed in markets for securities are more difficult to create in
markets for homes.”
69
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As the housing price was reaching its peak, Greenspan (2005) 71 admits there are
some“bubbles”, but only in some local housing markets. Basically, in 2005, he still
argues that housing market conditions are good. Shortly after he left office in 2005, he
maintained that housing prices would not go down even though the housing boom was
over. As another former Chairmen of Federal Reserve, Bernanke (2006a) 72 admits that it
is possible for housing prices to go down, but just slightly”. Bernanke (2006b) 73 also
believes that the mortgage market is more stable and the appraisal practice is better than
before.
2.6.2 Irrational Asset Bubbles
Keynesian economists, like Paul Krugman, and the economists of behavioral
finance, such as Robert Shiller, hold that the real estate cycles are the ebb and flow of
aggregate emotions and consciousness. They recognize the role of fundamental factors,
but they prefer the psychological factors in that they are the main reason for deviations in
the real estate cycles.
Shiller (2004) 74 lists three main psychological factors that boosted the most recent
housing bubble of the 2000’s in the US. First, the anxiety and insecurity emanating from
the burst of the technology bubble and the terrorist attack of 9/11 pushed money into
71
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tangible and thus safe assets, houses. Second, the growth in global communications has
upgraded the attraction of living in the world’s leading cities such as New York, San
Francisco. Third, there is “the speculative contagion that underlies any bubble”. (p134)
Krugman (2005a) 75 points out, “in parts of the country there's a speculative fever
among people who shouldn't be speculators that seems all too familiar from past bubbles
- the shoeshine boys with stock tips in the 1920's, the beer-and-pizza joints showing
CNBC, not ESPN, on their TV sets in the 1990's”. In another articles, Krugman (2005b)76
distinguishes Zoned Zone with Flatland. The former refers to the coast areas while the
latter refers to the middle of the country. Housing bubbles often emerge in the Zoned
Zone rather than the Flatland. “In the Zoned Zone, which lies along the coasts, a
combination of high population density and land-use restrictions – hence ‘zoned’ – makes
it hard to build new houses. So when people become willing to spend more on houses,
say because of a fall in mortgage rates, some houses get built, but the prices of existing
houses also go up. And if people think that prices will continue to rise, they become
willing to spend even more, driving prices still higher, and so on. In other words, the
Zoned Zone is prone to housing bubbles. And Zoned Zone housing prices, which have
risen much faster than the national average, clearly point to a bubble” (in 2005).
However, “In Flatland, which occupies the middle of the country, it’s easy to build
houses. When the demand for houses rises, Flatland metropolitan areas, which don’t
75
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really have traditional downtowns, just sprawl some more. As a result, housing prices are
basically determined by the cost of construction. In Flatland, a housing bubble can’t even
get started.” (p58)
Browne and Case (1992) 77 argue that construction of office buildings, is
inherently cyclical after they examine how the glut of commercial real estate space
developed. They further report that the cycle of the 1980s was magnified by tax and
institutional changes and by a faith that real estate was a high-return, low-risk investment.
The banks were severely damaged as a consequence.
As Case and Shiller (2003) 78 point out, the term "bubble" is widely used but
rarely clearly defined. They believe that the term, in its widespread use, refers to “a
situation in which excessive public expectations of future price increases causes prices to
be temporarily elevated. During a housing price bubble, homebuyers think that a home
that they would normally consider too expensive for them is now an acceptable purchase
because they will be compensated by significant further price increases. They will not
need to save as much as they otherwise might, because they expect the increased value of
their home to do the savings for them. First-time homebuyers may also worry during a
housing bubble that if they do not buy now, they will not be able to afford a home later.
Then, they argue that “the basic questions that still must be answered are whether
expectations of large future price increases are sustaining the market, whether these
expectations are salient enough to generate anxieties among potential homebuyers, and
77
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whether there is sufficient confidence in such expectations to motivate action”. (p194)
White (2009) 79 analyzes the reason for 1920-1926 housing bubble. He contends
that fundamental factors such as a post-war construction catch-up, low interest rates and a
“Greenspan put” 80 ignite the boom in the twenties.
However, mortgage securitization, a reduction in lending standards (subprime
loans) and weaker supervision are factors that produced the housing bubble in first
decade of 21st century.
Levitin and Wachter (2013) 81 explore the factors boosting the commercial bubble
between 2004 and 2008. They argue that it is the shift in the commercial mortgage
securitization market that caused the commercial bubble. The securitization has been a
main channel through which the commercial market was financed since 1998.
Commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) are quickly replaced by collateralized
debt obligations (CDOs). Savvy, sophisticated, experienced commercial mortgage
securitization investors were outbid by investors who merely wanted “product” to
securitize. The result was a decline in underwriting standards in commercial mortgage
backed securities (CMBS).
Holt (2009) 82 maintains there were four primary factors that resulted in the
housing bubble in the first decade of 21st century: low mortgage interest rates, low short-
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term interest rates, relaxed standards for mortgage loans, and irrational exuberance.
Shiratsuka (2003) 83 argues that Japan’s experience of asset price bubble is characterized
by euphoria, that is, excessively optimistic expectations. Thornton (2006) 84 contends that
the 2000-2008 housing bubble is a case of government failure. The effort that the
government attempts to improve home ownership through the policy of “easy finance”
eventually leaves many Americans in an economic pitfall.
2.6.3 Rational Asset Bubbles
Steimetz (2008)85 points out: “To see how prices might persistently deviate from
traditional market fundamentals, imagine that you are considering an investment in the
publicly held firm Bootstrap Microdevices (BM), which is trading at fifty dollars per
share. You know that BM will not declare any dividends and have ample reason to
believe that one year from now BM will be trading at only ten dollars per share. Yet you
also firmly believe that you can sell your BM shares in six months for one hundred
dollars each. It would be entirely rational for you to purchase BM shares now and plan to
sell them in six months. If you did so, you and those who shared your beliefs would be
“riding a bubble” and would bid up the price of BM shares in the process”.
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Steimetz (2008) 86 further argues: “This example illustrates that if bubbles exist,
they might be perpetuated in a manner that would be difficult to call irrational. The key to
understanding this is in recalling that an asset’s fundamental value includes its expected
price when sold. If investors rationally expect an asset’s selling price to increase, then
including this in their assessment of the asset’s fundamental value would be justified. It is
possible, then, that the price of such an asset could grow and persist even if the viability
of its issuing company is unlikely to support these prices indefinitely. This situation can
be called a ‘rational bubble’.” (p148)
From the studies about bubbles, the following conclusions can be drawn:
First, Chicago school economists do not deny the existence of asset bubbles. What
they contend is that asset bubbles cannot exist in the long term due to human being’s
ration. In a very short term, asset bubbles can exist.
Second, Keynesian economists follows the “tradition” of John M. Keynes and
emphasize the role psychological factors play in the investors’ decision-making process.
So they contend that the asset bubble can often appear and last for a while because human
beings are not always rational. However, they also agree that assets bubbles cannot exist
in the long term because investors cannot be always irrational in the long term. In this
sense, they are in accordance with Chicago school economists.
Third, rational bubbles theory argues it is “ration” that drives asset prices to go up

86

Steimetz, Seiji S. C. (2008). "Bubbles". In David R. Henderson (ed.). Concise Encyclopedia of
Economics (2nd ed.). Indianapolis: Library of Economics and Liberty. He also points out: “Economists
often refer to these types of bubble conditions as “bootstrap equilibria.” High prices are thought to be held
high by self-fulfilling prophecies, just as one might attempt to hold himself high off the ground by pulling
up on his bootstraps.”

47

and create asset bubbles. It is rational to buy assets when asset prices is expected to
increase and it is also rational to ask for a much higher resale prices because only a much
higher resale prices can compensate the very high risk that asset prices will go down.
Since investors love to buy assets and ask for a much higher asset prices in order to
compensate the risk, the asset prices will rise very quickly. However, if investors know
that assets have been overprices but still want to “fish in troubled water”, they are not
irrational. Therefore, rational bubbles theory is not convincing. What this theory does is
actually to explain asset bubble by psychological factors, which is what Keynesian
economists has done.
To sum up, although Chicago school economists and Keynesian economists hold
different viewpoints about assets bubbles, they both agree that asset bubbles can appear
within some time interval for the sake of investors’ irrational factors, but they will
disappear in the long term. Their difference or dispute only lies in how long the time
interval is. Chicago school economists hold that the bubbles can only exist in very short
time, that is, the time interval is very short. Keynesian economists insist that the bubbles
can exist not only in the short time, but also in the middle time, that is, the time interval is
pretty long.
However, neither Chicago school economists nor Keynesian economists can
explain the housing bubbles happening in China. Although China’s stock market has
experienced three-time bubble rising and breaking in past 16 years, the housing prices
have been continuously increasing in the same period of time. The housing bubbles
happening in China is obviously long-term bubbles, but all current bubbles theories deny
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long-term bubbles. Therefore, it is an important task for this study to give an satisfactory
explanation for this long-term housing bubbles in China.
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CHAPTER

3:

KEY

CONCEPTS,

RESEARCH

HYPOTHESIS AND FRAMEWORK
From Chapter 1, we can find that whether high savings can contribute to
economic growth really depends on what the high savings is spent on. If high savings is
spent on productions factors, it will boost economic growth of a country. By contrast, if
high savings is invested in speculative assets (like non owner-occupied housing), it will
not lead to economic growth but could also create an asset bubble. In order to analyze the
relationship between production factors and speculative assets in one research
framework, the concept “Real Assets” and “Virtual Assets” should be introduced. 87 In
order to explore the source of high savings, the concepts of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) and Gross Domestic Income (GDI), Gross Domestic Consumption (GDC) and
Gross Domestic Savings (GDS), Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) and Marginal
Propensity to Save (MPS), Average Propensity to Consume (APC) and Average
Propensity to Save (APS) will be used. Therefore, all these key concepts should be
clarified. Next, three hypotheses are put forward based on the discussion in Chapter 1 and
Chapter 2. And, finally, the research framework of this study is built.
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3.1 Key Concepts
3.1.1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross Domestic Income (GDI)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) represents the total currency value of all goods and
services produced during a specific time period in an economy. 88 It is also called
“aggregated product of an economy.” A similar concept is gross national product (GNP),
which represents the total value of all the final products and services produced in a given
period through the production owned by a country's citizens. 89 GNP is an economic
statistic that is equal to GDP plus any income earned by citizens from overseas
investments minus the income earned within the domestic economy by overseas
citizens. 90 Many countries do not declare their GNP because this statistic is difficult to
collect and calculate.
Gross Domestic Income (GDI) represents the total income received by all sectors of
an economy. It includes the sum of all wages, profits, and taxes minus subsidies. It can
also be called “aggregated income”(AP) of an economy. In theory, all income is derived
from production including the production of services. Thus, the GDI of an economy
should be exactly equal to its GDP. In reality, however, GDI is often lower than GDP
because underground or grey income exists and not all income is reported. As a result, the
difference

between

GDI

and

GDP

is

actually

the

measure

of

underground/invisible/unreported income.
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3.1.2 Gross Domestic Consumption (GDC) and Gross Domestic Savings (GDS)
Gross Domestic Consumption (GDC) represents the total consumption of all
households of an economy. It can also be called “Aggregated Consumption” of an
economy
GDS represents the total savings of all households of an economy. It can also be
called “aggregated savings” of an economy. GDC+GDS=GDI. Thus, GDS=GDI-GDC.
We also have GDS=GDP-GDC when GDI=GDP.
3.1.3 Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC), Marginal Propensity to Save (MPS),
Average Propensity to Consume (APC), Average Propensity to Save (APS)
Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) measures the proportion of extra income
that is spent on consumption 91 . It is equal to ΔC/ΔY, where ΔC is the change in
consumption (Marginal Consumption) and ΔY is the change in income (Marginal
Income). Marginal Propensity to Save (MPS) measures the proportion of extra income
that is held as savings. It is equal to ΔS/ΔY, where ΔS is the change in savings (Marginal
Savings) and ΔY is the change in income (Marginal Income). Marginal Income=Marginal
Consumption + Marginal Savings. Thus, MPC+MPS=1 or MPS=1-MPC.
Average Propensity to Consume (APC) refers to the percentage of income spent on
consumption (goods and services) rather than on savings. Average Propensity to Save
(APS) refers to the proportion of income that is saved rather than spent on consumption.
What is the relationship between MPC and APC? When there exists autonomous
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expenditure 92, APC will be bigger than MPC. When there does not exist autonomous
expenditure, APC will be equal than MPC. This argument can be shown by a simple
mathematical proof.
Keynes’ consumption function 93 can be expressed by,
C = a + cY

(3.1)

where C denotes consumption, Y denotes income, a denotes and c denotes a coefficient.
Then by definition, APC is can be calculated as:
APC =

a + cY a
= +c
Y
Y

(3.2)

In order to calculate MPC, assume that consumption increases from C 0 to C 1 when
income increases from Y 0 to Y 1 , Then,
MPC =

∆C C1 − C 0 (a + cY1 ) − (a + cY0 ) c(Y1 − Y0 )
=c
=
=
=
Y1 − Y0
Y1 − Y0
Y1 − Y0
∆Y

(3.3)

Therefore, when there exists autonomous expenditure(a≠0 ),
APC =

a + cY a
= + c > c = MPC
Y
Y

(3.4)

Therefore, when there does not exists autonomous expenditure (a=0 ),
APC =

a + cY
= c = MPC
Y

(3.5)

In this study, “a” is assumed to be 0, then MPC=APC. Given that they are equal,
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“Propensity to Consume（PC）” can be used to represent both of them.
3.1.4 Real Assets and Real Asset Market, Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Market
1. Real Assets and Real Asset Markets
An asset is any economic resource that can produce value in the future. It is a
resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events and from which future
economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity94.
All asset returns (benefits, profits, gains) come from production or operation
activities of economic entities. An asset that directly serves the production or operation
process of an economic entity is called a real asset. Examples of real assets include
tangible assets (land, raw and processed materials, machines and equipment,
manufacturing plant, inventory, and human resources) and intangible assets (patents,
trademarks, copyrights, and business methodologies). The money possessed by a
production entity and the money borrowed from banks or raised from capital markets are
also real assets, because all the money will serve the production or operation process.
Assets used for long term household consumption, such as cars, houses, and other
durable goods, are also real assets. Although buyers cannot earn profit from these assets,
they can gain consumption utility from them and thus save on living expenses. For
example, home owners can save on home rental expenses and car owners can save on
transportation costs. In economics, expenses saved are equivalent to profits earned. In
this sense, an asset used for household consumption can bring buyers the profits or
returns in this future; thus, it can be also called a real asset. In most situations, real assets
94
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refer to production factors. In fact, a real asset is a right. It is the right to possess and use.
Real asset markets are the markets where real assets are exchanged. Real assets
include factors of production and durable goods for consumption. Thus real asset markets
include factor markets and durable goods markets. Factor markets include raw material
markets, machine and equipment markets, commercial real estate markets, and
intellectual property rights. Durable goods markets include owner occupied housing
markets and auto markets (Figure 3.1.)
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Figure 3.1: Real & Virtual Sector and Real & Virtual Asset Market

Source: Author
2. Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Markets
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A virtual asset refers to an asset that is essentially a right to claim the return of real
assets in the future. Examples of virtual assets include stocks, funds, bonds, and the
ownership of real estate and gold.
The difference between real assets and virtual assets is whether they serve the
production process directly. Real assets are factors of production, and their value will be
transferred into the final products or services. Virtual assets do not serve the production
process directly, and their values will not be transferred into the final products or
services. Their values are equal to the discounted values of all the future returns of the
associated real assets.
Virtual asset markets are the markets where virtual assets are exchanged. Thus, the
stock market, bond market, funds market, and gold market are all virtual asset markets.
3. The relationship between real assets and virtual assets
Real assets are closely related to virtual assets. First, all virtual assets depend on real
assets. When a company issues stocks or bonds, it creates virtual assets based on its real
assets. Second, in theory, the values of virtual assets are determined by the profit earned
by real assets and the discount rate. Given the discount rate, the values of virtual assets
will increase when real assets are expected to earn more profit. Third, in practice, the
values of real assets are not determined by their production cost but by the values of
virtual assets.
A factory is usually managed and operated by its owner. This owner is a real asset
investor as well as a virtual asset investor, because he can use and operate the machine or
facilities in this firm, meanwhile he has the right to claim the profit earned from this
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factory. Modern corporations are characterized by the separation of ownership and
management. All shareholders are not willing or able to commit themselves to corporate
management except perhaps for some of the large shareholders. Small shareholders have
the right to claim the dividends from this corporation and eventually the capital gain or
loss when the stock is sold. Large shareholders have the rights to the dividends and
because of their larger stake they may choose to take a management role.

Thus, small

shareholders only have virtual assets, whereas large shareholders have both virtual and
real assets.
If an investor buys a piece of land, a factory building, or a machine but does not
include this asset in the production process, he or she has three ways to deal with these
assets. First, the investor leases these production factors to a company and the investor
becomes the lessor. Second, the investor can give them to a company and become a
small shareholder. Third, the investor merely holds these assets for a while and then
resells them. In all these situations, land, factory buildings, and machines are not real
assets but virtual assets for the investor, because the investor does not include these assets
in the production process and make a profit from them but instead the investor takes them
as pure rights to claim annual earnings or capital gains or both over time. These assets are
seen as real assets only for large shareholders who use them as production factors.
3.1.5 Real Sector (Economy) and Virtual Sector (Economy)
1. Real Sector: The consumption market and the factor market (the real asset market)
Firms in the consumption market provide people with the necessary goods and
services. To produce the necessary goods and services, firms buy factors of production
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from the factor market. Thus, both the consumption market and the factor market are
indispensable in people’s daily lives and are real economic sectors.
2. Virtual Sector: The virtual asset market
The virtual asset market is the market where rights to claim returns are exchanged
because virtual assets are the rights to claim the future returns. When the rights are
exchanged, money is transferred from a buyer to a seller, but no new goods or services
are created because the money does not directly go to the production process. The virtual
asset market is also called the virtual sector of the economy. The difference between the
real sector, the virtual sector, the real asset and virtual asset markets are detailed in Figure
3.1.6 Houses: Real Assets or Virtual Assets?
We end this section with a discussion on the housing markets. Is a house a real
asset or a virtual asset?
When a house is bought to possess or use, namely, live in or occupy, it is a real
asset. On the contrary, when it is bought in order to make profit by renting it out and
potentially reselling it at higher prices in the future, it is a virtual asset.
So a house is both a real asset and a virtual asset because the home owner not
only has the right to possess and use it, but also has the right to claim the rent and capital
gain from it. Therefore, a house is not a “pure” real asset although it is “very” tangible.
In current China, such a phenomenon can be observed very easily: a person buys
a house, but he neither uses it nor leases it to a tenant. Rather, he holds it and keeps it
vacant for several month or years, then reselling it at a potentially higher price. When he
buys this house, he knows he will never live in it. His purpose is to make money, which is
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very “pure”. For some people, this purpose is so “pure” that they never stay in the house,
never see it and never know its exact location before and after buying it. They only know
that they own a house somewhere in this city and can potentially make money from
owning this house. In this situation, although a house is tangible, it has the same
investment characteristics as a stock, a bond, or a fund share because it has become an
investment, a mechanism to make money. Therefore, it has become a pure virtual asset,
or a speculative asset. To sum up, when a house is taken as a speculative asset, it loses its
identity as “a real asset” and becomes a pure virtual asset.
Similarly, gold is not necessarily a real asset. In most situations, gold is a virtual
asset because it is bought not to possess and use, but to make money by reselling it in the
future. Only when gold is bought to produce rings, earrings or other ornaments is it a real
asset.

3.2 Research Hypothesis
The excessive liquidity of China’s housing market oddly coexists with a
contradictory phenomenon, which is the insufficient demand for consumption goods. The
former attracts significant attention, but the latter has been overlooked for a long time.
Thus, one question that needs to be answered is as follows: Why do these two seemingly
conflicting phenomena coexist? The following hypotheses are drawn.
Hypothesis 1: At a certain point, a high-income family spends a lower proportion of
its income on consumption compared with a low-income family. In other words, the
higher the level of a family’s income in a society at a certain time point, the lower the
proportion of its consumption is accounted for in its income.
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This hypothesis is about the interactive relationship between consumption and
income, one that has never been investigated by classical consumption theories (theory of
MPC, life cycle theory, and permanent theory). Although previous empirical studies
identified this relationship, they did not provide satisfactory explanations for this
relationship based on economic theories. The studies did not expound the implication of
the relationship to total savings rates, asset prices, and economic growth.
If this hypothesis can be verified, severe income inequality will lead to very high
aggregate savings rate and very low aggregate consumption rate.
Hypothesis 2: Very high aggregate savings rates and very low aggregate
consumption rates caused by severe income inequality will induce high investment
demand in the virtual sector and weak demand in the real sector. As a result, the virtual
sector will progress, whereas the real sector will decline.
Hypothesis 3: In the context of a declining real sector, investors prefer houses to
other types of assets in the virtual sector owing to the unique features of houses. Thus,
housing prices will increase.

3.3 Theoretical Framework
Base on the 3 hypotheses above, the theoretical Framework for this study can be
built, which is presented in Figure 3.2.
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(Note 2)
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The Core Competency of this Country
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Figure 3.2: Theoretical Framework of This Study

61

Next, Note 1-5 should be clarified one by one.
Note 1. As previously mentioned, the causality chain between income inequality and
consumption depends on Hypothesis 1, that is, the new relationship between income
inequality and aggregate savings rate: more severe income inequality will lead to high
aggregate savings rate.
Note 2. The causality chain between high savings and increasing assets prices
depends on Hypothesis 2, that is, overly-high aggregate savings rates and overly-low
aggregate consumption rates caused by severe income inequality will induce high
investment demand in the virtual sector and weak demand in the real sector.
Note 3. The causality chain between increasing asset prices and rapidly rising
housing prices depends on Hypothesis 3, that is, in the context of a declining real sector,
investors prefer houses to other types of assets in the virtual sector owing to the features
of houses.
Note 4. A declining consumption market is indicative of low profits and low wages,
which further contributes to the overall decline in the income of low- and middle-income
families. Most investors in the virtual asset markets are wealthy people belonging to
upper-income families who have high accessibility to capital and loan markets. Thus,
their income and wealth rapidly increase, at least until the virtual asset market fails. Lowincome and middle-income families do not have sufficient capital for investment, which
makes borrowing money from capital or loan markets difficult for them. As a result, these
families do not benefit from the asset market. Furthermore, when real estate prices
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increase, they suffer significantly because real estate is a necessity for them to live. That
is their real housing costs go up if the housing market in general goes up.
Note 5. The chain indicates that a self-intensifying mechanism exists: income
distribution inequality will exacerbate the inequality in income distribution by causing
the decline of consumption markets and the rise of the virtual asset markets, particularly
housing. The by-product of this mechanism is that the risk for the financial markets and
the entire economy will adversely affect the core competency of the country.

3.4 Basic Logic
3.4.1 The Assumption
Three types of families exist in a country.
1) High-income families, denoted by H, whose total wealth is WH, total consumption
is CH and total savings is SH. The proportion of the total wealth spent on consumption
and savings is denoted by Hc and Hs, respectively.
2) Middle-income families, denoted by M, whose total wealth is WM, total
consumption is CM and total savings is SM. The proportion of the total wealth spent on
consumption and savings is denoted by Mc and Ms, respectively.
3) Low-income families, denoted by L, whose total wealth is WL, total consumption
is CL and total savings is SL. The proportion of the total wealth spent on consumption
and savings is denoted by Lc and Ls, respectively.
Naturally,
WH>WM>WL
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(3.6)

3.4.2 Starting the Model with the First Hypothesis
Recall the first hypothesis, at a certain point, a high-income family spends a lower
proportion of its income on consumption compared with a low-income family. In other
words, the higher the level of a family’s income in a society at a certain time point, the
lower the proportion of its consumption accounted for in its income. Thus,
Hs>Ms>Ls

(3.7)

This relationship should be carefully explained theoretically and tested empirically
because it is the foundation of this dissertation.
Given (3.7) and a fixed Y or Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a country, we can
obtain
c = f (G ) where

dc
<0
dG

(3.8)

where G is the Gini coefficient, which is an index of income inequality; and c is the
proportion of the aggregate income spent on consumption goods and services.
Equation (3.8) shows that when G is large, c is small. In other words, a negative
relationship exists between income inequality and the aggregate savings rate; when
income is unequal, the aggregate consumption rate is low.
The aggregate consumption is equal to Y times the aggregate consumption rate:
C = cY = f (G )Y

(3.9)

The aggregate savings (S) is equal to the Y minus the aggregate consumption:
S = Y − cY = Y − f (G )Y = (1 − f (G ))Y

When G increases, f(G) decreases and then S rises.
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(3.10)

3.4.3 Extending the Model with the Second and Third Hypotheses
Recall the second hypothesis: very high aggregate savings rate and very low
aggregate consumption rate caused by severe income inequality will induce high
investment demand in the virtual sector rather than the real sector. Hence, we obtain
I V = αS = α (1 − f (G )Y ) where0.5 < α < 1

(3.11)

Where I v is the investments into the virtual sector, and α is the proportion of Iv of the
aggregate investment, which is equal to aggregate savings.
Recall the third hypothesis: under the context of a declining real sector, investors
prefer houses to other types of assets in the virtual sector owing to the features of houses,
a preference that increases housing prices. Those features might include:
1. Stocks and mutual funds are pure assets that do not have consumptive features.
By contrast, food and clothes are pure consumption goods that do not have asset features.
However, houses can be considered both an asset and consumption good. The asset
features of houses can bring buyers investment returns in the future that regular
consumption goods cannot. The consumptive features of houses bring buyers more
security than the pure assets can.
2. As an asset, a house is also a consumption product. An owner can rent his house to
himself (owner-occupied) or rent the house to a tenant for an income stream. In the first
case, the owner gets utility from housing. In the second way, he receives rent.
Theoretically, the value of the utility should be equal to the rent. In practice, however, the
owner considers the value of the utility to be much more than the rent. A detailed analysis
will be done in the following chapters. Rent cannot fully reflect the returns of self-
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occupied houses and thus will not be an effective signal for the market fundamentals of
houses. Consequently, even if the rent is very low, a home buyer can still think the market
fundamentals of houses are not bad and expect that the house prices will go up.
3. The scarcity of land convinces investors that the supply of real estate is limited. In
a developing country undergoing the process of urbanization, such belief is significant.
As a result, the price of real estate is expected to increase quickly, bringing investors
considerable profit even though returns from rent are low.
Aside from real estate, some “concept” stocks, including financial derivatives, gold
and antiques, can also be invested in as virtual assets. However, the two characteristics
discussed above make houses preferred virtual assets among investors.
In response to the increasing house prices, overdevelopment will emerge and a series
of negative consequences will occur.
Hence, we obtain
I h = βI V = βα S = βα (1 − f (G )Y ) where0.5 < β < 1

(3.12)

Where I h is the aggregate investment into the housing market, and α is the proportion of
I v in the aggregate investment into the virtual sector, which is the demand for houses.
3.4.4 Finalizing the Model
According to neoclassical economics, real estate, as a real asset, is priced (P) by its
expected returns (R) and discount rate or expected return (i). Keeping R and i constant
and using a simple perpetuity valuation model:
P=

R
i
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(3.13)

In the virtual housing market, the investment return will depend on the perceived
benefits gained from buying the house at a low price and hopefully selling it at a high
price. The return heavily depends on the capital gains benefits and the return from the
rent is negligible for these investors.
Price changes in the past have become an overwhelming important factor in the
decision-making process of investors and cannot be ignored. Based on the price changes
in the past, additional money is invested into the housing market and the higher the
housing prices. That is, the money significant investment into housing market is an
amplifier that strengthens the relationship between price changes in the past and the
expected price changes in the future.
Thus, we obtain the following equation:

Pr = g ( I h )

dPr
dt

(3.14)

where g ( I h ) is a monotone increasing function of I h (social savings).
In a linear manner, we can set g ( I h ) = gI h , where γ > 0 . Thus,

Pr = γI h

dPr
dt

(3.15)

The solution for this equation is
t

Pr = e

γI h

= exp(

t
)
γI h

(3.16)

Substituting (3.12) into (3.16) gives:
t

Pr = e

γI h

= exp(

t
t
) = exp(
)
γI h
γβδ (1 − f (G ))Y )
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(3.17)

A positive relationship exists between real estate development and real estate prices.
In a linear manner, we obtain,
t

D = κPr = κe

βI h

= κ exp(

t
t
) = κ exp(
)
γI h
γβδ (1 − f (G ))Y )

(3.18)

Where D is the new construction quantity, and γ is the positive coefficient.
Driven by the increase in housing prices, real estate developers construct an
increasing number of houses. Therefore, as long as the money to support construction is
sufficient, investors in housing markets can profit. Investors will also turn to housing
markets, which will result in the development of numerous houses.
This process, however, is not sustainable. The capital invested into the housing
market is limited by the national wealth, which increases only when the economy of the
country rises. Given that economic growth is always limited, the growth rate of the entire
national wealth is likewise limited. The limited growth rate cannot sustain the continuous
increase of housing prices.
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CHAPTER

4:

HOUSEHOLD

HOUSEHOLD

INCOME

CONSUMPTION:

A

AND
NEW

ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP
4.1

Previous

Research:

Propensity

to

Consume

is

Homogeneous for Different Income Level Household
Chapter 2 reviewed several classical consumption theories, namely, the theory of
Marginal Propensity to Consume (Keynes 1936), the life-cycle hypothesis (Modigliani,
1966), and the permanent income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957).
All these theories are helpful because they resulted in breakthroughs in the research
on consumption. However, the real concern is as follows. For a specific household, what
happens to consumption if the household income increases? The underlying assumption
behind these theories is the proportion of their consumption in its income is
homogeneous for everyone at a specific time point. One question that has never been
asked: At the same time point, do families of different income levels have a
heterogeneous propensity to consume?

4.2 Economic Data: Propensity to Consume is Heterogeneous
for Different Income Level Households
High-income-level households spend more money on both consumption and
investment than low-income-level families. Our question is this: will high-income-level
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households spend a lower proportion of income on their consumption or a higher
proportion of their income on investment than low-income-level families?
Considering that the previous studies did not address this question, the relationship
uncovered by this question can be called a new economic relationship between
consumption and income. This new relationship will contribute to consumption and
income theories in economics if proven by empirical studies and explained by economic
theories.
The new economic relationship between income level and the proportion of
household income spent on consumption is easy to demonstrate using data.
First at all, we use China’s expenditure and income data(2006-2012) to demonstrate
this new relationship, see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1。
Table 4.1: Ratio of Average Annual Expenditures to Average Annual Income of
Households by Income Quintiles in China (2006-2012)

Lowest
20
percent
Second
20
percent
Third
20
percent
Fourth
20
percent
Highest
20
percent

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

89.8%

90.2%

88.5%

86.7%

84.3%

85.1%

81.7%

80.9%

80.0%

78.4%

77.7%

76.0%

75.0%

73.3%

77.0%

75.5%

74.0%

73.4%

73.2%

71.8%

70.1%

72.7%

70.6%

69.2%

71.2%

69.6%

68.7%

66.5%

67.1%

65.5%

64.3%

64.2%

64.0%

62.6%

61.4%

Source: China Statistical Abstract (2007-2103), National Bureau of Statistics of China
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Table 4.1: Ratio of Average Annual Expenditures to Average Annual Income of Households
by Income Quintiles in China (2006-2012)
94.0%
89.0%
84.0%
79.0%
74.0%
69.0%
64.0%
59.0%
2006
Lowest
20
percent

2007

2008

Second
20
percent

2009
Third
20
percent

2010

2011

Fourth
20
percent

2012
Highest
20
percent

Source: the same to Table 4.1
These results from table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 confirm the new economic relationship
between consumption rate and income level, that is, at a certain point, a high-income
family spends a lower proportion of its income on consumption compared with a lowincome family.
This new economic relationship is not specific relationship only for China. It can
also be confirmed by U.S. expenditure and income data. See Table 4.2 and figure 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Ratio of Aggregate Average Annual Expenditures to Aggregate Average
Annual Income by Income Quintiles of Income In U.S. (2006 To 2012)
Lowest
20
percent
Second
20
percent
Third
20
percent
Fourth
20
percent
Highest
20
percent

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

203.4%

195.5%

218.3%

221.6%

209.3%

221.4%

217.5%

113.5%

112.6%

116.3%

116.2%

112.8%

118.4%

118.5%

92.3%

92.1%

90.1%

89.2%

90.1%

92.0%

90.9%

78.2%

79.0%

79.1%

77.7%

75.6%

77.7%

79.1%

62.7%

61.0%

61.1%

59.9%

58.9%

58.6%

59.5%

Data Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxashar.htm

Figure 4.2: Ratio of Aggregate Average Annual Expenditures to Aggregate Average Annual
Income by Income Quintiles of Income In U.S. (2006 To 2012)
250.0%
200.0%
150.0%
100.0%
50.0%
0.0%
2006
Lowest
20
percent

2007
Second
20
percent

2008

2009
Third
20
percent

2010
Fourth
20
percent

2011

2012
Highest
20
percent

Source: the same to Table 4.2
Again, these results based on U.S. data confirm the new economic relationship
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between consumption rate and income level: high-income families spend a lower
proportion of their income on consumption compared to low-income families. In fact, the
ratio of expenditure to income for the lowest-income 20% families was so high that it
was always greater than 1 from 2006 to 2012, which means that the expenditure of the
lowest-income 20% families is more than what they earned, namely, their income. The
reason for that is because they received a great deal of income transfer payment from
U.S. governments. As to China, since the bottom income-level families received very less
transfer payment government, the ratio of expenditure of bottom income-level families to
income is less than 1.

4.3 Theoretical Explanation by Modern Portfolio Theory and
Information Cost
After we prove the new relationship, the next step is to explain why this law holds by
modern economic theories. We cannot just attribute the reasons why this law can hold to
the psychological factors.
Modern Portfolio Theory(MPT) can help to explain this law. According to modern
portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952, 1959 95), investors base their asset-selection decisions
not only on the returns generated by investment opportunities but also on the risk
contained in these opportunities. Most importantly, MPT was the first theory to clearly
and rigorously show how the variance of a portfolio can be reduced through the impact of
diversification.
95

Markowitz, H.M. (March 1952). "Portfolio Selection". The Journal of Finance 7 (1): 77–91
Markowitz, H.M. (1959). Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments. New York: John
Wiley & Sons.
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n

E (rP ) = ∑ wi E ( ri )

(4.1)

i =1

Risk of a portfolio:
2
σ=
Var ( r=
p)
p

∑∑ w w Cov ( r , r )
n

n

=i 1 =j 1

i

j

i

j

(4.2)

Covariance can also be expressed in terms of the correlation coefficient as
follows:

σ ij
Cov=
( ri , rj ) r=
ijσ iσ j

(4.3)

where ρij is the correlation coefficient between the rates of return on security i, ri , and
the rates of return on security j, rj ; and σ i and σ j represent the standard deviations of ri
and rj respectively. Therefore,

Var ( rp ) = ∑∑ wi w j rijσ iσ j
n

n

(4.4)

=i 1 =j 1

However, information is a “commodity.” To construct a fully diversified portfolio,
investors have to spend “searching cost,” including time and money, on new assets
(Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980 96). Most importantly, searching cost is almost fixed and can
thus be considered a fixed cost for a specific investor, though the return coming from this
searching is marginal.
For example, $1000 spent to find the true information about a new asset can result in
a 1% increase of the portfolio return.

96

Grossman, S. J. and Stiglitz, J. E. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets." The
American Economic Review, Vol. 70, No. 3, (June 1980), pp. 393–408
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What does this outcome imply for high-income and low-income families?
H: $200,000 is available for investment.
Net profit=$200,000×1%-1000=$1000
Do it!
L: $ 50,000 is available for investment
Net profit=$50,000×1%-1000=-$500
Give it up!
Hence, low-income families have a significantly lower motivation to search for and
invest on new assets compared with high-income families. As a result, the portfolio of
high-income families will be more diversified than that of low-income families. The point
further implies that the portfolio of low-income families has a greater risk than that of
high-income families. That is,
Var ( R pL ) > Var ( RPH )

(4.5)

However, based on the Sharpe Ratio (Sharpe, 1994),
S=

Ri − R f

σ

(4.6)

Where Ri is the return of the asset or portfolio i, R f is the return on a benchmark asset
or risk-free return rate, and σ is the standard deviation of this return of the asset or
portfolio and measures the risk.
Investors require a higher return rate for a high-risk portfolio than for a low-risk
portfolio because S is almost constant in an open or fully arbitrary market.
As a result, the return rate required by a low-income family will be higher than that
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required by a high-income family:

E (rPL ) > E (rpH )

(4.7)

RPL > R pH

(4.8)

Alternatively,

When the required return (subject discount rate) increases, the present value of a
fixed amount of future benefit will decrease. This result implies that low-income families
do not like savings and investing, but will rather spend a large proportion of their income
on current consumption.
High-income families like to save and invest and tend to spend a large proportion
of their income on savings and investments. If the nominal return of a portfolio is the
same for H and L, but Var (rPL ) > Var (rpH ) ，then the real return for L will be lower than
that for H.
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Future Total wealth
Budget Constrain Line with bigger slope
(A big slope means higher real returns)

The lower real return causes more current consumption
Budget Constraint Line with small slope
(A small slope means lower real return)

Indifferent Curve
Current Total Wealth
0

C1

C2

Figure 4.3: Intertemporal Choice of Investors

On the basis of the two-period consumption model (Fisher, 1930), 97 it is easy to
establish that the current consumption will increase while the real return will decrease or
that the slope of the budget constraint line will decrease. See figure 4.3。

97

Fisher R. (1930). The Theory of Interest: As Determined by Impatience to Spend Income and
Opportunity to Invest It. Porcupine Press (June 1930).
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CHAPTER 5: INCOME INEQUALITY: A NEW
MEASURE

5.1 Income Inequality Measures or Metrics
5.1.1 Importance of Income Inequality Measure
Income inequality metrics are used by economists, sociologists, and other social
scientists to measure the distribution of income among individuals in a particular
economy.
Income distribution is a key concept in economic theory and economic policy.
Classical economists, such as Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and David Ricardo, were
mainly concerned with the distribution of income between land owners, laborers, and
capitalists, who respectively supply the production factors land, labor, and capital. The
most popular topic related to this issue is the relationship between income inequality and
economic growth. 98
However, good inequality metrics are the prerequisites to conducting research on
income inequality. Research about income inequality attempts to explain how income
inequality occurs and what income inequality will bring about. However, income
inequality metrics simply provide a system of measurement to determine the dispersion
of incomes.
98

See Ricardo, David (1937). The principles of Political Economy and Taxation. London. p. 73. And
Malthus, Robert. T. (1951). Principles of Political Economics. New York. p. 317.
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Income inequality is distinct from poverty and fairness. Poverty is severe income
inequality. Complete income equality or complete fairness, however, does not exist,
either. Thus, moderate income inequality is always seen as unfairness and not poverty.
Additionally, income inequality metrics are used not to measure poverty or fairness but to
measure the unequal extent of income distribution.
A close and similar concept to income inequality is wealth distribution. They are
tightly related. High income can be accumulated to gain substantial wealth, and
substantial wealth will produce “income.” However, these concepts are not the same.
Income is what an individual or a family earns within a time interval (e.g., one month or
one year), but wealth is what an individual or a family owns at some time point. Income
is a flow, whereas wealth is a stock. On one hand, income cannot be accumulated into
wealth if the income is overspent. In other words, if income is high but the consumption
is higher, the wealth growth can be negative. On the other hand, if wealth is high but
wealth is non-productive, considerable wealth cannot bring about income. Hence, income
inequality metrics are not the same as wealth inequality metrics.
5.1.2 Defining Income and Its Components
In measuring income inequality of a country in this study, “income” refers to all
kinds of income.
1. Wages and Salaries. Those are the main source of income.
2. Profits and Dividends. For sole proprietorships, the profist made are the income
of the owner. For a Limited Liability Company or Stock Corporation, the dividend from
the profit made by the company or corporation is the income of the shareholder.
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3. Rents. Two types of rent exist. One is movable-property rent and the other is
real (immovable) property rent. The former includes rents from leasing machines,
vehicles, and tools (movable property), while the latter includes rents from leasing houses
or commercial properties (real property). Rent is the income to the owner for renting out
the movable property or real property.
4. Interest Payments. Interest is the income to the capital supplier. Interest
includes bank interest and bond interest. The former is paid by the bank, and the latter is
paid by the companies or governments that issue those bonds.
5. Capital Gains. The difference between the purchase price at time point A and
the resale price at time point B is called the capital gain. Different assets have different
capital gains but essentially they are the same idea and represent the appreciation or
depreciation in value over the holding period.
Note that not all capital gains are calculated into the National Income Account.
Financial asset transactions in the secondary market will not add more products or
services to the economy and will, therefore, not improve the Gross Domestic Product or
the Gross Domestic Income. A financial asset transaction is essentially a process of social
wealth transfer. In the example of a secondary stock market, the money the stock seller
receives is equal to the money the stock buyer pays. When a stock price continuously
goes up, all participants seem to make profits from the buying and–holding–selling
strategy. However, when the stock price drops from its highest points to the original
purchase price, all the profit the previous investors earned is actually coming from the
one who buys the stock at the highest price. Regardless of the frequency of transactions
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and the number of people earning or losing, the aggregate payment is always zero in the
absence of a transaction tax and commissions. The result is very similar to a casino,
where the winner’s benefit is always equal to the loser’s loss, so the aggregate profit is
always zero (when the casinos do not charge the winners or the losers). When transaction
taxes and commissions exist, all the profit the previous investors earned is lower than the
loss the one who buys the stock at the highest price suffered. Therefore, the aggregate
payment would be negative. Similarly, when the casinos charge the winners or the losers
some money, the winner’s benefit is lower than the loser’s loss, so the aggregate profit
will be negative.
The same thing goes with real estate and gold. For example, a person bought a
house at $100,000 and then sold it in two years at $168,000. The price difference of
$68,000 is his capital gain. Obviously, $68,000 comes from the buyer. This transaction
did not add a $1 value to the house. Similarly, a person who bought 10 ounces of gold at
$15,000 and sold it at $17,000 after six months will have capital gains of $2,000, which is
paid by the buyer. However, their transaction did not add any value to the gold.
Given this fact, do we still need to calculate capital gains into an individual’s or a
family’s income? The answer is yes, because capital gains have a huge influence on
income distribution even though they never affect Gross Domestic Income. In many
developing countries, including China, the stock market has actually been a critical factor
that has worsened the income distribution because the stock market is a “legal” tool by
which a small group takes money from a large number of small investors. This topic will
be discussed in detail in the following chapter.
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6. Goods and Services. One form of income is the total amount of goods and
services that a person receives; money or cash is not necessarily involved. Services like
public health and education are also counted.
7. Unreported Income. As discussed in the following sectors, the unreported
income is a major source of income for China’s upper-income class. There are several
types of underground income.
a) Bribery and embezzlement. Government officials, high-position employees in
the public sector, senior managers of state-owned companies, and some senior managers
of private-owned companies might be the recipient of bribery and/or embezzlement cash.
b) Unreported income from supplemental employment. Employees in the public
sector or those of state-owned companies might be the recipient of this kind of income.
Strictly speaking, income from supplemental employment is not underground income
because it is derived from legal activities. However, because most of those activities are
not allowed by the employers, the income from supplemental employment will never be
reported to the employer.
c) Consumption that is taken into the cost account of the company. The owners of
private-owned companies or the senior managers in state-owned companies might be the
receiver of those kinds of income. 99
d) Other illegal or criminal income, such as drug sales and money laundering.
Numerous researchers defined “income” as “the taxed income per individual or
per household.” Such a definition is not applicable to China and many other developing

99

An example about (c) is given 5.4.3.
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countries because underground, grey, or illegal income is a considerable part of the GDI.
To show income inequality accurately, all types of incomes should be taken into account.

5.2 Gini Coefficient: A Well-Known Measure for Income
Inequality
5.2.1 Lorenz curve
Max O. Lorenz (1905) 100 developed a graphical representation of the distribution of
income or wealth. The curve is a graph showing the proportion of overall income or
wealth owned by the bottom x% of the people. In detail, it shows for the bottom x
(0%≤x≤100%) households what percentage y (0%≤y≤100%) of the total income they
have. The percentage of households is plotted on the x-axis, and the percentage of income
is plotted on the y-axis (Figure 5.1).

100

Lorenz, M. O. (1905). "Methods of measuring the concentration of wealth". Publications of the
American Statistical Association, Vol. 9, No. 70. 9 (70): 209–219.
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Cumulative share of income Earned

100%

Line of Perfect
Equity (450)

Lorenz Curve
10%
0

B

100%

35%

Cumulative Share of people from
lowest to highest income

Figure 5.1: Lorenz Curve and the Line of Perfect Equity

The points on the Lorenz curve represent statements that the bottom x of all
households have y of the total income. For instance, Point B indicates that the bottom
35% of all households has 10% of the total income.
A Lorenz curve always starts at (0,0) and ends at (1,1). It cannot rise above the line
of perfect equality. If the variable being measured cannot take negative values, then the
Lorenz curve, which cannot sink below the line of perfect inequality, increases. Note,
however, that a Lorenz curve for net worth starts out by going negative owing to the fact
that some people have a negative net worth because of debt.
A perfectly equal income distribution is one in which every person has the same
income. In this case, the bottom x of society will always have x of the income. This case
can be depicted by the straight line y=x (0%≤x≤100%, 0%≤y≤100%), which is called the
"line of perfect equality."
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By contrast, a perfectly unequal distribution is one in which one person has all the
income and everyone else has none. In that case, the curve will be at y=0% for all
x<100% and at y=100% when x=100%. This curve is called the "line of perfect
inequality."
The Lorenz curve for a probability distribution is a continuous function. However,
Lorenz curves representing discontinuous functions can be constructed as the limit of
Lorenz curves of probability distributions, the line of perfect inequality being an
example.
5.2.2 Concept of the Gini Coefficient
Gini (1912) 101 put forward a measure of statistical dispersion intended to represent
the income or wealth distribution of a country. This measure became so famous in
economics and sociology that it was called the Gini coefficient.
The Gini coefficient is defined mathematically based on the Lorenz curve. It is equal
to the ratio of the area that lies between the line of perfect equality and the Lorenz curve
(marked M in the diagram) over the total area under the line of equality [marked (M+N)
in the diagram], i.e., G = M / (M + N) (Figure 5.2). 102

101
Gini, C. (1909). "Concentration and dependency ratios" (in Italian). English translation in Rivista di
Politica Economica, 87 (1997), 769–789.
102
Sen, Amartya (1977), On Economic Inequality (2nd ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 179
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Figure 5.2: Gini Coefficient=M/(M+N)

There are two extreme cases of the Gini coefficient.
Case 1: G=0 means perfect income equality.
When the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality are the same, the income
distribution of this country is perfectly equal. In this situation, M=0, and thus
G=M/(M+N)=0. On the other hand, if G=0 then M=0. This case means the Lorenz curve
is overlapped with the line of perfect equality. The income distribution is perfectly equal.
Case 2: G=1 means perfect income inequality.
When the Lorenz curve is so convex to F that it becomes a broken line, O-F-E, the
income distribution of this country is perfect unequal. In this situation, N=0, and
M=M+0=M+N. As a result, G=M/(M+N)=1. On the contrary, if G=1, then M=M+N and
N=0. This case means that the Lorenz curve becomes the broken line O-F-E. The income
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distribution is perfectly unequal.
In the regular case, when G is bigger, the income inequality is more severe.

5.3 Other Income Inequality Measures
The Gini coefficient, although used very widely, is only one of the metrics used to
measure inequality. Others include the 20:20 ratio, the Palma ratio and the Hoover index.
5.3.1 The 20:20 Ratio
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The 20:20 or 20/20 ratio defined as the wealth owned by the top 20% of the
population divided by the wealth held by the bottom 20% of the population. The measure
is used by the United Nations Development Program as one of their Human Development
Indicators. Because this ratio ignores the middle 60% population, it is too simple to
reflect the true level of income distribution in a country.
5.3.2 The Palma Ratio
The Palma ratio is equal to the ratio of the wealth share of the top 10% of the
population divided by the bottom 40% of the population. It was put forward by Gabriel
Palma (2011), 104 who found that the wealth share owned by the middle class was always
50% with the rest split between the upper class the bottom class.
Since the middle class wealth is about 50%, the Gini coefficient will be very
sensitive to changes in the wealth share of the middle class, and will be every insensitive
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to changes in the wealth shares of the upper and bottom classes. Hence, the Palma ratio
can more accurately reflect the true wealth distribution of a society.
However, the income share of middle class is not always equal to 50%. In many
countries, the share might be much less than 50%. As a result, the Gini coefficient might
not be overly sensitive to changes in the income share of middle class. The suggested
advantages of the Palma ratio might not exist.
By contrast, the disadvantage of the Palma ratio might be very evident for many
countries. First, it ignores the income share of middle class of the country. Second, in
many countries, the top 5% of the population might own over 80% of total wealth, while
the other 95% own less than 20% of total income. In this instance, the Palma ratio might
not be a good measure for the income distribution.
5.3.3 Hoover Index 105
The Hoover index is the proportion of all income that has to be redistributed to
achieve the perfect income equality. If the income distribution is perfectly equal, no
income needs to be redistributed to achieve equal distribution, so the Hoover index is 0.
If the income distribution is perfectly unequal, all income needs to be redistributed to
achieve equal distribution, so the Hoover index is 1. Thus, the Hoover index ranges
between 0 and 1.
However, how is the Hoover index calculated? In order to get how much income
that has to be to be redistributed to achieve the perfect equality, the percentage of total
income owned by x% of population should be calculated. When the percentage of total
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income owned by x% of population is found, the Gini coefficient comes out immediately.
In this situation, the Hoover index is not needed any more.

5.4 A New Measure for Income Inequality: The Ratio of Gross
Income and Gross Domestic Product
5.4.1 Limitations of the Gini Coefficient
Across all measures for income inequality, the Gini coefficient is most widely used.
The reason for that is because it includes much more information than the others.
However, as all measures including the Gini Coefficient are actually summing an entire
distribution of incomes into a single index, detailed information on the measured
inequality is always reduced.
Furthermore, the Gini coefficient is a relative measure. The Gini coefficient of a
developing country can rise while the number of people in absolute poverty decreases
because the Gini coefficient measures relative, not absolute, income. Two countries might
have the same Gini coefficient although one country is very rich but the other one is very
poor.
In addition, the Gini Coefficient has the following shortcomings. First, different
income distributions may have the same Gini coefficient; Second, identical income
distributions can have different Gini coefficients and third, the income inequality can be
extreme but the income Gini coefficient can be very low.
5.4.2 The Gini Coefficient Announced by China’s Government is Not Trustworthy
The Gini coefficient is a widely accepted measure for income inequality. Many
counties in China announce their Gini every year. The Chinese government has
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announced China’s Gini since 2005 (Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.3 Gini Coefficient of China(2005-2015)
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Data Source:
https://www.statista.com/statistics/250400/inequality-of-income-distribution-inchina-based-on-the-gini-index/

The Gini coefficients in the table above are not reliable. Various reports by widely
respected economists estimate that the Gini coefficient was above 0.6 in 2010 and has
been increasing since 2010. In fact, even the trend reflected in the table is not reliable
because the income distribution has been getting worse since 2000. However, the
information from the government tells us that China’s Gini coefficient has been
decreasing since 2005.
The answer lies in the politics of a non-democratic country. A high Gini coefficient
indicates high income inequality, something a non-democratic country is not likely to
admit to. Socialism theory by Karl Marx argues that capitalism must lead to severe
income polarization, while socialism will create a society with income equality. Karl
Marx and his followers insist that income equality is actually a unique advantage owned
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by socialist countries. Declaring that China is a socialist country, China’s Communist
Party has to show that the income of China is much more evenly distributed than that of
capitalist counties. A specific leader of a communist party will think it is his big
achievement that the Gini coefficient has decreased during his tenure. This can explain
the fact that although almost all Chinese people think that the income inequality has
become more severe over the past 16 years, but the data shows that income inequality has
actually been continuously decreasing.
If the Gini Coefficients announced by the Chinese government are not trustworthy,
how do we find the true Gini Coefficient? It is very hard to do so. The true Gini
Coefficients can only be determined after the true household income is measured, but the
data on true household income is hard to collect due to the existence of substantial grey
income. Grey income will never be reported by its beneficiaries because most of it is
illegal. As a result, other indices or coefficients need to be developed to measure the true
income equality of a country.
5.4.3 Why is Gross Income Lower than Gross Domestic Product? Who Owns the
Unreported Income?
According to macroeconomic fundamentals, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a
country must be equal to the Gross Domestic Income (GDI) of this country. Therefore, if
the GDI is less than the GDP, invisible income or underground income that is not
detected by census must exist, which is called unreported income. The question is who
owns the unreported income.
It is a basic fact that almost all the people in the upper income levels are
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businessmen in U.S, European countries, Japan, Canada, Australia and other democratic
and market-oriented countries. However, wealthy businessmen are only a very small
proportion of the upper income class in China. It is a basic fact that government officials,
high & middle-position employees in public sectors and state-owned companies are the
main part of the upper income class in China. However, it is also a basic fact their salary
(visible income) are very low. Therefore, those people with low visible income and high
total income can be called “invisible millionaires” or “the invisible wealthy”.
Similar to government officials, high & middle-position employees in public sectors
and state-owned companies are also they groups with low visible income but high total
income. We discuss their salary and other underground income one by one.
1. Government Officials
China’s officials have a very strict hierarchical system. There are totally 12 levels
from the lowest to the highest in this system, which are Banshiyuan, Keyuan, Vice Ke,
Ke(Town Governor), Vice Chu, Chu(County Governor), Vice Ju, Ju(City Governor), Vice
Bu, Bu(Provinces Governor), Vice Guo, and Guo(President or Prime Minister).
According to the Salary Standardization Rates of China’s Government Employees
(2016) 106 , the total salary of lowest-level official is less than ￥3000 (434.78.50) per
month. It is too low to believe, but it is the truth. The total salary of the highest-level
official, President or Prime Minister, is ￥11,385 (about $1,830) per month or ￥136,620
($21,960) per year. 107
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Although China’s officials’ salary (visible income) is very low, they lead very
luxurious lives. They consume the most expensive food and clothes. Furthermore, they
have very luxurious purses, watches, gold, diamonds, and luxury cars. They not only own
the most expensive houses in the cities where they are working but also in China’s main
large cities, like Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. That is the reason why they are
called “invisible millionaires” or “the invisible wealthy”.
How can this happen? The only answer is that they have numerous sources of
invisible income apart from their salary (visible income). In fact, Every Chinese knows
that their salary is only a very small part of their total and real income, and every Chinese
knows why they would not like to report their invisible income.
Where does their unreported income come from? Their unreported income is from
bribery and embezzlement. In addition, they also have another kind of income, which is
their personal expenditure but paid not by themselves. They always have dinner in the
best restaurants in a city, but the bills are often paid by the individuals or corporations
that want to bribe them or by the government budget. The same goes for their car, gas,
insurance, domestic or overseas luxury travel, entertainment or erotic activity in night
clubs, and gambling in casinos. This is also a basic fact in China.
2. Employees in Non-government Public Sectors
1) Employees in Non-government institutions with public power or functions
There are many non-government institutes or organizations that have the public
power in non-government public sectors. Many employees in those institutes or
organizations are also “visible millionaire”. Here several examples are taken.
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A. Office of Public Notary
The Office of Public Notary is a monopolistic non-government public institution.
Chinese laws require that many civil activities can only be done through public notary
services. As the only institution to provide public notary services, the Office of Public
Notary can profit by charging high prices but not taking any responsibilities. However,
this high profit does not go into government accounts, but are rather shared by the
employees in the office.
B. Construction Quality and Safe Supervision Office
Similar to the Office of Public Notary, the Construction Quality and Safe
Supervision Office has the power to supervise the construction process but never has the
responsibility for the construction quality and safety. Whether this office confirms to the
construction quality and safety only depends on how much money the contractors will
bribe the office.
C. Red Cross Society of China
Red Cross always refers to the humanitarian institution or movement worldwide.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is the oldest and most honored
organization within the movement and one of the most widely recognized organizations
in the world, having won three Nobel Peace Prizes in 1917, 1944, and 1963. The
American Red Cross, Canadian Red Cross, British Red Cross, German Red Cross, and
other countries’ Red Cross always provide the society with charitable services.
The exception is China’s Red Cross Society. Although China’s Red Cross Society
is a non-government and non-profit organization by law, it is actually affiliated to the
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National Health and Family Planning Commission of China. All senior managers of Red
Cross Society in different area of China are designated by the local government, and all
employees have the same salary, medical insurance, pension as government officials.
The Chinese government controls the Red Cross Society in order for the
government to take possession of the large amounts of money donated by the society. To
accumulate more and more money, the government requires that only the donation given
to Red Cross from companies is tax deductible. Although some charitable organizations
exist in China, those organizations have big difficulties to raise charitable money because
people or companies cannot claim tax deductions if they donate their money to those
organizations. As a result, Red Cross Society became the richest charitable organization
in China.
The visible salary of the employees of China’s Red Cross Society is also very low.
Their luxurious lives are supported not by their basic salary but by their underground
income, which comes from donations from society. A typical example is “Red Cross
Scandal with Guo Meimei” that happened in Juen, 2011. 108 Although Red Cross of China
has declared many times that Red Cross of China was totally innocent, they have never
shown any convincing evidences that can refute what Guo Meimei said.
2) Teachers of Elementary school, middle school, and high school
Some teachers of Elementary school, middle school, and high school have a great
deal of unreported income, which is Buke (Out-of-School Classes) Income. It should be
emphasized here that Buke Income is just unreported income, not illegal income.
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It is the biggest dream for most parents in China to have their children to be
enrolled to the best universities in the country. Thus, in current China, each parent
employs all means possible to improve their children's grades and thus increase their
chances of getting into a leading university. Such competition begins in kindergarten.
Many parents want their children to go to the best kindergartens, the best elementary
schools, middle schools, and high schools. They consider this the best way to ensure their
children go to the best universities.
Before 2000, middle school and high school students learned at school. To
improve the students’ grades, every school tries to extend the study time of students.
Then, many key schools started enforcing a boarding system from the beginning of the
first year of middle school, in which students can only go home once a week and rest one
day. Upon reaching their third year in middle school, the students only go home every
two weeks and rest one day. While in high school, the students go home only once a
month and rest one day. Under such circumstances, students have a longer time to study,
and the parents do not need to find tutors for their children because the children have
almost no time outside of school.
After 2000, the Chinese Ministry of Education began the so-called education
reform, which aimed to shorten the learning time of students and lighten their burden.
According to the new policy, students can only have a maximum of eight classes a day up
to five days a week. On Saturday and Sunday, students must be allowed to rest. From
Monday to Friday, students must be allowed to go home after 4 p.m.
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This education reform, reasonable at first sight, ignored a basic fact. As long as
academic pressures continue to exist, students and parents will use up all the possible
time to study because they understand that entering a leading university with only eight
hours a day of learning is impossible. Then, when students’ study times are forcibly
shortened, parents will absolutely not allow students to rest for a long time outside school.
They will start searching for excellent teachers outside school to make up lessons for
their children.
The competition for good tutors is so fierce that the incomes of many excellent
teachers for making up lessons outside school can reach up to ￥2,000 per hour
(US$300). In Shanghai, many of these teachers can earn $10,000 per week because they
have so much time from 5 p.m. to 8 p.m. Monday to Friday, and from 9 a.m. to 8 p.m.
Saturday to Sunday).
In fact, many parents look for teachers to give extra classes to their children such
that almost all teachers have the opportunity to teach out-of-school classes. Although the
regular teachers do not get paid so well, they can still make big money.
3) Professors in universities and colleges
Unlike teachers in elementary school, middle school, and high school, professors
in universities and colleges do not have opportunities to receive bribes or teach out-ofschool classes. Owing to their low salaries, many professors have been living on very
tight budgets in China. Nonetheless, there are some very rich professors in China’s
universities and colleges. Obviously, their luxurious lives are not supported by their
salaries. What supports their luxurious lives?
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A. Research Grant. Strictly speaking, a research grant is not a grey or
underground income. In the United States and European countries, some proportion of a
research grant is the professor’s income. However, in China, any cent in the research
grant cannot be paid to the professor. Therefore, no matter how many grants a professor
receives, no one cent of these grants is counted into his/her income. However, his/her
salary is so low that he/she has to figure out some ways to transfer the money from his
grant to his own bank account or spend some money from the grant for his/her personal
consumption. The grant money that is transferred to his/her personal income or spent on
personal consumption is the grey or underground income.
B. Income from Part-time Jobs. Many professors in China are unwilling to
commit themselves to teaching and research because of the low salary. They have
considerable free time due to their very light teaching and research tasks such that they
can regard their profession as unimportant. Consequently, many professors take a second
job out of campus. In fact, those professors spend more time in this second job than in
their jobs in the universities. By doing so, they earn a large amount of money. However,
because universities forbid professors from engaging in jobs outside of campus, these
professors will never report the income from their second job. The big money is also the
grey or underground income for these professors.
It should be emphasized here that the income above is just unreported income, not
illegal income.
4) Doctors in hospitals
Doctors in hospitals also have very low incomes, a situation that is very similar to
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those of professors. Some doctors live frugally, though very rich doctors also exist in
China. Where does their extra money come from?
A. Bribery. Doctors are always the persons to whom medicine companies want to
give bribes to. The form of bribery used is kickback. For example, the acceptable price of
a heart stent is $1,200 for a medicine company. The salesman of this medicine company
will tell doctors that his company will pay 20%, that is, $240, back to doctors if they
choose to buy the heart stents for their patients from their medicine company. If a doctor
has 200 patients a year, and each patient needs two stents on average, then this doctor can
earn 200×2×240=$96,000.
B. Out-of-Hospital jobs. Doctors have many opportunities to provide medical
service for other hospitals. For example, excellent surgeons are often invited by other
hospitals to perform surgery for patients there. Although surgeons are paid very little in
their own hospitals, they are paid much higher by other hospitals. For example, an
ophthalmic surgeon is only paid ￥300 ($43) for an extracapsular cataract extraction in
Shanghai Changhai Hospitals. However, if this surgeon is invited to a hospital in Suzhou,
Jiangsu Province, he will be paid ￥1800 ($258).
Again, the income above doctors earn is just unreported income, not illegal
income.
3. Senior Managers of State-Owned Companies
Two kinds of state-owned companies exist. The first is monopolistic state-owned
companies, including State Grid Corporation of China, Water Supply Companies, China
Gas Holdings Ltd., China Grain Reserves Corporation, China National Petroleum
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Corporation, China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation. The second is nonmonopolistic state-owned companies, including the Big Three mobile operators (China
Mobile Co. Ltd., China United Telecommunications Co. Ltd., China Telecommunications
Co. Ltd.), the Big Four state-owned commercial banks (Industrial and Commercial Bank
of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China),
Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation, and China Poly Group Corporation.
The first kind of companies earns significantly more than the second kind owing
to monopoly. In fact, many of the first kind are semi-government companies. For
example, the China Railway Corporation Ministry of Railways is affiliated with the State
Council of the People's Republic of China.
Similar to the government officials in China, the senior managers of state-owned
companies also live very luxurious lives even though their salaries are very low. How can
this happen?
State-owned companies do not have one owner or one person who is actually
responsible for it, although they have a nominal one, say, the company board. In reality,
the senior managers become the true controller of the company. In other words, the senior
managers often make almost all of the decisions without supervision. This is the big
problem with state-owned companies worldwide.
As a result, senior managers can easily take advantage of their power to make
extra money in addition to their salaries. In fact, numerous cases like these can be found
in China. However, this is only the tip of the iceberg. They could make extra money in
the following ways.

100

A. Senior managers could “steal” money from state-owned companies. For
example, they could fake the company’s profit, give a portion of the profit to the
government, and then keep the remaining portion for themselves.
B. Senior managers could include all of their personal consumption expenses into
the company’s cost account. In other words, all of their personal consumption could be
paid by their companies. A portion of the consumption of their spouse, parents, and
children can also be paid by the companies. In fact, they could use company money to
bribe important persons, for example, the presidents of a good high school. Their children
could go to this school even if their children are not qualified.
C. Senior managers could earn money by selling their power. Unlike the owners
of private-owned companies, the managers of state-owned companies do not try to
maximize the company’s profits. What they always do is to try to maximize their own
profits. Here we have two examples.
Example 1: A state-owned housing development company has 200 newly
developed condominiums for sale. However, senior managers have the power to give
10% discount to some persons. For example, if one condo is $1,000,000, then the senior
managers have the power to give $100,000 to some persons. Only the persons who give
bribes to the managers can get this discount. Some managers give a bribery amount, for
instance, $30,000, which means the person who gives $30,000 to the manager could buy
the condo at a 10% discount.
Example 2: A state-owned mobile service company plans to build a new signal
station in a city. The total budget for this new signal station is $1,000,000. The general
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manager has the power to choose the contractors. If three contractors want to undertake
the project, the one who gives the largest bribe to the general manager will be chosen.
4. Owners of Small or Middle Private-owned Companies
Owners or senior managers of private-owned companies have very few
opportunities to conduct bribery and embezzlement. Do they also have grey income, just
like officials do?
First, there is no tax return/deduction of personal income for personal
expenditure. In U.S. and many other western countries, some specific expenditure, for
example, the monthly payment for a housing loan, are income-tax-free. In other words,
they could result in income tax reduction. However, in China, no expenditure could result
in an income tax return.
Second, the tax rate on corporate income is at least 25% in China. The simple
formula is Corporate Tax = (Corporate Earning - Corporate Cost)× 25%. This equation
means that if the corporate cost rises because of corporate earnings, the corporate tax will
go down.
Third, in China, no clear boundary exists between the owner’s personal
expenditure and the company’s cost because neither the content of tax law nor the
execution of tax law is strict.
Thus, owners of private companies can easily include their personal expenditures
into the cost accounts of their companies. In this way, on the one hand, they will not
spend their own salaries on their expenditures, and thus save a lot of money. On the other
hand, their companies will save tremendously on corporate tax.
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Owners can and will take their expenditures into the accounts of their companies.
The companies will have higher costs and lower profits before tax and then lower profit
after tax, because the owners include their expenditures into the accounts of their
companies. The owners’ dividend (their income) will also go down because the profits
after tax are lower. As a result, their nominal income is much lower. We take an example
below.
Assume that Mr. Li is the only owner of H Company, and all his income comes
from the after-tax profit of the company. He used a credit card to pay his expenditures
within a year. At the end of this year, he will use his income to pay back the credit card.
We also assume the following:
Total expenditure of Mr. Li in 2016: ￥300,000
Total earnings of H Company: ￥2,000,000
Total cost of H Company: ￥1,200,000
In China, the corporate tax rate is 25%.
Scenario 1: Mr. Li does not take all his expenditures into the cost account of H
Company.
The tax paid by H Company: (2,000,000-1,200,000)×25%=200,000
His income will be: (2,000,000-1,200,000)×(1-25%)=600,000
If we conduct a survey about income, we will obtain the result that Mr. Li’s
income in 2016 is ￥600,000.
Scenario 2: Mr. Li includes all his expenditures into the cost account of H
Company.
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If Mr. Li includes all his expenditures into the cost account of H Company, then
the cost of H Company will be: 1,200,000+300,000=1,500,000
The tax paid by H Company:(2,000,000-1,500,000)×25%=125,000
His nominal income will be: (2,000,000-1,500,000)×(1-25%)=375,000, which is
also his actual income.
Then the corporate tax he saved is: 200,000-125,000=75,000
His nominal income is: 375,000
His actual Income is: 375,000+300,000=675,000
If we conduct a survey about income, we will obtain the result that Mr. Li’s
income in 2016 is ￥375,000. This income is severely underestimated.
5.4.4 Ratio of Gross Domestic Income and Gross Domestic Product (RGG): A New
Measure for Income Inequality
1. Why is RGG constructed as a new measure?
As previously mentioned, all high-income individuals in China, except the owners or
senior managers of big private-owned companies, have very low salaries (their visible
income). Therefore, their high income does not come from their salary but from
underground or grey income. More precisely, most of the grey income is earned by the
high-income class, which includes officials, employees in public institutions, senior
managers of state-owned companies, and owners of private-owned companies. Grey
income brings them to the high-level-income class because their salary is insufficient.
As indicated in Chapter 1, GDP should be equal to GDI because every dollar in GDP
produced in China must belong to someone in this economy. As a result, if all the income
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of the high income class, including the small salary (nominal income) and the big
underground income, can be uncovered, collected and calculated, then the national total
income or GDI will be equal to the nation’s total product or GDP. By contrast, if one
cannot account for the underground income, then the GDI will be based on salary and
will be less than the GDP.
Given the difficulties in collecting underground income, the data on average
individual income that the China National Bureau of Statistics announces or that other
data-service companies in China own are all only based on the salaries, capital gains, and
other types of reportable income. Thus, the data on China’s average individual income is
actually visible income. Then the GDI can be much lower than the GDP.
Although the GDI has disappointed numerous researchers because it is inaccurate, it
can still deliver crucial information about China. All underground income is earned by
the high income class. Thus, the lower the GDI is than the GDP, the more evidence of the
grey income earned and the more severe the income inequality will be as detailed in
Figure 5.5.
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Bigger Ratio of GDI and GDP

Bigger Difference between GDI
and GDP

More Unreported Income Possessed
by High-level-income Class

Bigger Part of Gross Domestic
Income is owned by High-levelincome Class

More severe Income Inequality
Figure 5.4: Why RGG can be a Measure for Income Inequality

Consequently, along with the Gini coefficient, we can use the ratios of GDI and
GDP, what we will call RGG, to be a measure of the income inequality of China.
Therefore, although salary-based GDI is inaccurate, the ratio of GDI and GDP can
indicate the severity of China’s income inequality.
2. The Process of Calculating RGG
In order to make RGG easier to understand, the calculation process of RGG should
be showed step by step.
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In China, GDP can be used not only for the whole country, but also a province or a city. In U.S., GDP is
often used for the whole country. The aggregate product of a metropolitan area is called Gross Metropolitan
Product(GMP). In the process of calculating, “GDP” means the aggregate product of different cities, which
is equivalent to GMP in U.S. In fact, GDP in this whole study including empirical study(chapter 8), is
always equivalent to GMP in U.S.
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Step 1: The quarterly GDP of four municipalities in China from 2000 to 2003 is detailed
in Table 5.3.
Beijing

Tianjin

Shanghai

2000 Q1

449.10

335.18

985.30

354.94

2000 Q2

595.00

409.03

1104.48

349.09

2000 Q3

649.30

426.56

1109.32

410.84

2000 Q4

1467.60

468.64

1572.07

676.13

2001 Q1

550.50

376.66

1081.86

386.99

2001 Q2

683.17

459.31

1221.08

393.42

2001 Q3

736.63

478.43

1268.93

441.79

2001 Q4

1740.20

512.27

1638.25

754.66

2002 Q1

584.50

426.95

1159.53

424.18

2002 Q2

762.30

488.87

1363.81

451.38

2002 Q3

806.10

534.77

1378.81

500.02

2002 Q4

2177.50

572.01

1838.88

857.28

2003 Q1

666.30

490.57

1325.86

478.23

2003 Q2

849.80

588.74

1499.84

517.06

2003 Q3

945.87

620.46

1584.12

568.36

2561.83

687.17

2284.41

992.07

2003 Q4

Chongqing

Table 5.1 Quarterly GDP of Four Cities
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Step 2: The quarterly disposable income per capita of four municipalities from 2000 to
2003 is obtained.
Beijing

Tianjin

Shanghai

Chongqing

2000Q1

2727.79

1796.61

2594.68

1232.10

2000Q2

2526.09

1874.50

2674.27

1298.31

2000Q3

2382.61

1840.40

2721.65

1353.20

2000Q4

2576.59

1891.33

2804.26

1361.30

2001Q1

3000.57

1981.00

2885.93

1392.22

2001Q2

2778.70

1943.20

2931.70

1429.04

2001Q3

2884.41

1951.25

3029.53

1466.45

2001Q4

2894.53

2040.55

3098.44

1532.44

2002Q1

2938.09

2060.44

3146.94

1588.07

2002Q2

2979.81

2097.56

3234.24

1632.59

2002Q3

3023.99

2160.64

3391.21

1689.23

2002Q4

3152.30

2398.69

3466.45

1744.98

2003Q1

3292.08

2692.22

3526.03

1765.23

2003Q2

3317.42

2777.15

3615.81

1779.73

2003Q3

3348.30

2844.96

3684.43

1804.02

2003Q4

3494.41

3000.32

3767.24

1848.76

Table 5.2 Quarterly Disposable Income per capita of Four Cities
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Step 3: The quarterly residential population data of the four municipalities from 2000 to
2003 is gathered.
Population
Beijing
2000 Q1

937.42

Tianjin

Shanghai

Chongqing

998.50

1605.75

2675.53

2000 Q2

991.00

999.29

1617.34

2678.61

2000 Q3

1047.65

1000.09

1629.01

2681.68

2000 Q4

1107.53

1000.88

1640.77

2684.76

2001 Q1

1170.84

1001.67

1652.61

2687.84

2001 Q2

1237.76

1002.47

1664.54

2690.93

2001 Q3

1308.51

1003.26

1676.55

2694.02

2001 Q4

1383.31

1004.06

1688.65

2697.11

2002 Q1

1393.19

1004.84

1691.26

2706.65

2002 Q2

1403.13

1005.62

1693.88

2716.23

2002 Q3

1413.15

1006.40

1696.50

2725.84

2002 Q4

1423.24

1007.18

1699.12

2735.48

2003 Q1

1431.46

1008.21

1704.43

2745.92

2003 Q2

1439.72

1009.24

1709.76

2756.40

2003 Q3

1448.03

1010.27

1715.10

2766.91

2003 Q4

1456.39

1011.30

1720.46

2777.47

Table 5.3 Quarterly Residential Population of Four Cities
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Step 4: The quarterly population is multiplied with the quarterly disposable income per
capita to obtain the GDI.

2000 Q1

Beijing
255.71

Tianjin
179.39

Shanghai
416.64

Chongqing
329.65

2000 Q2

250.34

187.32

432.52

347.77

2000 Q3

249.61

184.06

443.36

362.89

2000 Q4

285.37

189.30

460.11

365.48

2001 Q1

351.32

198.43

476.93

374.21

2001 Q2

343.94

194.80

487.99

384.54

2001 Q3

377.43

195.76

507.92

395.06

2001 Q4

400.40

204.88

523.22

413.32

2002 Q1

409.33

207.04

532.23

429.84

2002 Q2

418.11

210.93

547.84

443.45

2002 Q3

427.34

217.45

575.32

460.46

2002 Q4

448.65

241.59

588.99

477.34

2003 Q1

471.25

271.43

600.99

484.72

2003 Q2

477.62

280.28

618.22

490.56

2003 Q3

484.84

287.42

631.92

499.16

2003 Q4

508.92

303.42

648.14

513.49

Table 5.4 Quarterly Gross Domestic Income of Four Cities
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Step 5: GDP is divided by GDI to derive the RGG.
Beijing

Tianjin

Shanghai

Chongqing

2000 Q1

0.339893

0.46445

0.378356

0.794392

2000 Q2

0.323245

0.463525

0.369109

0.802042

2000 Q3

0.309673

0.446045

0.361998

0.798015

2000 Q4

0.344568

0.433764

0.36132

0.749404

2001 Q1

0.401249

0.462453

0.390527

0.803794

2001 Q2

0.381504

0.432274

0.384967

0.792031

2001 Q3

0.397394

0.421426

0.383654

0.784626

2001 Q4

0.407266

0.424696

0.374435

0.791359

2002 Q1

0.409237

0.437079

0.38838

0.830476

2002 Q2

0.392522

0.428291

0.387122

0.806338

2002 Q3

0.381049

0.423762

0.395937

0.820933

2002 Q4

0.392477

0.444698

0.392027

0.789722

2003 Q1

0.394192

0.481641

0.379606

0.801267

2003 Q2

0.384962

0.474051

0.372682

0.77743

2003 Q3

0.381521

0.475

0.368307

0.76622

2003 Q4

0.386711

0.483889

0.373248

0.768325

Table 5.5 Quarterly Ration of GDI to GDP of Four Cities

3. The Comparison between RGG and Gini Coefficient
In order to clarify the feature of RGG, a comparison is made here between RGG and Gini
Coefficient.
(1) Common Features of Gini Coefficient and RGG
First, they are both nonnegative.
Second, they are both bounded by 0 and 1.
Third, they are both a proportion, not an absolute value.
(2) Differences between Gini Coefficient and RGG
First, they are calculated differently and based on different economic information.
Second, RGG is suitable for a country where the majority of the income of the
upper class is coming from grey income. It is not a good measure for a country where the
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proportion of grey income in a household’s income for every class is very low. The Gini
coefficient can be used everywhere, but it is very hard to get the true Gini coefficient
when there is a large amount of grey income in the economy.
Third, there exists a negative relation between RGG and income inequality. In
other words, a smaller RGG means more extreme income inequality, or a larger RGG
means less income inequality. However, the relationship between the Gini coefficient and
income inequality is positive.
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CHAPTER 6: TRANSMISSION MECHANISM FROM
INCOME INEQUALITY TO RAPIDLY RISING
HOUSING PRICES
6.1 Under the New Economic Relationship, Increasing Income
Inequality will Cause High Aggregate Savings Rate
In the literature review in Chapter 2, many studies have been conducted on income
inequality and gross savings rate. However, the relationship between the two are rarely
examined.
Research on the relationship between income inequality and the gross savings rate is
rare because most previous studies assume that the MPC and MPS are both homogeneous
for all households at different income levels. If households at different income levels
have the same MPC and MPS, then income inequality will have no effect on the gross
savings rate. As a result, the relationship between income inequality and the gross savings
rate has been ignored. However, income inequality is crucial to the gross savings rate if
the MPC and MPS are heterogeneous, that is, households at different income levels have
different MPCs and MPSs.
Under the new law, a more severe income inequality will increase the gross savings
rate. The proof is as follows.
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6.1.1 The Proof that More Severe Income Inequality Leads to Higher Gross Saving
Rate: Discrete Income-level
1. Two income levels and two different propensities to save
Assumptions: there are two income-level household in an economy. One is highincome household, the other is low-income household. Let α1 α 2 be the proportion of
total income of high-income and low-income households in Gross Domestic Product,
respectively. Obviously, α 1 > α 2 and α 1 + α 2 = 1 . The bigger α1 , the more severe
income inequality.
Let c1 c2 be the propensity to consume for high-income and low-income households,
respectively. According to the new economic law discussed in Chapter 4, we know

0 < c1 < c 2 ≤ 1 .
Denote Y to be Gross Domestic Products and denote S to be aggregate saving rate.
We have:
S=

α 1Y (1 − c1 ) + α 2Y (1 − c 2 )

(6.1)

Y

Want to show: S will increase if α1 increases, in other words, more severe income
inequality will cause higher aggregate saving rate.
Proof:

α 1 + α 2 = 1 gives α 1 = 1 − α 2 . Then,
S=

α 1Y (1 − c1 ) + α 2Y (1 − c 2 )
Y

= α 1 (1 − c1 ) + α 2 (1 − c 2 ) = α 1 (1 − c1 ) + (1 − α 1 )(1 − c 2 )

(6.2)
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Therefore,

dS
= (1 − c1 ) − (1 − c 2 ) = c 2 − c1 > 0
dα 1

(6.3)

This means that the aggregate saving rate will increase when income inequality
becomes severe.
2. Three income levels and three different propensities to save
Assumptions: there are three income-level household in an economy: high, middle
and low. Let α1 α 2 α 3 be the proportion of total income of high-income, middle-income,
low-income

households

in

Gross

Domestic

Product,

respectively.

Obviously,

α 1 > α 2 > α 3 and α 1 + α 2 + α 3 = 1 .
Let c1 c2 c2 be the propensity to consume for high-income, middle income and lowincome households, respectively. According to the new economic law discussed in
Chapter 4, we know 0 < c1 < c 2 < c3 ≤ 1 .
Denote Y to be Gross Domestic Products and denote S to be aggregate saving rate.
We have:
S=

α 1Y (1 − c1 ) + α 2Y (1 − c 2 ) + α 3Y (1 − c3 )
Y

(6.4)

When income inequality becomes severe, we have the following scenarios:
Scenario 1: α1 becomes bigger
Want to show: S will increase if α1 increases, in other words, more severe income
inequality will cause higher aggregate saving rate.
Proof:
Sub-scenarios 1: α1 becomes bigger, both α 2 and α 3 become smaller
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So

∂α 2
<0
∂α 1

∂α 2
≤1
∂α 1

Since ∆α 2 ≤ ∆α 1 , Then

(6.5)

Sub-scenarios 2: α1 becomes bigger, α 2 become smaller, α 3 does not change
So

∂α 2
<0
∂α 1

Since ∆α 2 = ∆α 1 , Then

∂α 2
= −1
∂α 1

Sub-scenarios 3: α1 becomes bigger, α 2 does not change, α 3 become smaller
So

∂α 2
=0
∂α 1

Sub-scenarios 4: α1 becomes bigger, α 2 becomes bigger, α 3 become much smaller
So

∂α 2
>0
∂α 1

Then,

α 1Y (1 − c1 ) + α 2Y (1 − c 2 ) + α 3Y (1 − c3 )

= α 1 (1 − c1 ) + α 2 (1 − c 2 ) + α 3 (1 − c3 ) ⇒
Y
S = α 1 (1 − c1 ) + α 2 (1 − c 2 ) + (1 − α 1 − α 2 )(1 − c3 ) ⇒
S=

∂α 2
∂α 2
∂S
)(1 − c3 ) ⇒
= (1 − c1 ) +
(1 − c 2 ) + (−1 −
∂α1
∂α 1
∂α 1
∂α 2 ∂α 2
∂α 2 ∂α 2
∂S
c 2 − 1 + c3 −
c3 ⇒
= (1 − c1 ) +
−
+
∂α 1
∂α 1 ∂α 1
∂α 1 ∂α 1
∂α 2
∂S
(c 3 − c 2 )
= (c3 − c1 ) +
∂α 1
∂α 1

(6.6)

Since c1 < c2 < c3
we have:
c3 − c1 > 0

c3 − c 2 > 0

c3 − c1 > c3 − c 2
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For Sub-scenarios 1, we also know

∂α 2
≤1
∂α 1

Then we have:
∂α 2
∂α 2
∂S
= (c3 − c1 ) +
(c3 − c 2 ) = (c3 − c1 ) −
(c 3 − c 2 ) > 0
∂α 1
∂α 1
∂α 1

Sub-scenarios 2: We also know

(6.7)

∂α 2
= −1
∂α 1

Then we have:
∂α 2
∂S
(c3 − c 2 ) = (c3 − c1 ) − (c3 − c 2 ) = c1 − c 2 > 0
= (c3 − c1 ) +
∂α 1
∂α 1

Sub-scenarios 3: We also know

(6.8)

∂α 2
=0
∂α 1

Then we have:
∂α 2
∂S
(c3 − c 2 ) = c3 − c1 > 0
= (c3 − c1 ) +
∂α 1
∂α 1

Sub-scenarios 4: We also know

(6.9)

∂α 2
>0
∂α 1

Then we have:
∂α 2
∂S
(c 3 − c 2 ) > 0
= (c3 − c1 ) +
∂α 1
∂α 1

(6.10)

This means that the saving rate will go up when income inequality become severe.

Sub-scenarios 5: α1 becomes bigger, α 2 becomes much smaller, α 3 become bigger
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So

∂α 3
>0
∂α 1

Then,

α 1Y (1 − c1 ) + α 2Y (1 − c 2 ) + α 3Y (1 − c3 )

= α 1 (1 − c1 ) + α 2 (1 − c 2 ) + α 3 (1 − c3 ) ⇒
Y
S = α 1 (1 − c1 ) + (1 − α 1 − α 3 )(1 − c 2 ) + α 3 (1 − c3 ) ⇒
S=

∂α 3
∂α
∂S
= (1 − c1 ) + (−1 − 3 )(1 − c 2 ) +
(1 − c3 ) ⇒
∂α 1
∂α 1
∂α 1
∂α
∂α 3
∂α 3 ∂α 3
∂S
= (1 − c1 ) + −1 + c 2 − 3 +
−
c2 +
c3 ⇒
∂α 1
∂α 1 ∂α 1
∂α 1 ∂α 1
∂α 3
∂S
= (c 2 − c1 ) +
(c 3 − c 2 )
∂α 1
∂α 1

(6.11)

Since c1 < c2 < c3
we have:
c3 − c1 > 0

c3 − c 2 > 0

We also know

∂α 3
>0
∂α 1

Then
∂α 3
∂S
(c 3 − c 2 ) > 0
= (c 2 − c1 ) +
∂α 1
∂α 1

Scenario 2: α1 does not change, α 2 becomes bigger, α 3 become smaller
In this scenario, When α 2 increases, the income inequality becomes more severe.
Want to show: S will increase if α 2 increases, in other words, more severe income
inequality will cause higher aggregate saving rate.
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Proof:
Then we have:

∂α 1
=0
∂α 2

∂α 3
= −1
∂α 2

α 1Y (1 − c1 ) + α 2Y (1 − c 2 ) + α 3Y (1 − c3 )

= α 1 (1 − c1 ) + α 2 (1 − c 2 ) + α 3 (1 − c3 ) ⇒
Y
S = α 1 (1 − c1 ) + α 2 (1 − c 2 ) + (1 − α 1 − α 2 )(1 − c3 ) ⇒
S=

∂α
∂α 1
∂S
=
(1 − c1 ) + (1 − c 2 ) + (− 1 − 1)(1 − c3 ) ⇒
∂α 2
∂α 2 ∂α 2

∂S
= 0 + (1 − c1 ) − (1 − c3 ) =c 3 −c1
∂α 2

(6.12)

Since c1 < c2 < c3
We have:
∂S
==c 3 −c1 > 0
∂α 2

(6.13)

This means that the aggregate saving rate will go up when income inequality
become severe.
6.1.2 A Simple Simulation on the Relationship between Income Inequality and
Aggregate Saving Rate at Discrete Income-level
In order to show the relationship between income inequality and aggregate saving
rate at Discrete Income-level, a simple simulation is run here.
General Assumptions:
1. The population is 100
2. Total income is $5,000,000 in a specific year
3. Three income level: Low, Middle and High
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There are four scenarios.
1. Scenario 1: Income Inequality
Assumptions:
1) There are 10 low-level income families, 80 middle-level income families, 10
high-level income families.
2) Each low-level income family earns $10,000; Each middle-level income
family earns $50,000; Each high-level income family earns $90,000 this year.
3) The Propensity to Consume of low-level income families is 100%; The
Propensity to Consume of middle-level income families is 80%; The Propensity to
Consume of high-level income families is 40%.
The results are shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Income Distribution and Social Saving Rate (Scenario 1)
Population: 100 Total Income: $ 5,000,000

Low-Level
Income
Families
Low-Level
Income
Families
Low-Level
Income
Families

Sum

Population

Income
Per
Capita
($)

Total
Income of
Each Class

Propensity
to
Consume

Consumption
Per Year ($)

Propensity
to Save

Savings
Per Year

10

10000

100000

100%

100000

0%

0

80

50000

4000000

80%

3200000

20%

800000

10
90000
900000
100
5000000
Aggregate Consumption Rate
0.732

40%

360000
60%
540000
3660000
1340000
Aggregate Savings Rate
0.268

Table 6.1 shows the aggregate savings rate is 0.268 when income distribution is equal.
2. Scenario 2: Not Severe Income Inequality
Assumptions:
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1) There are 70 low-level income families, 20 middle-level income families, 10
high-level income families.
2) Each low-level income family earns $10,000; Each middle-level income
family earns $50,000; Each high-level income families earn $330,000 this year.
3) The Propensity to Consume of low-level income families is 100%; The
Propensity to Consume of middle-level income families is 80%; The Propensity to
Consume of high-level income families is 40%. (Same as before)
The results are shown in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 Income Distribution and Social Saving Rate (Scenario 2)
Population: 100 Total Income: $ 5,000,000

Low-Level
Income
Families
Low-Level
Income
Families
Low-Level
Income
Families

Sum

Population

Income
Per
Capita ($)

Total
Income of
Each Class

Propensity
to
Consume

70

10000

700000

100%

700000

0%

0

20

50000

1000000

80%

800000

20%

200000

10
330000
3300000
100
5000000
Aggregate Consumption Rate
0.564

40%

Consumption
Per Year($)

Propensity
to Save

Savings
Per Year
($)

1320000
60% 1980000
2820000
2180000
Aggregate Savings Rate
0.436

Table 6.3 shows the aggregate savings rate is 0.46 when income inequality is not severe.
3. Scenario 3: Severe Income Inequality
Assumptions:
1) There are 90 low-level income families, 8 middle-level income families, 2
high-level income families.
2) Each low-level income family earns $10,000; Each middle-level income
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family earns $50,000; Each high-level income family earns $1,850,000 this year.
3) The Propensity to Consume of low-level income families is 100%; The
Propensity to Consume of middle-level income families is 80%; The Propensity to
Consume of high-level income families is 40%. (Same as before)
The results are shown in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3 Income Distribution and Social Saving Rate (Scenario 3)
Population: 100 Total Income: $ 5,000,000

Low-Level
Income
Families
Low-Level
Income
Families
Low-Level
Income
Families

Sum

Population

Income
Per Capita
($)

Total
Income of
Each Class

Propensity
to
Consume

Consumption
Per Year

Propensity
to Save

90

10000

900000

100%

900000

0%

0

8

50000

400000

80%

320000

20%

80000

2 1850000
3700000
100
5000000
Aggregate Consumption Rate
0.54

40%

Savings
Per Year

1480000
60% 2220000
2700000
2300000
Aggregate Savings Rate
0.46

Table 6.3 shows the aggregate savings rate is 0.46 when income inequality is severe.
4. Scenario 4: Very Severe Income Inequality
Assumptions;
1) There are 70 low-level income families, 10 middle-level income families, 20
high-level income families.
2) Each low-level income family earns $10,000; Each middle-level income
family earns $50,000; Each high-level income family earns $180,000 this year.
3) The Propensity to Consume of low-level income families is 100%; The
Propensity to Consume of middle-level income families is 80%; The Propensity to
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Consume of high-level income families is 40%. (Same as before)
The results are shown in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4 Income Distribution and Social Saving Rate (Scenario 4)
Population: 100 Total Income: $ 5,000,000

Low-Level
Income
Families
Low-Level
Income
Families
Low-Level
Income
Families

Sum

Population

Income
Per
Capita ($)

Total
Income of
Each Class

70

10000

700000

10

50000

Propensity
to
Consume

Consumption
Per Year

Propensity
to Save

100%

700000

0%

0

500000

80%

400000

20%

100000

20
180000
3600000
100
4800000
Aggregate Consumption Rate
0.529

40%

1440000
60% 2160000
2540000
2260000
Aggregate Savings Rate
0.471

Table 6.4 shows the aggregate savings rate is 0.471 when income inequality is very
severe.
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Savings
Per Year

6.1.3 The Proof that More Severe Income Inequality Leads to Higher Aggregate
Savings Rate: Continuous Income-level
Income Proportion Y
Consumption Proportion
y
100%
Lorenz Curve

0 Lowest Income

Highest Income 100%

Income Level x

Figure 6.1: Lorenz Curve and Gini Coefficient
Assume that Lorenz Curve is expressed by:

Y = xa 0 ≤ x ≤ 1

a ≥1

(6.14)

Y: the percentage of income, or the proportion of overall income possessed by the
bottom x of the people.
If we assume the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of this country is equal to 1, Y is
also the total income possessed by the bottom x of the people.
x: The bottom x of the people
Then we have:
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Y

=x

a =1

A diagonal Line

= xa

a >1

A curve convex to (0,1)

0 ≤ x <1

0

=

a=∞

x =1

1

A broken Line

(6.15)
So, Y = x a is a function that describes Lorenz Curve very well. We also see that “a”
is the coefficient that represents the income inequality.
The Gini coefficient G, can be obtained by:
1

1

G = (0.5 − ∫ x dx) / 0.5 = 1 − 2 ∫ x a dx
a

0

(6.16)

0

we have:

1 a+1 1
x 0 = 0.5 − 0.5G
a +1

(6.17)

1
1+ G
−2=
1− G
1− G

(6.18)

a=

Obviously, when G is bigger, a is bigger. So, “a” represents the income inequality.
When G=0, a=1, which means the income is totally equal for all people in this country.
When G=1, a = ∞ , which means the income is the most extremely unequal, or the
wealthiest one possesses all the wealth of this country.
As said before, when we assume this country’s GDP is equal to 1, Y is the income
owned by the bottom x of the people, that is, the accumulated income owned by the
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bottom x of the people. Then the derivative of Y is the income owned by the xth person,
which is denoted by y.
That is: y =

dY
= ax a −1
dx

(6.19)

The savings of the xth person, s, is a proportion of y:

s = b( x) y = b( x)ax a −1

(6.20)

Where b is the savings rate
We know that, s becomes larger when x becomes larger due to the new economic
relationship established in Chapter 4. That is:

b = f (x) with

db
>0
dx

(6.21)

Let us assume b and x have a positively linear relation and the savings rate for the
most lowest income level and most highest income level are 0 and m (m is less than 1 but
very close to 1), respectively.
Then we have: b = mx 0 < m < 1
When x=0, b=0, which means the savings rate for the lowest income family is
equal to 0, that is, b(0)=0. When x=1, b=m, which means the savings rate for the highest
income family is m, that is, b(1)=m. All these conclusions are exactly consistent with the
assumptions.
Substituting b = mx into (6.21) gives:

s = by = (mx)(ax a −1 ) = max a

(6.22)

Then the aggregate savings rate, which is also equal to total savings of this
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economy because Y=1, is the integral of s, that is,
1

S = ∫ max a dx =
0

Substitute a =

am a +1 1
am
x 0=
a +1
a +1

(6.23)

1+ G
into (6.23) gives:
1− G

1+ G
S = m × 1 − G = 0.5m(1 + G )
1+ G
+1
1− G

(6.24)

Since m>0, S will increase when G increases. In other words, when income
inequality becomes more severe, the savings rates will go up. This is exactly what we
want to prove.
Let’s end this discussion by adding consumptions curve and savings curve to
Lorenz curve.
Denote c to be the consumption of the xth person. We know

s = by = mx × ax a−1 = max a

(6.25)

we have：

c = (1 − b) y = (1 − mx) × ax a −1 = ax a −1 − amx a

(6.26)

The accumulated consumption C of the bottom x of the people is the integral of
c, that is,
x

(

)

C = ∫ az a −1 − amz a dz = z a 0x −
0

ma a +1 x
ma a +1
z 0 = xa −
x
a +1
a +1
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(6.27)

The accumulated savings , S of the bottom x of the people is:

S = Y − C = xa − (xa −

ma a+1
ma a+1
x )=
x
a +1
a +1

(6.28)

The consumption curve and saving curve are shown in Figure 6.2.
Income Proportion Y
Consumption Proportion
y
100%

Lorenz Curve

Savings Curve

Consumptions Curve
0 Lowest Income

Highest Income 100%

Income Level x

Figure 6.2: Lorenz Curve, Savingss Curves and Consumptions Curve

6.2 High Gross Savings Rate Will Cause High Demand for
Virtual Assets and Low Demand for Real Assets
A high gross savings rate is not necessarily a negative thing. By contrast, a high
gross savings rate is a good signal for a country in most situations. According to
neoclassical theories, the basic production function is as follows:
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Y = f ( K , L)

∂Y
>0
∂K

∂Y
>0
∂L

(6.30)

where Y denotes production, K denotes capitals, and L, denotes labor.
The equations show that production will rise when capital increases because the
latter will increase when the gross savings rate increases given the GDP. Therefore, a
high savings rate will bring about high production and, consequently, boost the economic
growth of this country. This result is a mainstream viewpoint in economics.
The underlying assumption for this viewpoint is that all savings can be transferred to
production capital. Thus, a high savings rate will increase production capital. However, it
is not necessary for all savings to be transferred to production capital under some
conditions.
Companies base their product supply decisions on how much profit they will earn
from the product. If the demand for consumption goods is strong, the prices of
consumption goods will go up and then the benefit to the companies will increase. As a
result, the company will produce and supply more. When demand, supply, and
transactions all increase, the prosperity of the consumption market increases.
The demand for production factors (materials, machines, assembly lines, facilities,
land, and labor) is a derivative demand from the consumption market. In other words, the
demand for production factors is caused by the demand for consumption goods. For
example, the demand for cotton, sewing machines, and spinning mills will rise when the
demand for clothes, quilts, and sheets is high. Consequently, the production factor market
will be prosperous if the consumption market is strong. By contrast, if the consumption
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market is weak, the production factor market will be recessive.
In addition, profits will go up if both prices and transactions increase. Assuming that
a country’s GDP is Y and the total savings is S, then the consumption C is
C =Y −S

(6.31)

Obviously, when C becomes bigger (demand line shifts right), both the prices (P)
and transactions (Q) of goods will increase. On the other hand, when the C becomes
smaller (demand line shifts left), both the prices (P) and transactions (Q) of goods will
decrease (Figure 6.3).
P

P1
P0
P2

D1
D2’
Q2 Q0

’

D0
Q

Q1

Figure 6.3 Both Demand and Transaction will Change When C Changes

Denote sales revenue by H, then H=PQ, which is the measure for the consumption
market’s prosperity. Since P and Q are both increasing functions of C, then H is also a
increasing function of C. That is,

H = f (C )

f ′(C ) < 0

We know C=Y-S. When Y is fixed, we have:
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(6.32)

dC
= −1
dS

(6.33)

Given (6.32) and (6.33), we have,

dH dH dC
dH
=
⋅
=−
<0
dS
dC dS
dc

(6.34)

Assume the cost per product is stable. Then profits will go up if H becomes larger.
Let π be the profit. We then have

π = g (H )

g ′( H ) > 0

(6.35)

Combining (6.32) and (6.35) gives:

π = g ( f (C )) = g ( f ( K − S ))
Since

(6.36)

dπ
dH
< 0 and
>0
dS
dH

we have

dπ dπ dH
=
×
<0
dS dH dS

(6.37)

We find that the profits will decrease if savings, S, increases. Then, companies will
reduce their supply instead of extending production. Therefore, the consumption markets
and production factor markets will be recessive. In other words, when savings increases,
the increased savings will not transfer into production capital and boost the real sector to
be prosperous, which is an opposite conclusion to that expected for mainstream
economies.
When the savings continuously increases but is not invested into the real sector,
where will those savings go? The answer is that they will go to the asset markets. In other
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words, they will be used to buy stocks, bonds, funds, gold, houses, and so on.
If the return from an asset market, say, the stock market, can totally reflect the
performance of consumption markets, then the return from asset markets is always the
same as or very close to that from consumption or factor markets. Then, the return from
asset markets will not be higher than that from consumption or factor markets, and high
savings will not be motivated to pursue after assets.
However, the return from asset markets does not always reflect the performance of
consumption markets. The prices of assets depend on the expected return of consumption
or factor markets, not the current return of consumption or factor markets. Consequently,
the prices of assets actually depend on the prices of consumption goods or factors
expected in the future, not the current prices of consumption or factors goods. Asset
prices do not always reflect the performance of consumption markets because
expectations are not always accurate. In fact, investors often build their expectation on
what has happened in the past. That is, the asset prices built on the expected return will be
affected by the historical trend of the asset prices. For example, when asset prices
continuously increase in the past 12 months, people will often predict that asset prices
will also go up in the next 3 months.
Even if we admit that the return from asset markets does not always follow the
return from consumption or factor markets very closely, we cannot conclude that the
return from asset markets is higher than that from consumption or factor markets. For
example, if the return from asset markets is lower than the return from consumption or
factor markets, then why will savings still flow into the asset markets?
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The reason lies in the unique feature of asset markets. When a person spends his/her
money founding a manufacturing company (real assets) and then manages this company,
his/her return is determined by the profits the company earns. However, when a person
invests money into the stock (virtual assets) of a manufacturing company, his/her return
not only depends on the holding period returns (dividends) coming from the profits but
also on the difference between purchase prices and expected resale prices (capital gains).
When the capital gains are high, the investor will prefer the virtual assets to real assets
even if the ratio of dividends/price of virtual assets is much lower than that of
profit/investment of real assets (a company).
However, how can the capital gains be high if the D/P ratio of virtual assets is
extremely low? The answer is the difference between the purchase price and the expected
sale price, because the capital gains will be determined by the price trend. If the asset
prices are expected to increase, then the capital gain will increase by expectation.
Consequently, even if the dividend of one asset is very low, the asset can still be
attractive if investors expect the prices to increase, that is, the expected capital gains will
increase. Hence, once investors expect that the price will rise for some reason, they will
transfer their money into this asset market. Once a huge amount of money hits this asset,
the asset price will go up, thus confirming the investors’ expectation. They will transfer
more money into this asset market when their expectations are confirmed. Consequently,
the asset price will continue to rise, and the positive feedback cycle appears.
If there is any factor that helps investors build the expectation that asset prices will
go up, then savings will pour into this asset market and push the asset prices up. The
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increasing asset prices will confirm the expectation and then attract more savings to this
market, further boosting the asset prices to rise.
This mechanism is called a self-reinforcing or self-actualizing mechanism. Owing to
this mechanism, when the savings increase and the consumption and factor markets are
recessive, the savings will flow into the asset markets. As long as there is information that
helps investors build the expectation that the asset prices will go up, the savings will pour
into the asset markets and lead to the prosperity of these markets.
Next, when savings increased, the savings will not flow to the consumption markets
but will flow into the asset markets instead. The reason is that the high savings caused by
income inequality is always accompanied by low consumption, which will lead to a very
weak demand for consumption goods and recessive consumption and factor markets.
Recessive consumption and factor markets reap low profits, which stifles the new savings
from coming in and chases the capital out of the market.

6.3 High Demand for Virtual Assets and Increasing Housing
Prices: Why Are Houses Preferred to Other Assets?
The previous part has concluded that high savings caused by income inequality will
flow into the asset markets. The next question is this: In China, why are houses preferred
over other assets given that high savings result from severe income inequality?
There are many types of assets in capital markets:
1. Stocks
2. Bonds
3. Commercial Real Estate (Office, Retail, Industrial, and Other Commercial Real
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Estate) and Real Estate Investment Trusts
4. Gold
5. Houses
To answer the question, we can analyze the different types of assets one by one.
1. Stock
Theoretically, a stock value is determined by the present value of all expected
dividends from the company in the future. In practice, however, a stock price is
determined by the present value of the expected dividends before sale and the expected
price at sale.
In the short run, the stock price often deviates from the market fundamentals because
the expected price at sale is affected by the previous price. The stock prices, however,
have rarely been away from the market fundamentals in the long run.
Given that the expected dividend is coming from the profit the company is expected
to earn in the future, a stock price relies on the profits the company is expected to earn
and the expected price when it is sold. The expected price essentially relies on the
expected profit the company is expected to earn in the long run. Therefore, the stock price
is essentially determined by the expected profit of the company in the future, which is
called the market fundamentals of this stock. If the consumption markets are recessive,
the profit from consumption markets will decrease, and then the stock price will go down
due to the low expected profit and the low expected price at sale.
Therefore, only when the market fundamentals are very good will investors conduct
a long-term investment on this stock. If the market fundamentals have a poor
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performance, investors will take a short-time strategy of buying stocks and then selling
them in very short time. This behavior has thus become a pure speculation behavior and
the market has become a speculative market.
When severe income inequality leads to high savings and low consumption, the
consumption markets will be recessive and will bring investors a poor market
fundamental. The stock market will become a speculative market, which is always a very
risky market. Therefore, when the market fundamentals are poor, the stock market
becomes a very risky market. A very risky market is less attractive and prevents investors
from investing into this market. This is the reason the stock market is not preferred by
investors under the condition of severe income inequality.
2. Bonds
In practice, a bond price is determined by the present value of the interest paid by
the company before sale and the expected price at sale. However, the interest payments
from a bond are typically all equal to the fixed value by the bond contract. The discount
rate is the determining factor for bond prices. Future discount rates are hard to predict.
The same goes for bond prices. When bond prices are unpredictable, bonds will be less
attractive to investors.
When the income inequality is severe and the consumption market is recessive,
corporate bonds and government bonds will be unable to pay high interest rates to the
bond holder. The low interests plus very risky capital gains make the debt unattractive to
the investors.
3. Commercial Real Estate
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Similar to a stock, the price of a piece of commercial real estate is determined by the
expected rent collected from the real estate before sale and the price at sale. Moreover,
similar to a stock, the price at sale is essentially determined by expected rents, though it is
affected by the previous prices of this real estate in the short run. When income inequality
is severe and the consumption market is recessive, the affordability of consumers and
companies will go down. As a result, the expected rents from commercial real estate, for
example, retail, office, and industrial property, will decline. Subsequently, a commercial
real estate investment will have poor performance.
Consequently, the return from investment on commercial real estate deteriorates if
the consumption markets are recessive. When the consumption markets are recessive and
the savings increase, those savings are not likely to flow into commercial real estate or
REITs.
4. Foreign Exchanges
Exchange rates are the ratios between the currencies of different countries. The
reasons for an exchange rate change are very complex.
1) In the short term, only “arbitrage opportunities” are available for the exchange
market. In reality, arbitrage opportunities are very few because the exchange market is
very efficient. Even if arbitrage opportunities appear, they disappear very quickly because
of arbitrage.
2) In the middle term, there are “speculation opportunities” in the exchange market.
But the opportunities could only show up in a monetary crisis. Since monetary crises
appear rarely; thus, speculation opportunities are also rare.
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3) In the long term, there are “investment opportunities” in exchange markets. When
the investors expect that one country’s currency will appreciate in the long term, they will
buy this country’s currency right now and sell them in the future. The reason this
country’s currency increases is rooted in the real economy or the financial systems. Those
opportunities are also very few.
5. Financial Derivatives
Derivatives are one of the three main categories of financial instruments, with the
other two being stocks (i.e., equities or shares) and debt (i.e., bonds and mortgages).
Financial derivatives include forwards, futures, options, and swaps. A derivative is
essentially a contract that derives its value from the performance of an underlying entity.
Derivatives can be used for a number of purposes, including insuring against price
movements (hedging), increasing exposure to price movements for speculation, or getting
access to otherwise hard-to-trade assets or markets 110.
The prices of the derivatives will be mainly determined by the fluctuations of the
underlying asset prices. The derivatives are risky because the prices of underlying assets
change frequently over time. In addition, most derivatives are bought by leverage, which
adds more risks to derivatives. Therefore, financial derivatives are not preferred by many
investors.
6. Gold
The most distinguished feature of gold is that it has very strong liquidity. In fact, it is
the one with the strongest liquidity in all assets except currency. Due to the very strong
110

Koehler, Christian. "The Relationship Between the Complexity of Financial Derivatives and Systemic
Risk". Working Paper: 10–11
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liquidity, gold will be overpriced than any other assets. So the return of gold is lower than
many other assets.
In addition, investment in gold is a pure speculation behavior because investors do
not get income from holding gold. The only profit the investors get is from the capital
gains. Due to no periodical returns, the return of gold is much lower than many other
assets.
As a result, The purpose of investment on gold is to avoid wealth loss, not to get a
high return. Gold is preferred only in very uncertain economic environments, say, in a
period of war, a big economic crisis, or a severe natural disaster, when the risk of wealth
loss is high.
7. Funds and Insurances
An investment fund is a supply of capital belonging to numerous investors used to
collectively purchase securities while each investor retains ownership and control of his
own shares 111. Mutual funds and hedge funds are the two main types of investment funds.
Mutual funds pool money from numerous investors to purchase securities and build
an asset portfolio. There are stocks, bonds, and exchanges in this portfolio. In other
words, various types of funds and insurances make profits by investing on stocks, bonds,
and exchanges. Hence, the performance of funds and insurances depends on the
performance of those assets. A hedge fund is an investment vehicle that is open only to
investors who are qualified in some way. A hedge fund employs a number of different
strategies to earn an active return or alpha for their investors. Hedge funds may be
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http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/investment-fund.asp
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aggressively managed or make use of derivatives and leverage in both domestic and
international markets with the goal of generating high returns 112.
A mutual fund sets its goals as “low risk, reasonable return, and steady growth.” In
other words, investors can hardly make a big fortune by investing funds. The exception is
a hedge fund, which sets its goals as “high return and reasonable risk,” but it is only
accessible to accredited investors.
Moreover, as discussed earlier, very few opportunities are available to make big
profits from exchanges and gold. There may be opportunities to make big money in stock
markets and bond markets, but these are very short-term and risky when the market
fundamentals are poor.
8. House
A house is very similar to a commercial property or a stock when it is invested in as
an asset, but it also has distinct differences.
1) House purchase is both a consumption decision and an investment decision
The reason is rooted in the characteristics of houses. A house is not only an
investment asset but also a consumption good. When a person buys a house, his purpose
may be to consume, to invest, or to consume and invest.
When a person conducts a pure investment behavior, for example, buying a stock or
a retail property, his decision purely relies on the profits he expects to earn. When a
person makes a consumption purchase, the decision relies on the utility from the
consumption good. However, if a person buys an object that is both a consumption good

112
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and an asset, the decision can become very complex.
On one hand, home buyers may consider the home purchase as an investment
decision. When they do this, they will consider how much they will expect to earn when
they sell the house in the future. Even if they are not sure when and if they will sell the
house, they still consider if the current housing prices are reasonable and if the housing
prices will rise in the future. In this situation, whether they will accept the current
housing prices will only depend on the expectation for the price trend. What factors will
help the buyers build the expectation for the price trend? Those factors could be GDP
growth, population growth, land supply, monetary supply, and historical housing prices.
On the other hand, home buyers may also view a home purchase as a consumption
decision, especially for owner-occupied houses. When they do that, they consider if the
house meets their living demands. Subsequently, the consumption characteristics, like
location, area, and decoration, will be emphasized. Furthermore, the freedom to redesign
the inner space of a house, and the feeling of settlement and identity will also be
emphasized. 113
2) Housing Prices depend on both rents and non-rent factors
The freedom to redesign the inner space, and the feeling of settlement and identity,
are called non-rent factors. The most important characteristics of those non-rent factors is
that they are difficult to quantify. Therefore, in the eyes of the house buyers, it is very
possible that those non-rent factors are more valuable than the rent earned from houses.
In other words, when the non-rent factors are emphasized by the house buyers, the buyers
113

All those factors including the freedom to redesign the inner space of a house, and the feeling of
settlement and identity will be discussed in detailed in the next chapter.

141

will ignore how much rent they could earn from the houses. As a result, the expected
rents of the house have a limited influence on their decisions.
Nonetheless, the rent level reflects the true demand and supply in housing markets
(market fundamentals). Therefore, the housing prices can become disconnected with the
market fundamentals.
What if houses become disconnected from the market fundamentals at some extent?
The answer is that any change in market fundamentals will have a limited influence on
housing prices. When the severe income inequality causes weak consumption and factor
markets, the housing rents will decrease. However, house prices could still increase. If
houses have been disconnected from the market fundamentals, housing prices will have
more freedom to rise rapidly or to crash.
When the weak consumption and factor markets make the market fundamentals of
all assets weak, the assets whose prices are disconnected from the market fundamentals
will be preferred by investors. Therefore, houses become more preferred than other kinds
of assets. This is what has been happening for the past 16 years in China. A more detailed
analysis on the housing market is presented in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 7: ASSET DICHOTOMY, SUPPLY
ELASTICITY AND PRICE ADJUSTMENT: THE
PARTICULARITY OF HOUSES
7.1 Asset Dichotomy: Real Assets and Virtual Assets
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, real assets refer directly to the production process
of assets, including tangible assets (land, raw materials, machinery and equipment, plant,
human capital, and stock) and intangible assets (patent, trademark, and solid industrial
secrets, i.e., the intellectual property rights). Real asset users are production units
(generally refers to enterprises) or persons. These assets may be purchased or leased by
the enterprises in the form of equity or debt.
The market for trading real assets is called the real asset market, also called the
production factor market, including the raw material market, machinery and equipment
market, and labor market.
The concept of real assets can actually be expanded to the consumer sector. For
example, land, houses, cars, and other durable consumer goods can also be considered as
real assets. These assets can continuously provide consumers with utility for a long
period in the future, which is the consumers’ return.
A Virtual Asset is a right to claim return, which is a normally attached to a certain
real asset (capital, equipment, or intellectual property rights), but it is not the real asset
itself. Stocks, bonds, fund shares and financial derivatives are purely virtual assets. A
virtual asset and a real asset have the following differences.
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First, the same quantity of money or other real assets may not bring investors the
same right to claim return.
Second, no stable relationship exists between the value of return claims and the
value of real assets. Real asset value is determined by current market conditions, namely,
the demand and the supply. Generally, the value of real assets decreases over time. Virtual
asset value, or the value of the right to claim return, depends on the present value of the
expected return, and with the passage of time, its value may not be reduced and may even
unexpectedly increase.
Third, a real asset could correspond to multiple virtual assets, and a virtual asset
could correspond to a number of real assets.

7. 2 Two Types of Virtual Assets and Their Creation Process
7.2.1 Two Types of Virtual Assets
1. Non-pure virtual assets
Non-pure virtual assets refer to the virtual assets mixed with real assets or embedded
in real assets. For example, a person uses his own money to set up a family workshop
specializing in the production of noodles. The money on hand and the money used to
purchase the equipment, and the processing workshop are all real assets.
At the same time, as the sole shareholder of the family workshop, he has full right to
own all profits that are made through the family workshop. This claim is his virtual asset.
Although he had to spend money buying equipment and setting up the workshop in order
to obtain the right to claim return (virtual assets), this right to claim return is not
equivalent to these real assets. The value of the residual claim he has is not necessarily
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equal to the value of the real assets. Thus, the virtual asset he owns is not the same as the
real assets he owns.
Note as well that in this family workshop, his real assets and virtual assets are mixed
together. In other words, he not only has the ownership of these raw materials, machinery,
and plant but also has the right to claim the profits of the raw materials, machinery, and
plant in the future. Although there is a difference between the two, the value of both may
not always be equal, but the two are mixed together.
2. Pure virtual assets
Financial assets, including stocks, bonds, are all pure assets. No one-to-one
corresponding relationship exists between these virtual assets and real assets. Moreover,
there is no relationship between these virtual assets and specific production and
management. Hence, these assets are called pure virtual assets.
7.2.2 Virtual Asset Creation Process
1. Non-pure virtual assets: direct creation
As previously mentioned, non-pure virtual assets refer to those assets that have no
clear separation of the power to use real assets from the rights to claim the future returns.
When individuals use their own real assets to make profit, they also have the right to
claim the return. Therefore, there is no an independent process to create virtual assets,
because when one person possesses and uses the real asset, he would have the right to
claim the future returns as while. In other words, non-pure virtual assets are created
directly from the ownership of real assets.
2. Pure virtual assets created through equity and debt
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A company can acquire production factors (real assets) in three ways. First, it can
spend money in buying those production factors. That is essentially an exchange of one
kind of real asset “money” for another kind of real asset (production factors). The seller
does not get the right to claim the returns (virtual assets) but they get the money (real
assets). Second, it can lease these production factors from the lessor and pay rent to the
leaser. The lessor loses the power to possess and use the production factors, but gets the
right to claim the rent during the lease term（virtual assets）. Third, it exchanges its
equity share for production factors. As a result, the owner of production factors loses its
real assets, but obtains the right to claim the residual of the enterprise. In the second way
and the third way, pure virtual assets are created.
When the company purchases production factors, pure virtual assets are not created.
When this company pays rent to lease the real assets or exchanges its shares for real
assets, the pure virtual asset is created. In other words, virtual assets are created in two
forms: debt or equity.
7.2.3 Relation between Virtual Assets and Real Assets
Real assets must contain virtual assets. If a person has ownership or the power to
possess or use the real asset, he/she must have the right to claim the future return of the
asset at the same time. However, in turn, virtual assets may not contain real assets. That is
to say, owning virtual assets may not entail having the power to possess and use the real
assets.

7.3 Virtual Asset Prices and Real Asset Prices
In this sector, some basic financial models in Finance will be reviewed in order to
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analyze the relationship between virtual assets and real assets.
7.3.1 The Price of Virtual Assets: Depending on Future Returns and Discount Rates
Theoretically, the price of a virtual asset is determined by the total present value of
all expected returns from the real assets in the future.

Vvirtual =

∞
CFm
CF1
CF2


+
+
=
∑
2
m
(1 + i ) (1 + i )
m =1 (1 + i )

(7.1)

7.3.2 The Price of Real Assets: Depending on Supply and Demand in Production
Factor Markets
As a production factor price, a real asset price is determined by the demand and the
supply in this factor market (see Figure 7.1).
P
S

Preal
D
Q
Q0
Figure 7.1: Asset Supply and Asset Demand

Preal = f ( D, S )
7.3.3 Why Must Virtual Asset Prices and Real Asset Prices Be Equal?
Regardless of the kind of market structure, the price of virtual assets (P virtual )
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associated with real assets (production factors) is bound to be equal to the price of real
assets (P real ). That is, Preal = Pvirtual (see Figure 7.2).
P
S

Preal=Pvirtual
=P0

D
Q
Q0
Figure 7.2: Real Asset Prices is Equal to Virtual Asset Prices
when market is efficient

1. The value of each point on the demand curve of the real asset market (factor
market) is equal to the marginal product value, which is equal to the sum of all the
discounted cash flows in the future brought by one added unit of real assets. Namely, the
value of each point on the demand curve is the marginal value of the virtual assets.
The value of each point of the supply curve of real assets is the marginal cost of
producing real assets. The value of each point of the supply curve is the marginal cost of
the real assets.
When a factor market attains its equilibrium, the marginal value of virtual asset
equals the marginal cost of the real asset. Thus the price of virtual asset is equal to the
price of the real asset.
2. Non-pure virtual assets: an increase of the virtual asset price will directly increase
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the demand for real assets. As a result, the price of real assets will increase.
When one equipment is owned by its user, the user has the right to possess and use
this equipment as well as having the right to claim the return from this equipment. In this
situation, the virtual asset is a non-pure virtual assets because it is mixed with real asset.
In this case, if the owner expects that the future return of real assets will increase, the
price of virtual assets goes up. Therefore, investors are willing to purchase real assets at a
higher price. As a result, the price of real assets will increase, eventually making the two
equal.
3. Pure virtual assets: the increase of the virtual asset price will increase the demand
for real assets through Tobin Q, 114 thereby increasing the price of real assets.
When the real assets and virtual assets are separated, how can virtual asset prices
affect real asset prices?
Tobin Q is the bridge between a real asset and a virtual asset. When the asset price
rises but its replacement cost is fixed, the asset price is greater than replace cost (Tobin
Q >1), then corporate refinancing is favorable and companies can have capital to
purchase real assets, so the price of real assets will rise. Eventually, the price of real
assets will be equal to the price of virtual assets.

114
Tobin's Q, or the Q ratio, is the ratio of the market value of a company's assets (as measured by the
market value of its outstanding stock and debt) divided by the replacement cost of the company's assets
(book value). See http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=Tobin%27s-q-ratio
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7.4 Adjustment of Real Asset Prices under Different Supply
Elasticity: A Comparative Static Analysis
7.4.1 Adjustment of Real Asset and Virtual Asset Prices under Elastic Supply
The supply of physical assets is elastic, which means that when the real asset prices
rise (fall), the supply will increase (decrease) very soon.
1. Good news on the demand side of the assets
When good news comes, the demand curve moves to the right. Within very short
time, the virtual asset price quickly rises to P 1 . The price of real assets will rise to the
same point because the supply cannot increase within very short time.
i
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Figure 7.3 : Higher Asset Demand and Price Adjustment

As time goes by, the supply side of a real asset reacts to rising prices and the market
supply increases. With the increase of real market supply, marginal return on a real asset
falls and the virtual asset prices begin to decrease, and the real asset demand is also
reduced, which leads to the decline of real asset prices.
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Eventually, the market equilibrium lies at E N ; the final equilibrium price is at P 2 . At
this point, the equilibrium price of assets and asset quantity are both higher than the
original equilibrium price of assets and asset quantity (see Figure 7.3).
The following phenomena are observed:
First, when good news comes out, the virtual asset prices first rise, which then leads
to the rise of real asset prices.
Second, when the supply of real assets cannot respond in an extremely short period,
real and virtual asset prices rise rapidly to a high level.
Third, the increase of real asset supply is the force that lowers the high level of asset
prices. The specific mechanism is as follows: the increase in the supply of real assets will
reduce the marginal future return of the assets, thereby reducing the price of virtual assets
and ultimately decreasing the price of real assets.
Fourth, in summary, the most active variable is virtual asset price. Supply is the force
that drives virtual and real asset prices up to a new equilibrium level.
2. Good news on the supply side of the assets
If some technological improvement happens, the production cost of the real assets
will be greatly reduced. As a result, the profits of the manufacturing company will be
improved significantly. Thus, the supply curve shifts to the right. In this case, how do the
asset prices adjust to the change?
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Figure 7.4: Higher Asset Supply and Price Adjustment

In the short term, asset prices will not adjust. Because of the decline in the cost,
supply rapidly increased to Q 1 . Along with the supply increases to Q 1 , real assets’
marginal return will decline. When real assets’ marginal return declines, the price of
virtual assets falls to P 1 , which will drive the price of real assets to falls to P 1 .
Lower market prices will dampen the enthusiasm of the supplier, and the supplier of
real assets will reduce the supply. With the reduction in supply, the future return of real
assets rises, and the final price will return to P 2 , which is a new equilibrium price, with
the corresponding equilibrium yield of Q 2 (see Figure 7.4).
3. Fake Good News on the Demand Side
If there is fake good news on the demand side, investors will think that the future
returns of real assets will rise and that the demand curve will move right from the original
D to D 1 , as shown in Figure 7.5.
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Figure 7.5: Fake News and Asset Market Fluctuation

Virtual asset prices will rise, resulting in an increase in demand for real assets. Thus,
the price of real assets will also rise. Given that the supply of real assets cannot keep up
with the increase in the very short run, the virtual asset and real asset prices will be
adjusted to P 1 .
Along with the increase in the supply of real assets, asset prices will fall from P 1 to
P 2 in the middle run. Nonetheless, P 2 is not the ultimate equilibrium. On one hand, the
future return of real assets did not increase because the good news is false. On the other
hand, because of the increased supply, the return on real assets will be lower than the
initial level. When investors observe this, the expectations will be reversed, which drives
the asset demand curve to the left. In fact, the asset demand curve goes so far that it
crosses the original demand curve D and arrives at D 2 . At this time, the new equilibrium
point is E 3 , and the new asset price is P 3 .
However, E 3 is not the ultimate equilibrium point, either. At this point, the price is
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very low, so the supply of real assets will be reduced. Along with the reduced supply, the
marginal return on real assets will increase. With the increase of marginal return, the
price of virtual assets and real assets will also increase, and the final equilibrium will
return to E, which is the initial equilibrium point.
We see that a false information will result in sharp fluctuations in the price and
quantity of the entire factor market (real asset market). The fluctuation follows four
stages:
Step 1: Supply is unchanged, and prices rise sharply to the highest point.
Step 2: Supply increases, and prices decrease slowly.
Step 3: Increases in supply leads to a decline in returns, a further decline in prices,
and a sharp decline to a lower level than the original price.
Step 4: Supply decreases, returns rise, and prices rise slowly to the original
equilibrium level (see Figure 7.5).
This phenomenon can be observed in various industries in a economy.
4. Good news on the demand side is true, but an overreaction (investors are
overoptimistic) occurs.
If there is good news in the market and if investors reflect moderately, asset prices
should rise from P 0 to P 1 and then fall back to a new level of equilibrium P N .
However, if investors are overoptimistic about the good news, it means that the
future return of real assets is overestimated. Therefore, in a very short period of time, the
asset price is not increased from P 0 to P 1 but directly up to P 2 . With the increase in the
supply of real assets, asset prices fall from P 2 to P 3 . However, at this point, too many real
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asset supplies will lead to a decline in return, thereby pushing the asset demand curve to
shift left sharply toward D2. At this point, asset prices fall to P4. Nonetheless, at this
point, the supply of assets is too small; hence, the return on assets will increase, and the
price of assets will rise, eventually returning to the equilibrium price of P N (see Figure
7.6).
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Figure 7.6: Over-Optimistic Reaction and Assets Market Fluctuation

From the analysis of (3) and (4), we see that:
First, when there is false good news, the virtual asset prices will rise and then cause
the real asset price to go up.
Second, when the real asset supply cannot respond in a very short time, asset prices
will rise rapidly to a very high level.
Third, the increase of supply in real assets is substantial to the decline in the high
level asset prices. The specific mechanism is as follows: the increase in the supply of real
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assets will lead to the decline in returns. As the expected rise in returns is not achieved,
the return falls to a lower level than the original return. Hence, the false price of the
assets will fall sharply and lead to a rapid decline in the price of real assets and then to a
substantial decline in supply.
Fourth, the low level of supply will increase the return on assets, thereby increasing
the price of virtual assets and the price of real assets.
Fifth, the market fluctuations are caused by the false information, that is, the most
active variable is virtual asset price, and the return of asset price to equilibrium is caused
by the supply changes as a result of unit return on asset changes.
7.4.2 Adjustment of Real Assets and Virtual Assets Prices under Complete
Inelasticity
When the supply of real assets is completely inelastic, the supply curve is
perpendicular to the horizontal axis.
1. Good news on demand side
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The demand side of good news means that the future returns will rise, thereby
pushing the demand’s dotted line to the right. In the absence of any flexibility in supply,
the price of virtual assets and real assets will increase to P N . For the sake of no new
supply, asset prices have no incentive to fall (see Figure 7.7).
This outcome is not surprising, but it is not the focus of our attention. Our focus is
the following: What If the demand side of good information is false?
2. Good news on demand side is false
A. Short term
When the good news on the demand side is false, investors have the false
expectations that future returns will increase. Therefore, the real asset demand curve will
be shifted right to D N . In this case, the price of virtual assets will increase to P N . With the
rise of virtual asset prices, the price of real assets will also increase to P N .
When the supply of real assets is elastic, supply as a positive variable will bring the
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virtual asset prices back to normal levels. In other words, when the supply of real assets is
elastic, the final price of the asset is determined by the demand and supply together.
However, in the current situation (the supply is completely inelastic), the supply cannot
function as a driving force. Consequently, the price of the assets depends entirely on the
demand. For example, the supply of high-quality human resources is inelastic (such as
basketball star Yao Ming). Thus, the “price” of Yao Ming as a basketball star depends
entirely on the club’s expectation of how much profit he will be able to earn for club
make in the future. When Yao Ming is expected to bring high profits, the “price” of Yao
Ming will increase. This expectation is not related to the production cost of "Yao Ming"
which is the cost of living and training costs during the growth of Yao Ming.
The supply of a premium-located retail estate is also inelastic. The market price of
this retail shop depends entirely on the expected return this shop can bring to investors.
The price of the real estate has nothing to do with the production cost (see Figure 7.8).
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Figure 7.8: High Price will increase in short term
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B. Medium term
In the medium term, investors find that the actual return on assets does not go up and
thus realize that the previous expectation are wrong. However, this does not necessarily
cause investors to sell their real assets, thereby pushing the price of real assets back to the
original level. The reason is that the curve is lower than expected, but it does not mean
that future earnings are still below the expected level. If investors still believe that the
real asset prices will increase, the investor’s total return will not be low because the
earning from increased capital gains will compensate the loss from the reduced holding
return. In details, investors' rate of return depends not only on each period of income
(such as rent, dividends) but also on future capital gains. If the current income of each
period is relatively low but investors expect that the future income will be higher, the
capital gain will be large. The high capital gains in the future can be used to make up for
the current loss of income.
Even if investors find that the original good news is indeed false, they will choose to
continue to hold the asset as long as investors still believe that the real assets will
continue to appreciate in the future. Even if the investor himself does not believe that the
price of the asset will rise, he will think this asset will continue to appreciate as long as
the investor believes that other investors will expect the asset price to rise. Thus, he will
continue to hold the assets, and the price of the assets will not fall. He and other investors
are also likely to continue to purchase the assets; hence, the price of the asset will likely
to continue to rise from P N1 to P N2 .
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The fundamental reason for this phenomenon is that the supply of real assets is
inelastic, which disallows the decrease in overvalued asset prices. If the supply of the real
assets is elastic, the supply will rise as the price of the asset rises and then push the price
to go down. In this case, investors’ expectation of rising future returns or asset prices will
be destroyed, so asset prices will return to the original level. In contrast, if the supply of
the asset is inelastic, the return on assets will not fall when the rate of return is declining.
In this case, investors can continue to expect that the return of the asset and the asset
price will continue to rise (see Figure 7.9). Thus, even in the medium term, asset prices
will not return to their original level.
We see that when the supply of real assets is not elastic, such that even the increase
in asset prices is caused by the false good news, it is difficult to return the price to the
original level because the mediation function of supply to the asset price has disappeared.
C. Long term
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In the long run, the false news is finally proved to be false. Any expectations that
asset prices will continue to rise will not be supported. Hence, asset prices will fall to the
original level of P 1 (see Figure 7.10.)
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7.4.3 The Adjustment of the Real Assets and Virtual Assets Under Less Elasticity
When the real asset supply is lack of elasticity, the slope of the supply asset curve is
large and close to a vertical line. In this case, the adjustment of real asset and virtual asset
prices is very similar to the condition of complete inelasticity.
1. Good news on the demand side:
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When the return on assets is expected to rise, the demand curve moves right to D N .
In the short term, the supply cannot react quickly; thus, the price of assets rises to
P1; see arrow ①.

In the medium term, the supply will increase a little, which will cause the reduced

marginal return. Because of the limited supply of assets, however, the decline in return on
assets is so small that investors will consider it a normal market deviation. Thus,
investors’ expectations of rising asset prices, which are based on an increase in return on
assets, will not break. In other words, despite the increase in supply, the price will not be
reduced to P 2 but will be maintained at P 1 . At this time, the supply will increase to Q 1 .
See arrow ②.

In the long run, because of the considerable supply of Q 1 , the marginal return on unit

assets will continue to go down. Therefore, investors will begin to sell the assets. At this
time, the price will drop to P 2 , while the supply of assets will decline slowly; see arrow
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③ (see Figure 7.11).

2. Good news on the demand side is false
When there is false good news on the market, according to this news, investors
expects that future asset returns will increase; hence, the demand curve moves right to
D1.
In the short term, the supply cannot immediately increase, so the price of assets will
rise to P 1 .
In the middle term, the supply of assets is so small and thus asset returns fall so
slightly that investors considered it as normal market bias. Consequently, investors’
expectation that asset prices will rise will not be broken. Despite the increase in supply,
the price will not be reduced to P 2 but will be maintained at P 1 ; see arrow ②. (If the
asset supply is sufficiently elastic, the supply will increase rapidly and thus the asset

returns will fall very fast. A fast decline in asset return will break expectations on the
rising return or asset prices, real estate price will go down)
In the long run, when investors find that the return on assets is relatively low,
investors will realize that the original good information is false. As a result, prices will
begin to fall. Because of the increase in the supply of assets, the return of the unit asset is
relatively low, which makes the demand curve move to the left side of the original
demand curve. Thus, the price dropped to P 3 . At this price level, the supply is low; thus,
the return will begin to rise, and the price and the supply of assets will return to the
original level, P 0 and D 0 (see Figure 7.12).
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In summary, we have:
1. When the supply is elastic, the overvalued asset prices will be pulled back to
normal levels regardless of what causes the overvalued asset price.
2. When the supply is elastic, the supply change can also affect the price of assets. If
the supply has a substantial increase due to the decline in the cost of the real assets, it will
certainly lead to a decline in the return of the assets (diminishing marginal rate of return),
thereby reducing the price of assets. Thus, when supply is elastic, both demand and
supply will affect the price of the asset. When we valuate assets, the income method and
cost method can both be used.
3. The mechanism for regulating the price of assets is as follows: when the expected
return increases, resulting in asset price rise, the supply of assets will rise. Given the role
of diminishing marginal returns, when the supply of assets increases, the marginal
product of the unit assets diminishes, and so the return of the unit assets will inevitably
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decline. Moreover, the return of asset will eventually reduce asset prices.
4. When the supply is completely inelastic or almost inelastic, no matter what causes
the overvalued assets, this overestimation will be kept not only in the short term but also
in the middle term. The intuitional reason is the following: the market lack the signal that
pulls the overvalued price back to normal.
When the supply cannot increase or hardly increase, the marginal income of the unit
assets will not fall at all (completely inelastic) or drop very little (lack of flexibility).
When the marginal income of assets does not change or change very little, asset return is
still in decline if the asset price increases. Theoretically, declining return should pull the
overvalued asset prices back to its normal level. In reality, however, even if the return of
each asset does not rise as expected, investor will still think that the return on investment
will not decline in the future as long as the return does not decline. As a result, the force
to pull down the overvalued price does not exist anymore. Overvalued prices will remain
high for considerably long periods.
If the supply is elastic, everything will change. As mentioned earlier, when the
expected return increases and thus cause asset price to rise, the supply of assets will rise.
Given the role of diminishing marginal returns, the marginal product of the unit assets
diminishes when the supply of assets increases. Thus, the return of the unit assets will
inevitably decline, which the investors cannot ignore or deny. With this signal, the
expectation that the return on the unit asset will be expected to rise in the future cannot be
established; correspondingly, neither does the rising expectation on future sales price of
assets. In a word, overvalued asset prices will inevitably fall back to normal.
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We see that the elastic supply is the force to pull the overvalued asset prices back to
normal. What’s more, the elastic supply can offer the market a signal that the overvalued
market price is unlikely to maintain.
5. When supply is completely inelastic or almost inelastic, a piece of false
information can also affect the asset price in a long period of time. Therefore, when
supply is completely inelastic or almost inelastic, the cost approach method cannot be
used to evaluate assets. Income approach will be a suitable appraisal method.
Inferences from the conclusion above are as follows:
1. The more inelastic the supply of real assets is, the longer the overvalued price will
last. The more elastic the supply of real assets is, the shorter the overvalued the price will
last. This is not the same as in the consumer goods market. For the consumer goods
market, regardless of the elasticity of the supply of consumer goods, the prices of
overvalued consumer goods can quickly return to equilibrium.
2. In the mechanism of asset price adjustment by supply, the key variable is the
marginal return of asset and the key relationship is that between the return and the price.
In fact, we have:
The asset supply increases---the marginal return decreases---the asset price decreases.
The asset supply decreases---the marginal return increases---the asset price will
increase.
Then we could ask such a question: if the relation between asset price and asset
return does not exist any longer, namely, the price of an asset does not depend on its
holding period return in the future, what will happen?
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First at all, we could guess that if the relationship between the price and the marginal
return is separated, the mechanism of asset price adjustment by supply will not work even
though the assets are elastic.
Secondly, we could go further to guess that the asset price can be very high and
continues to rise even if the asset return is very low.
But, what is the reason that the price of an asset does not depend on its holding
period return in the future any more?
The holding period returns we are talking about above are actually “cash” or
“monetary” returns. When owning the real assets could bring the owners something
much more than monetary returns, namely, some non-monetary returns, the purpose of
investors in buying this asset will be to get not only monetary returns but also nonmonetary returns. In this case, even if the current monetary returns on assets are very low,
as long as investors believe their non-monetary returns are high, investors do not feel that
their returns on investment are very low. What’s more, even if an investor expects that
the cash returns on the asset in the future are still very low, he still expects that the price
of the asset will rise as long as the investor believes that the non-monetary returns
brought by the asset in the future are very high.
Does such an asset exist? Yes, a house is such an asset. We will discuss houses in
details later.
Then we could give some possible answers for such a question: why can the asset
price be very high and continues to rise when the asset return is very low?
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First, the asset return is only the monetary return. It does not reflect all the return the
investors can get from the asset due to the existence of non-monetary return.
Second, although the current cash returns are very low, investors expect the future
cash returns might be very high.
Third, one investor expect the future cash returns are low. Moreover, he/she also
expect that assets are currently overvalued and will fall sharply one day. However, this
investor thinks that other investors believe that the asset prices will continue to rise in the
future. This means that the current assets can be sold to them at higher prices in the future.
Then this investor would like to buy more assets to make profit.
Fourth, even if this investor believe that other investors, like himself/herself, also see
that the assets are overvalued and the asset bubbles are bound to burst one day. However,
as long as the investor believes that the day is still far away and that he/she can run ahead
before its arrival, he/she will also continue to buy the assets, thereby boasting the
appreciation of asset prices. In other words, he believes that a bigger fool exists and this
fool would be the buyer of his asset.

7.5 The Consequences of Asset Prices Deviating from Market
Fundamentals
1. Asset prices cannot reflect the asset market fundamentals
When asset prices fully reflect the asset market fundamentals, namely, the holding
period returns, assets cannot be overpriced for long. Asset markets will function very well
as a tool to uncover the true price of assets and add value to those assets. In this case, all
investors can only get the normal returns.
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Now let’s focus on the welfare effect which asset markets bring to society. When the
asset market is efficient, very little speculative money will come into this market because
there are very few opportunities to make profit from speculation. What’s more, because
investment can only get normal returns, investors are not highly motivated to buy and sell
assets very frequently. As a result, the turnover rate is not high.
Moreover, a virtual asset market can function as a tool of value discovery and value.
When good news appears, the prices of virtual assets will increase immediately. This is
the function of price discovery. When virtual asset prices rise but the replacement costs of
real assets remain the same, enterprises will then expand the scale of production or start
new projects by issuing new shares. In addition, these virtual assets have such attractive
returns that market investors are willing to purchase new shares. Subsequently, profitable
projects are financed through the virtual asset market. This is the function of value
creation or wealth creation.
Note as well that in the process of price discovery and value creation, investors will
not overreact or underreact to new information. Therefore, the situation is the same as
previously discussed. First, because price does not rise continuously, money entering the
capital market does not increase quickly because the speculative opportunities are low.
Second, although the future returns of real assets rise because of the rapid rise in the price
of virtual assets, investors can only get a normal return. Therefore, they are not highly
motivated to buy and sell the assets on a frequent basis. This is the basic feature of
efficient asset markets: they could discover value and create value, but hardly entails
excessive speculation and speculation.
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Case 1: An investor is expected to receive $1 per share from one stock; the discount
rate is 4%. If the price per share of this stock is equal to the sum of discounted value of
all future yield per share, the stock price per share should be as follows:
P=

∞
$1
$1
$1
$1
+
+
+
==
=
= $25


∑
n
2
1 + 4% (1 + 4%)
4%
n =1 (1 + 4%)

(7.3)

If the market price always reflect market fundamentals, its price is always $25
whenever the stock is sold.
P=

$1
= $25
4%

In this case, if the stock is exchanged once, the money newly entering the stock is
$25. Given that the stock price does not rise, investors also get nothing but the income
return (4%). Therefore, investors are not highly motivated to buy and sell the stock and
the turnover rate will be very low. We could assume that it is exchanged four times a
year, then the total money newly entering into the market is $25 × 4 = $100.
Three points should be emphasized here.
First, due to the stable stock price, each transfer does not bring more money to stock
market. (By contrast, if the stock price keeps going up, each transfer always bring more
money to this market.)
Second, because of lack of excess returns, the stock holders are very likely to
withdraw these funds from the stock market and transfer them to the real economy after
they sell the stock. In any case, the money taken out from real economy and spent on
speculation is not large. Thus, the real economy will be well supported by enough
working capitals.
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Third, since every investor can only get a normal return, no redistribution of wealth
happens and income inequality will not be worsened.
Case 2: A stock is the same as in case 1. Each share of this stock is expected to bring
$1 to its investor and the discount rate is 4%. By flow discounted model, the stock price
per share should be $25 because of:
P=

$1
= $25
4%

In the next one year, we assume good news appears at the end of each quarter. For
example, the government announces that it will loosen some regulation on some. Assume
that the appearance of every piece of good news can upgrade the yield per share by $0.2,
and there will be no good news in one year. If the market is efficient, the price of the
stock will react quickly after the good news appears. At the end of each quarter, the stock
price is as follows:
P=

$1.2
= $30
4%

P=

$1.4
= $35
4%

P=

$1.6
= $40
4%

P=

$1.8
= $45
4%

Assume that the stock is sold after each price rise. The following table lists the price,
the holder, the dividend, and the capital gain of the stock in the year.
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Table 7.1 Price, Holder, Dividend and Capital Gain
Season
Stock Price
Holder
Dividends
Capital Gains

Beginning
of
1st Season
25
Holder A
0

End of
1st
Season
30
Holder A
1
5

End of
2nd
Season
35
Holder B
1.2
5

End of
3rd
Season
40
Holder C
1.4
5

End of
4th Season

After 4th
Season

45
Holder D
1.6
5

45
Holder D
1.8
0

Total money newly coming into the stock market is: 30 + 35 + 40 + 45 = $150
The following are what we can observe.
First, the stock price experienced a rise before transfer at the end of every quarter.
Because stock price was not caused by the false information or overly optimistic
investors but by the changing of market fundamentals, the stock price rose reasonably.
Hence, the times of transfers did not significantly increase. Although funds into stocks
now are more than the previous example, the rise is not large.
Second, because the stock price rose quickly after the good news came, the
opportunity to excess returns is fleeting. In addition, after an excess return appears, it is
difficult to predict when the next excess return will come. Thus, after selling shares to
obtain excess return, each stockholder will withdraw these funds from the stock market
and transfer them to the real economy or for consumption. In this case, the development
of the real economy can be well supported.
Third, in addition to dividends, holders A, B, C, and D obtained the excess return
because of the capital gains. The capital gains are asset price appreciations brought about
by the ascension of expected returns. They are parts of investor benefits and also one of
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the purposes of investors. Consequently, no redistribution of wealth occurs because no
one loses.
2. Virtual assets deviate from market fundamentals
When virtual assets deviates from market fundamentals, virtual markets will attract
more and funds for speculation and eventually lead to a changed wealth distribution.
Meanwhile, virtual markets will not function as a tool of value discovery and value
creation.
When virtual assets deviate from market fundamentals, the asset price could rise
continuously even though the market has poor fundamentals. In this situation, the main
purpose of the investors in buying assets is not to get holding period returns but rather the
future price appreciation, namely, capital gains. Therefore, although more money flows
into the market accompanied by rising asset prices, most of the money cannot be
transferred effectively to the real economy as production factors because investors are
pursuing after the assets with high price appreciation, not the assets with high holding
period return. The virtual asset market becomes a big casino: assets are swapped very
frequently, but the new value created is zero. Money are not working as production
factors, but as a tool to take money from other investors. To sum up, in such an asset
market, there is not value discovery and value creation, but the wealth redistribution and
wealth waste.
Case 3: A stock is the same as before. When an IPO is offered, the issue price of
stock should be as follows:
P=

$1
= $25
4%
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Assume the dividend does not change within one year but the asset price keeps going
up. Also, assume that stocks are transferred 12 times in a year and stock price rises by $3
at the end of each month when the transfer happens. Since the rising prices are not
supported by market fundamentals, asset prices will fall to the original level. Assume that
stock prices fall to the original level ($25 per share) in the 13th month.
The holders, prices, dividends, and capital gains of this stock at the end of each
month in the whole year will be as follows.
Table 7.2 Price, Holder, Dividend and Capital Gain
st

nd

rd

th

th

th

th

th

th

th

th

th

th

Month

Before
st
1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

Investor

A

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

K

L

L

Dividends

-

$1

$1

$1

$1

$1

$1

$1

$1

$1

$1

$1

$1

$1

Prices

$25

$28

$31

$34

$37

$40

$43

$46

$49

$52

$55

$58

$61

$25

Source: Author
Here, three points should also be emphasized.
First, the market fundamentals have not changed, but for some reason, the asset price
rises away from fundamentals. Rising asset prices will lead to more-rapidly-increasing
asset prices, asset prices will be deviating from fundamentals. Driven by rising
expectations, turnover increases. With the increasing turnover rate and asset prices, more
and more funds flow into the asset market to buy this stock.
Within 12 months, new funds pouring into the stock market to buy the stock are as
follows: 28 + 31 + 34 +…………+61 = $523
In case 1, the funds pouring into the stock market to buy the stock is only $100 in a
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year; in case 2, it increases to $150. Compared with case 1, there is $423 more flowing
into the stock market in case 3; compared with case 2, there is $375 flowing into the
stock market in case 3.
Second, much money flows into the stock market and but it rarely come out. In cases
1 and 2, the seller will very likely put the money received into the real economy after
selling the stock because the opportunities for excess returns in the stock market are very
limited. In current case, investors will not invest the money into the real economy after
they sell the stock. They will continue to wait and look for opportunities of obtain
excessive returns in the stock market.
With so much money pouring into the virtual asset market and remaining there, we
have the following consequences. First, funds originally invested in the real economy are
tied up in virtual assets market. Second, funds originally intended for consumption are
also tied up in virtual assets market. As a result, aggregate demand for consumptions and
aggregate output will be reduced.
Third, when stocks are swapped, wealth is redistributed. In other words, the process
of stock swapping is the process of wealth distribution. As previously mentioned, the
rising prices are not supported by market fundamentals; hence, asset prices are bound to
fall to the original level. Suppose that stock prices fall to the original level ($25 per share)
in the 13th month. Thus, the net loss of holder L at then end of a year is as follows:
Loss of L = 61 − 25 – 3 = $33
We can also calculate the total gains of other investors. Obviously,
GainA = GainB = …… = GainK = $3, and
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GainA + GainB + …… + GainK = $33
Subsequently, our results confirmed that the loss of L is equal to the sum of the gain
of A, B, …… D.
LossL= GainA+GainB+……+GainK

(7.4)

This means that the wealth of investor L is redistributed to the other 11 investors.
However, the total wealth they created in this economy is zero.
Fourth, the rise of asset prices will attract a large sum of money to buy these assets.
If the asset is a real asset, the rise of asset prices will directly promote its supply
increases, even far beyond social demands, and result in an enormous waste of resources.
If the asset is a pure virtual asset, the increase of the asset prices will increase demand for
real assets and then increase the supply of real assets. Similarly, it will exceed social
demand and cause a huge waste of social resources.
Generally, when the price of pure virtual assets is deviating from market
fundamentals and the price is rising, the following will occur.
First, new funds would flow into virtual asset markets to purchase the assets, which
means money constantly escapes from the real economy.
Second, continuously-rising asset prices would prompt investors to build the
expectations that the prices will go higher. Under such an expectation, investors are
unwilling to leave the asset market and return the money to the real economy after they
have sold their assets and taken large profit. Hence, increasing amounts of money are
detained in asset market merely for speculation but not for real economy production.
Third, the virtual asset market becomes a casino. Social wealth redistribution
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happens and the income inequality worsens. Nevertheless, no new social wealth is
created because all returns sum to zero.
Fourth, the sharp rise of virtual asset prices would promote the demand for real
assets. Eventually, the real asset will be oversupplied, which cause the big waste of
social resources.

7.6 Real Estate: A Special Asset
7.6.1 Real Estate as a Real Asset and a Virtual Asset
The category of real estate is, first and foremost, a consumer good, and one of the
most fundamental of such goods. There is a common Chinese saying: clothing, food,
housing, and transportation are indispensable!
Land, factory buildings, and real estate offices are important to production.
Additionally, shops, apartments, hotels, entertainment properties, airports, stations, and
gas stations are crucial elements in the provision of for-profit services. Conversely,
government office buildings, school buildings, museums, hospitals, and churches, are
vital for the delivery of non-profit services. Hence, real estate matters.
Every real asset contains a virtual asset. That is to say, possessing a real asset
involves simultaneous right to claim returns from this assets. When an enterprise
purchases a piece of land or a house and puts them into the production process,
simultaneously, the purchaser obtained the right to claim the return from the real asset. In
other words, the enterprise also acquired virtual assets, which are the claims on the future
profits of the land or real estate. Similarly, when a family bought a piece of land or real
estate, the family possessed the real assets. Meanwhile, they also had claims (namely,
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virtual assets) on the future utility of the land or real estate.
The current selling price of the house is exactly the price of real assets. Furthermore,
the total discounted value of the future utility brought by the housing is the price of the
residential virtual asset. Investors do not wish to buy a house only until the price of
virtual assets is higher than that of the real assets. As for society, the marginal price of
virtual assets is equal to those of real assets.
Real assets can be disconnected with virtual assets. The real assets and virtual assets
of real estate can also be disconnected. When real estate is exchanged for shares or leased
to an enterprise for rent, the owner loses the real assets but gains virtual assets, namely,
the claims for the residual of the enterprise or the claims for the rent and the principal.
Similarly, when real estate were leased to a family, the owner also acquired the virtual
assets, specifically, the claims on the rent.
When real estate is sold to an enterprise, the owner obtains another real asset
(money) but does not acquire the virtual assets. Likewise, when lands or real estates were
sold to a family, the owner gained another real asset (money) but did not secure the
virtual assets.
When real assets and virtual assets of real estate are separated from each other,
virtual assets of real estate are pure virtual assets.
7.6.2 Supply Elasticity of Real Estate
When real assets and virtual assets of real estate are disconnected to one another,
virtual assets of real estate are pure virtual assets. The supply of real estate is inelastic
because of the limited supply of land.
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1. Real estate with a special location or extensive historical and cultural value:
supply is completely inelastic.
Many cities possess a single landmark. Buildings on that landmark are unique. They
can neither be replaced nor reproduced. Real estate with special cultural value, in most
cases, is unique. As a result, its supply is fully inelastic.
2. Real estate in developed areas: supply lacks elasticity.
Real estate in developed areas could be replaced by surrounding real estate.
However, given that no two identical space positions exist, any location is essentially
unique. The surrounding real estate could be approximately substituted for this kind of
real estate but cannot completely replace it.
Therefore, the supply of real estate in developed area is less elastic. The more
developed this area is, the more inelastic the supply is. Therefore, the closer to the city
center the real estate is, the more inelastic the supply because the central area of a city is
the most developed areas.
3. Real estate in developing areas: supply has elasticity
In developing areas (for example, in emerging cities), there is much space available
for the real estate development. When real estate prices increase, supply will rises very
rapidly. Real estate supply is more elastic in those areas.
7.6.3. The Elasticity of Supply and the Adjustment of Real Estate Prices
1. Real estate with complete inelasticity
When real estate is completely inelastic, the overly high price is hard to come back
to the normal level because the signals of market fundamentals can rarely appear.
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If false good news appeared in real estate market (for example, a new subway will
go through a place), the rent will rise. Real estate prices will also rise accordingly.
However, no new supply appears because the supply is completely inelastic. Hence,
real estate rents have not fallen. Real estate rent-to-price ratio will be decreasing because
of the rising housing prices and fixed rents. Even so, the real estate price will not
necessarily fall if investors expect future price increases.
Therefore, when real estate prices rise because of false information, house prices will
not fall for a considerable time. In fact, house prices will not fall but rise instead for an
extended time because of the lack of signals.
2. Real estate with not complete inelasticity.
In this situation, given that the signal of market fundamentals provided by supply is
unclear, once the price is overvalued, it would be difficult for the price to fall as well.
If false news appears on the market, then real estate prices will rise. Moreover, if the
supply of the real estate increases heavily, then the rent of the real estate market will be
reduced by the increased supply. As an important signal, dropping rent will break the
market expectations about house prices rising continually, and then the high housing
prices will return to normal.
Consequently, owing to the lack of supply elasticity, few supply increases shall occur
despite the overvaluation of house prices. Thus, rent decline is not obvious and cannot
provide investors with a strong signal that housing prices will drop significantly.
When the supply rises very little, the rents fall slightly. Falling rents will lead to the
fall of the housing rent-to-price ratio. However, if investors expect future prices to rise,
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then the decrease of the rents will be offset by the rise of capital gains. In conclusion, due
to the inelasticity, the market does not provide the signals that are strong enough to pull
the real estate’s price down.
Therefore, even if real estate prices rise owing to false information, house prices
will not fall for a considerable time. In fact, because of the unapparent signal about
housing price decline and the expectations about housing price rising continually, house
prices will not fall but rise for extended period. Of course, such time is shorter than when
supply is completely inelastic.
3. Real estate with high elasticity: rapidly increased supply drives overvalued real
estate prices back to normal level very quickly
In this case, once the real estate prices were overvalued, the supply would increase
quickly. With such increase, real estate rents would decline very fast. As an important
signal, rent decline could break the expectations that real estate prices will rise
continually, and thus the real estate prices would begin to fall.
Therefore, real estate prices fluctuate more frequently in developing areas.
Specifically, prices cannot remain overvalued when false good news appears.

7.7 Houses and their Uniqueness
7.7.1 The Essential Difference between a House and a Commercial Property
Purchasing commercial property is similar to purchasing stocks. Rents represent the
holding period returns from commercial property. By the Discounted Flow Model, the
theoretical value of a commercial property is equal to the sum of discounted value of all
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future rents. In practice, the total returns of a commercial property consist of the rents
before sales and purchase-resale differences (capital gains).
Is the theoretical value of a house also equal to the discounted value of the total
future rents? If the answer is yes, then no essential difference would exist between a
commercial property and a house. However, the answer is no. Given that most of houses
are self-occupied, the theoretical value of a house should be the sum of discounted value
of all returns that its owner receives from its self-occupied house. However, the total
returns that the owner receives from his/her self-occupied house are not equal to the rents
of the house. The utility that the owner obtains from his self-occupied house is much
greater than the rents if this house is leased.
In fact, owners can obtain at least five types of utilities from their self-occupied
houses. Residence is only one of those utilities. However, “residence” is all the utility
that tenants can acquire from their rented houses, so the rent is actually the price of
“residence”. The following are the five types of utilities the owner can obtain from their
self-occupied houses.
1. Residence. It is one of the basic needs of people, because it is a vital condition for
all kinds of human activities, such as sleep, leisure, diet, and party. The utility that tenants
gain from their rented houses is residence.
2. The Right of Free Arrangement. People have personalized demands for their own
living space, such as space design and decoration style. If the house is rented, the tenant
is not allowed to freely rearrange and decorate the space according to his/her own needs.
However, the owner has the free right to arrange and decorate his own space according to
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his preference. In fact, the need fulfilled from the right of free arrangement also belongs
to the needs of the living, which can be raised to the personalized level.
3. The Feeling of Settlement. This is a psychological need that is essentially equal to
a sense of security plus a sense of belonging.
First, it is impossible for rented houses to provide tenants with an adequate sense of
security because tenants cannot live in a rented house as long as they want. In China,
lease agreement is an obligatory-right contract. The house owner can dissolve the
contract at any time before termination date as long as the owner compensates the tenants.
This means the tenants can be evicted out of the house at any time during the lease term.
(In many western countries, tenant’s right from the lease contract is not obligatory right
but a property right. Under this condition, the owner cannot end the lease contract until
the termination date, so the tenants could have more of a feeling of security and
settlement during the lease term. Even if so, being evicted at the end of the lease remains
possible.) By contrast, owning a house is a property right, people’s ownership of houses
completely eliminates the possibility of being evicted and thus ensure the feeling of
security. In addition to the sense of security of not being evicted, ownership fosters the
feeling of security at other aspects. A house can protect a family from the risk of rapidlyincreasing rent, various emergency, accidents, economic pressure and family bankrupt. In
this sense, owning a house is very similar to buying a insurance for the whole family.
Second, a house is an immovable property. When people acquire the sense of
security from this immovable property, they would also acquire the sense of belonging to

183

its area. When people own a house, they will psychologically feel that they are residents
of the area.
4. Proud Identity. It is a “higher level” of psychological need. For an upscale
property, ownership of such a property can have a function of flaunting due to its unique
location value, historic value or other cultural value. For an ordinary property, although it
does not have the function of flaunting, ownership of such a property can improve the
credit rating in banks and other financial intermediaries. This ownership can also upgrade
the trust level from business partner and promote the trust level from the prospective
spouse and his/her family. Hence, while ordinary property cannot provide the function of
flaunting, it can offer a certain degree of “sense of identity.”
By Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory, "physiological needs", "safety or security
needs", "belonging" and "love" needs, "esteem" needs, "self-actualization" needs are the
pattern that human motivations generally move through. Owning a house meets the needs
of the first four.
5. Economic benefits. When house prices rise, the owners of self-occupied houses
can potentially increase their wealth through. Such benefits are unavailable for tenants. In
addition, when rents rise, self-occupied owners are not affected, but tenants have to pay
more rent.
7.7.2 The Price-To-Rent Ratio of a House will be Higher than That of a commercial
Property
As shown by the above analysis, compared with renting, purchasing a house has the
following advantages: free arrangement, the feeling of settlement and the feeling of proud
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identity. When the economy is in a rising cycle, and therefore both house prices and rents
rise, purchasing a house can represent a fourth advantage: economic benefits.
Thus, the profits that an owner receives from his self-occupied house extend far
beyond those from renting out his house. Therefore, the profits that an owner obtains
from his self-occupied house can be divided into two parts: rental income and non-rental
income. The latter includes the feeling of settlement, the right of free arrangement,
identity, and the possibility of gaining economic benefits.
As stated, the theoretical value of a house is based on the total gains that its owner
receives from the self-occupied house. Given that the rent from this house is only a part
of the total gains, the theoretical value based on total gains must be more than the value
based only on rents.
Therefore, the price-to-rent ratio of a house is higher than that of the commercial
property and higher than the Price/Earning Ratio (P/E Ratio) 115 of the stock.
A simple comparison can be made here. A large retail chain company intends to
open a new branch in a commercial street. It has two ways to open this branch: buying a
store or renting a store. Those two ways present no difference. Even if the owner bought
the store, he could not obtain the feeling of settlement, which could be acquired from
buying a house. Certainly, buying the store can generate the right of free arrangement.
However, renting the store also involves this right due to the particularity of retail store.
If the store is located in a well-known street (such as Shanghai’s Nanjing Road and
115

The price-earnings ratio (P/E Ratio) is the ratio for valuing a company that measures its current share
price relative to its per-share earnings. The price-earnings ratio can be calculated as: Market Value per
Share / Earnings per Share.
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Xujiahui and Beijing’s Xidan, Wangfujing), buying it can bring popularity to the
enterprise, but renting it can also have the same popularity.
Similarly, if an enterprise wishes to set up a new office in a city, the enterprise also
has two means to acquire the office: buying or renting. No matter which means is chosen,
the function remains indifferent. When the enterprise decides to buy an office, it could
not obtain the feeling of settlement that could be acquired from buying a house. Buying
an office involves acquiring the right of free arrangement. However, similar to the retail
store, renting the office involves this right, too. If the office is located in a well-known
area (such as Shanghai’s Lujiazui, People's Square and Beijing’s China World Trade
Center, Dongdan), buying it can add popularity to the enterprise, but renting it can also
achieve the same effect.
To sum up, the utilities acquired from renting and purchasing are the same for stores
and office buildings. The same is true for hotels, storage properties, and tourism
properties. As a result, the rent could reflect the total return from those commercial
properties. Hence, the prices and rents of commercial properties are closely related.
However, in China, lease and residence are not interchangeable, because the total
benefits of owning a house is very different from the benefits of renting a house. In fact,
this difference is so big that the link between prices and rents of house is cut off. Thus,
the prices can be separated from the rents, and they free rise or fall under the influence of
other factors.
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7.7.3 Why Are Housing Prices Increasing Faster than Commercial Property and
Other Assets?
The advantages noted above only suggest that house prices are overvalued but do not
answer the following question: compared to commercial property and other assets, why
do house prices rise so rapidly?
First, purchasing a house has the same characteristics as the investing in investment
vehicles, because buying a house is also an act of investment. As an investment, the price
of a house is not the same as that of a pure consumption good.

The prices of

consumption goods merely depend on their marginal utilities and theirs marginal
production costs, but the housing prices depend on market fundamentals (the rents) and
expectations for future price movements, which is affected by the trend of historical
house prices.
Second, compared with investment in commercial property, stocks, bonds and funds,
purchasing a house has a characteristic that these assets do not have: market
fundamentals (rents) that have minimal influence on house prices, or the link between the
price and its fundamentals is cut off. Hence, compared with other types of assets, house
prices can go up more freely, quickly and longer. Besides the consumption attribute of
residence, which can be acquired from renting, buying a house also presents three types
of additional consumption attributes. The three attributes include the right of free
arrangement, the feeling of settlement, and identity. These three consumption attributes,
which cannot be received from renting, create the effect whereby house prices are
minimally affected from rents and the link between house prices and rents is severed.
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If house buyers are purchasing houses not for living in, will that affect the above
conclusions? In other words, at this time, are houses similar to commercial properties
wherein the prices and rents have a close relationship?
The answer is no. Even if the buyers are not purchasing houses for living in, it
remains difficult for a connection between house prices and rents to exist. The
fundamental reason is that most of the houses are self-occupied. Hence, the house price
depends on the total benefits that the owner received from the self-occupied house, rather
than on the returns (rents) that the house lessors obtained from lessees. Purchasing a
house has the advantages which renting a house does not have, such that the total benefits
that the owner received from the self-occupied house is higher those from rent. Thus, the
price of a house based on the benefits from the self-occupied house is higher than that
based on the rents.
Therefore, the price-to-rent ratio of a house is higher than that of commercial
property and higher than the P/E ratio of other assets as well. Conversely, when buying a
house to obtain rent, the investment return measured by rent/price is lower than from
commercial property and other assets.
It is emphasized that the total benefits from self-occupied houses are bigger than
those from rented houses. We cannot, however, conclude that the higher housing prices
are always resulting from the bigger benefits. In fact, in many situations, the soaring-up
housing prices cannot be explained by the bigger benefits at all. In other words, the
reason why the investors buy a house at a very high price, is not because they can acquire
the big benefits (residence, self-arrangement, security, settlement and identity) from
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living in those houses, but because they expect that they get big capital gains from rapidly
increasing prices. The existence of non-monetary benefits from houses cut off the
relationship between housing prices and rents, then letting the housing prices can go up
freely.
Overtime, house prices rose so rapidly that investors with many houses did not care
about the trivial rental incomes, and left the house empty. Typical to speculative behavior,
the wait until prices rise to an ideal level and then sell the houses. This is why there are so
many vacant houses and ghost cities in China.
7.7.4 Why Do There Exist House Rental Markets?
The residential utility obtained from purchasing a house and renting a house are not
interchangeable. This condition, therefore, leads to the relatively high price-to-rent ratio
of a house. Conversely, that ratio means that the rate of return of a house is relatively low.
Given this relatively rate of return of a house (due to the relatively high price-to-rent
ratio), why is the house rental market still widespread? Or, why would some companies
like to run houses renting business?
The answers can only be found in transaction and service costs.
1. The transaction costs of buying a house are far greater than that of renting one.
When someone comes to a city, he can solve the problem of living only by two ways:
renting and buying. If he chooses to rent, the costs of moving to another area include the
search costs, contract negotiation costs, brokerage commission s, and the cost of
termination of the lease (default) when renting a house. However, if he chooses to buy,
the costs of moving to another area entail house searching costs, contract negotiation
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costs, taxes, brokerage commission, as well as the buyer's search costs when the house is
sold, the contract negotiation costs, taxes, and brokerage commission. Clearly, the
transaction costs of buying a house are far greater than that of renting one. Consequently,
house owners can charge higher rents. Higher rents indicate that the lessor of a house can
obtain higher incomes, which makes house rental business profitable. Therefore, the
house rental markets can exist.
If the time that a person lives somewhere is shorter (such as within 15 days), even
the cost of renting a house is too high. Thus, staying in a hotel becomes a better choice.
Therefore, the following market segmentation was formed: people who live for a very
short term choose to stay in hotels, those for a short and medium term choose to rent a
house, and those for the long term choose to buy a house. All these choices results from
transaction costs.
2. Aside from the advantage of transaction costs, renting a house also presents
another advantage: the low service costs brought about by scale economy. When a
company specializing in house rental services operates numerous apartments, it needs
only to hire a few people to provide many apartments with cleaning, maintenance, and
other services (including emergency services). Thus, tenants can enjoy these services at a
very low cost. However, if a person chooses to buy rather than to rent, the cost of
obtaining these services will be extremely high. Therefore, lessors can further improve
the rents. Higher rents make the house rental business more profitable, and therefore the
house rental markets can exist.
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7.8 Housing Bubbles can Last in the Long Run Because
Housing Prices and Rents are Separated
Previous analysis shows that when housing is overvalued, supply is the crucial factor
in pulling back prices. The reason supply was able to play this role is that increasing
supply will lower rents. The smaller the supply elasticity, the lesser the supply increases
when housing prices are overvalued. Additionally, more supply cannot provide the signal
of breaking the aforementioned expectation. Hence, there is minimal possibility of
overvalued housing prices declining. The least possibility of overvalued prices declining
occurs for the real estate with completely inelastic supply, followed by that with inelastic
supply. However, for the real estate with elastic supply, the reduction space of overvalued
real estate price is extremely large.
The above analysis is primarily used in commercial real estate and is unsuitable for
housing. Given the difference between utilities provided by leased houses and those
provided by self-occupied, housing rent cannot fully reflect the total benefits of selfoccupied houses. Specifically, housing rent cannot indicate the housing market
fundamentals. In this situation, capitalization of housing rent will be far less than the
price of the house.
Such difference is crucial because it means that the relationship between housing
price and housing rent is cut off. Given that rent is a core variable, the signal effects rent
has on house prices disappear. Therefore, even for an emerging urban residential market
with elastic supply, housing prices will hardly drop not only in the short and middle term
but also in the long term. In conclusion, the particularity of houses likewise enables
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overvalued prices to persist in the short, medium, and long term, whether the housing
supply is completely inelastic, partially inelastic, or elastic.
1. When good news appears on the residential market, it is not necessarily
manifested as the rise of rent, because when buying houses, investors aim not only at
rent, but also at other non-rental utilities, such as right of freedom to decorate, sense of
stability, and identity recognition. Even though the rent stays low in the long run, as long
as investors find that other returns are on the rise, they do not consider that returns
provided by the house are shrinking.
When good news appears on the commercial real estate market, the good news must
be reflected in the rent very soon, because rents are the only return from commercial real
estate investors. If the rent of commercial real estate remains extremely low, it will prove
that the good news about commercial real estate is false. Hence, the price of commercial
real estate cannot remain overvalued but must fall.
2. Related to the first point, if the housing investors focus not only on rent but also
on the non-rent benefits, what they care is not the rental return, but the total return
Therefore, expectations of rising asset prices cannot be broken even if rental return is low
in the long run. If the rent is extremely low but investors consider the total returns is very
high, overvalued housing prices will be maintained. If investors think the total returns
will be rising, then overvalued housing prices could be further overvalued.
For commercial real estate (or other kinds of financial assets such as stocks), because
investors are concerned about the rent, the relative return measured by investors must be
the rental return, that is, rent-to-price ratio. For commercial real estate with inelastic
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supply, when prices are overvalued, supply will not increase and the rent will not drop.
Expectations that the prices commercial real estate will be rising cannot be broken in the
short and medium term. However, in the long run, the rental return will falls because the
rent is the same but the price is overvalued. It will eventually break the expectation of
rising prices and cause a decline in commercial real estate prices.
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CHAPTER 8: EMPIRICAL STUDIES
It is very clear that “Housing Prices” is the dependent variable and “Income
Inequality” is one of independent variable. In addition to Income Inequality, independent
variables also include Aggregate Products, Population, Housing Prices, Money Supply
and Stock Market Index. The reasons why those variables were chosen and the measures
for them will be illustrated one by one.
The data of Housing Prices, Aggregated Product, Population, Housing Prices and
Income Inequality are quarterly data collected from the first Quarter of 2000 to the third
Quarter of 2016, for China’s 70 different cities. The data of Money Supply and Stock
Market are quarterly data collected from the first Quarter of 2000 to the third Quarter,
2016, at national level, not for different 70 cities.

8.1 Dependent Variables and Independent Variable
8.1.1 Dependent Variable: Housing Prices
1. Measure: Quarterly Average Housing Prices（Y）
2. Data Source
Quarterly Housing Prices for 70 different cities from the first Quarter of 2000 to the
third Quarter of 2016 are from 2005-2017 Report of Real Estate Market. E-House China
R&D Institute (Authorized Access), 2000-2017 Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of
Statistics of Republic of China.
8.1.2 Independent Variables
1. Aggregate Product of an Economy
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(1) Measure: Quarterly Gross Domestic Product（X 1 ）
GDP will certainly affect such prices. There are two ways in which GDP or GDI
influences housing prices. One is by increasing demand in the capital market, and another
is by increasing demand in the rental market.
The basic economic model tells us that asset prices are driven by rent, which is then
driven by space demand. Thus, the first path in which GDP affects housing prices is
“high GDP, high space demand, high rent, leading to high housing prices.”
However, in many situations, housing prices are separate from housing rents. They
are directly driven by GDP. Thus, the second path in which GDP influences housing
prices is “high GDP, high assets demand, resulting in high housing prices.”
When there is no speculation demand in a housing market, the housing prices are
mainly driven by the first path. Conversely, when there is high speculation demand in a
housing market, the housing prices are primarily driven by the second path. The demand
in the first path is for consumption, while the demand in the second path is for assets.
(2) Data Source
Quarterly Gross Domestic Product for 70 different cities from the first Quarter of
2000 to the third Quarter of 2016 are from Wind Database, iFinD Database, CEInet
Statistics Database and 2000-2017 Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics of
Republic of China.
2. Population
(1) Measure: Quarterly Permanent Residential Population（X 2 ）
Population also influences housing prices. Population increase comes from two
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sources: the self-increase of this city’s population and immigrants from other cities. In the
short and middle term, immigrants cause the population increase.
In China, there are two definitions of population. One is called “HUKOU”
population, which is very similar to “citizens.” Another one is called Permanent Resident
Population, which includes the people with “HUKOU” and the people who work and live
here but do not have “HUKOU.”
“HUKOU” residents (citizens) and “Non-HUKOU” residents have very different
“welfare profits.” For example, in Beijing, Non-HUKOU residents are not eligible to buy
houses unless they have worked and paid social insurance for five consecutive years.
Non-HUKOU residents are ineligible to attend the Beijing vehicle-license-plate lottery.
Moreover, children from Non-HUKOU families are disqualified from enrolling in all
elementary, middle, and high schools in Beijing but are allowed in some assigned
schools, which are usually very poor schools. Non-HUKOU residents are also ineligible
for medical insurance, endowment insurance, unemployment insurance, home loans from
housing accumulation fund, and affordable housing policies. Consequently, NonHUKOU residents are seen as “second-class citizens.” They have their own name, that is,
“Beijing Drifters.”
While governments always use HUKOU residents in statistical work, permanent
residents population is used instead in this study. The Non-HUKOU residents work, live,
and consume various kinds of goods in this city despite being overlooked and
discriminated against by governments. They represent an important part of the total
demand for homes. Hence, both Non-HUKOU residents and HUKOU residents are
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participants in the home markets.
(2) Data Source
Quarterly Permanent Residential Population for 70 different cities from the first
Quarter of 2000 to the third Quarter of 2016 are from 2000-2017 Statistical Yearbook,
National Bureau of Statistics of Republic of China and Wind Database.
3. Housing Policy
(1) Measure: Quarterly Housing Policy Dummy Variable（X 3 ）. When there are
housing policies, X 3 =1; when there are not housing policies, X 3 =0.
In China, various types of housing policies have emerged since 2005. They include:
1) Home Loan Policies. These include:
A. Increasing the interest rate by 10% for the second home
B. Increasing the down payment rate from 30% to 70% for the second home
C. Prohibiting a loan for the third home
D. Changing the definition of “Second Home Loan.” Normally, the second home
is defined as the second home a family buys when this family has already owned one.
2) Purchase Constraint Policies. These include:
A. One citizen family in this city can buy a maximum of two new houses after the
policy came out. In other words, one citizen in one city cannot buy a third home.
B. An unmarried adult citizen (over 18 years) can only buy one new house after
the policy came out. Thus, said adult citizen cannot buy a second home.
C. An adult (over 18 years) without “HUKOU”(citizenship) but who has worked
and paid social insurance in a city for five consecutive years can buy only one new house
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after the policy came out. Said adult cannot buy a second home.
3) Transaction Tax Policies
A. Adjusting contract tax
B. Adjusting income tax
C. Adjusting Value-added tax
(2) Data Source
Quarterly Housing Policies for 70 cities from the first Quarter of 2000 through the
third Quarter of 2016 are from 2000-2017 Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of
Statistics of Republic of China, 2005-2017 Report of Real Estate Market. E-House China
R&D Institute, and Wind Database.
4. Money Supply
(1) Measure: Quarterly M2 (X 4 )
Why does money supply have influence on housing prices? First, more money
supply means more home loans available for home buyers. Second, more money will lead
to low interest rate, and then the home buyer would like to borrow more money to buy
houses. Third, more money supply will lead to inflation, then the demand for houses will
be strong because home purchase will become a good strategy to offset inflation.
People’s Bank of China defined M0, M1 and M2 as follows: 116
M0: currency in circulation
M1: M0 + Demand Deposits
M2: M1+ Quasi-Money (Time Deposits + Saving Deposits + Other Deposits).
116

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4049854-interpreting-chinas-monetary-aggregates-relation-shadowbanking-business April 4th, 2017
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In monetary aggregates (M0,M1,M2,and M3), the most widely used in literature is
M2. Hence, M2 was selected as the index for money supply.
(2) Data Source
Quarterly M2 from the first Quarter of 2000 through the third Quarter of 2016 at
national level are from Wind Database. All those data does not vary by city.
5. Stock Market
(1) Measure: Shanghai Stock Market Index (X 5 )
Various types of assets exist in markets, including stocks, houses, funds, real estate
investment trusts, exchanges, and gold. However, houses and stocks are often regarded as
two of the most important assets. According to portfolio theory, these two important
assets should be considered in the investment portfolio. They are often interchangeable
with each other.
Consequently, housing prices and asset prices should have an extremely close
relationship. For example, if the stock prices have been increasing and investors expect
that it will keep going up, significantly more money will flow into the stock market from
all other kinds of asset markets, such as housing markets. If the money comes out of the
housing market, then the housing prices will decrease. That is called the replacement
effect.
Therefore, the stock market should be taken into account. There are two stock
market index in China. One is Shanghai Stock Market Index, the other is Shenzhen Stock
Market Index. The first one is more widely used, so Shanghai Stock Market is selected as
the measure for China stock market.
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(2) Data Source
Quarterly Shanghai Stock Market Index from the first Quarter of 2000 through the
third Quarter of 2016 at national level is from Wind Database and iFinD Database.
Those data do not vary by city.
6. Income Inequality
(1) Measure: Ration of Gross Domestic Income and Gross Domestic Product(RRG)
(X 6 ) . We frequently discuss this variable in the entire study because the relationship
between income inequality and housing policies is the topic of this research.
(2) Data Source
Quarterly RGG for 70 cities from the first Quarter of 2000 through the third Quarter
of 2016 is calculated from GDP, Population and Per Capita Disposable Income, which are
come from Wind Database, iFinD Database and CEInet Statistics Database(2000-2017),
2000-2017 Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics of Republic of China and
Income Research Report, China Income Institute for Income Distribution.

8.2 Panel Data Analysis Models
8.2.1 The Constant Coefficient Pooled Data Model
The simplest model for this analysis is Constant Coefficient Pooled Data Model.
This model is also called the Pooled Regression Model because neither the time-series
effects nor the cross-section effects are taken into account. In other words, all data is
pooled into a simple regression model given where both the intercept and the coefficient
are constant for the sample.
The model can be expressed by:
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HPit = β 0 + β 1GDPit + β 2 POPit + β 3 HOPit + β 4 M 2 it + β 5 SSI it + β 6 RGGit + ε it

(8.1)

Or,
Yit = β 0 + β1 X 1it + β 2 X 2it + β 3 X 3 it + β 4 X 4 it + β 5 X 5it + β 6 X 6it + ε it

(8.2)

where:
Y or HP: Housing Prices
X 1 or GDP: Gross Domestic Product
X 2 or POP: Population
X 3 or HOP: Housing Policy（Dummy Variable）
X 4 or M2: Money Supply
X 5 or SSI: Shanghai Stock Market Index
X 6 or RGG: Income Inequality

ε it ~ i.i.d (0, σ 2 )
8.2.2 The Fixed Effects Panel Data Model
Fixed Effects Panel Data Model or Fixed Effects Model is obtained when the assumption
that the intercept is constant for all cities is removed. In other words, Fixed Effects Model
has constant slopes and different intercepts by cross-sectional unit. In this model,
temporal effects are not taken into account, but individual-specific features (intercept,
denoted by u i ) are emphasized. Different cities have different intercepts, but the
intercepts remains constant during all periods. It is emphasized that u i is correlated with
some independent variables because u i includes all the individual-specific features. The
model can be expressed by:
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HPit = u i + β1GDPit + β 2 POPit + β 3 HOPit + β 4 M 2 it + β 5 SSI it + β 6 RGGit + ε it

(8.3)

Or

Yit = u i + β1 X 1it + β 2 X 2it + β 3 X 3 it + β 4 X 4 it + β 5 X 5it + β 6 X 6it + ε it

(8.4)

Where

ε it ~ i.i.d (0, σ ε2 ) and it is independent of all X it
u i ~ N (0, σ u2 ) but it is correlated with some X it
Another way:

HPit = α 1City1 + α 2 City 2 + α k City k  + β1GDPit
+ β 2 POPit + β 3 HOPit + β 4 M 2 it + β 5 SSI it + β 6 RGGit + ε it

(8.5)

Or

Yit = α 1C1 + α 2 C 2 + α k C k  + β1 X 1it
+ β 2 X it + β 3 X 3it + β 4 X 4it + β 5 X 5it + β 6 X 6it + ε it

(8.6)

With the variables as previously describes.
8.2.3 Random Effects Panel Data Model
The Random Effects Panel Data Model is a regression model with random
intercepts and constant coefficients. Precisely, the intercept is assumed to be a random
variable in order to take errors into account. This cross-specific error term u i should be
uncorrelated with the independent variables because the intercepts are not individualspecific. In addition, the random error ε i of the whole model is assumed to have
temporal effects, that is, follow some auto regression (n) process.
The model can be expressed by:
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HPit = u i + β 1GDPit + β 2 POPit + β 3 HOPit + β 4 M 2 it + β 5 SSI it + β 6 RGGit + ε it
Or

Yit = u i + β 1 X 1it + β 2 X 2it + β 3 X 3 it + β 4 X 4 it + β 5 X 5it + β 6 X 6it + ε it
Where u i = β 0 + vi
So

Yit = β 0 + β1 X 1it + β 2 X 2it + β 3 X 3 it + β 4 X 4 it + β 5 X 5it + β it IX 6it + vi + ε it
where,
vi ~ N (0, σ i2 ) but it is independent of all X it

ε it ~ AR(1) or ε it = ρε i ,t −1 + η it
with variables as described above.

8.3 Data
As a summary of 8.2, all data sources are listed here.
8.3.1 Main Sources
Wind Database (Authorized Access)
iFinD Database (Authorized Access)
CEInet Statistics Database (Authorized Access)
2000-2017 Income Research Report, China Income Institute for Income
Distribution (Private Access )
2005-2017 Report of Real Estate Market. E-House China R&D Institute
(Authorized Access)
2000-2017 Internal Reports of National Bureau of Statistics of Republic of
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China(Private Access)
8.3.2 Reference Source
2000-2017 Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics of Republic of
China (Public)

8.4 Results and Discussion
8.4.1 Putting 70 Cities with 67 Quarters Together
In this section, 70 medium and large cities with 67 quarterly data from the first quarter of
2000 to the third quarter of 2016 are taken as a whole sample.
1. Pooled Regression Model
As said above, neither time-series effects nor cross-section effects are taken into
account in pooled regression. All data is run in a simple regression model. The results are
shown in Table 8.1
Linear Regression

Table 8.1 Results of Pooled Regression Model
Number of Obs. = 4,690
F(6, 69)=42.78
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared
= 0.6843
Root MSE
= 2510.6
Std. Err. Adjusted for 70 Cluster in Cities
Robust Std.
Err.

Y Coef.

T

P>ItI

[95% Conf.

Interval]

X1

3.552575

0.596295

5.96

0

2.362999

4.742151

X2

-1.971045

0.494902

-3.98

0

-2.958346

-0.9837429

X3

991.582

371.1852

2.67

0.009

251.0878

1732.076

X4

0.0256562

0.00524

4.9

0

0.015202

0.0361105

X5

0.0350784

0.063811

0.55

0.584

-0.0922218

0.1623785

X6
_cons

-7470.654

2221.687

-3.36

0.001

-11902.8

-3038.511

6652.292

1699.884

3.91

0

3261.116

10043.47
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Without time-series effects and cross-section effects, the results show that housing
prices(Y) is significantly affected by GDP(X 1 ), Population(X 2 ), Housing Policies(X 3 ),
M2(X 4 ) and RGG(X 6 ) at 99% level. The fitting degree (R2) is also good, which is
0.6843.
The coefficients of GDP(X 1 ), Population(X 2 ) and M2(X 4 ) are all positive. This is
consistent with economic fundamentals. When GDP, Population and Monetary supply
increases, housing prices should also increase.
At first, it is a confusing that the coefficient of RGG（X 6 ）is negative because
what this study tries to show is the positive correlation between income inequality and
housing prices, in other words, when income inequality is more severe, housing prices
will be higher. The reason why the coefficient of RGG（X 6 ）is negative is because the
relationship between RGG and income inequality is negative, that is, a lower RGG means
more severe income inequality. As a result, the coefficient of RGG（X 6 ）should be
negative, as showed by table 8.1.
It is also confusing that the coefficient of Housing Polies(X 3 ) is negative
because the purpose of all housing policies is to suppress rapidly increasing housing
prices. Therefore, the expectation for this coefficient is a negative sign. In other words,
when housing policies came out(Dummy variable X 3 =1), the housing prices were
supposed to decrease; when housing policies did not come out or were
terminated(Dummy variable X 3 =0), the housing prices were supposed to increase.
However, the reason why housing Policies came out is because housing prices

205

increased too fast and the housing markets were too “hot” over past 16 years in China.
Correspondingly, the reason why housing prices didn’t come out or were terminated is
because housing prices were very stable or decreased slightly. 117In details, the following
facts can be observed in China:
When housing prices were stable, housing policies did not come out (X 3 =0) ;
When housing prices increased very quickly, housing policies came out (X 3 =1);
After housing policies came out, housing prices still increased although they
increased not as fast as before. When housing prices were stagnant or began to decease
slightly, housing policies were then terminated. That is the reason why the coefficient of
Housing Policies(X 3 ) is positive.
2. Fixed Effects Panel Data Model
As said before, then fixed Effects Panel Data Model has constant slope with
different intercepts by cross-sectional unit. In this model, temporal effects are not taken
into account, but individual-specific features (intercept) are emphasized.

117

Housing prices in all cities in China have never experienced quick decrease since 2000 except every few
cities, like Ordos, Inner Mongolia.

206

Table 8.2a Results of Fixed Effects Model (Part)
Fixed-effects (Within) Regression
Number of Obs. = 4,690
R-sq:
Obs per group
within = 0.7377
min =67
between = 0.2979
avg =67.0
overall = 0.3347
max =67
F(6,69) =48.70
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.8411
Prob>F =0.000
Std. Err. Adjusted for 70 Cluster in Cities
Robust
Std. Err. t
Y Coef.
P>ItI
[95% Conf. Interval]
X1

2.298844 0.528963

4.35

0

1.243592

3.354095

X2

12.52721 2.775459

4.51

0

6.990318

18.0641

X3

560.6446 245.4185

2.28

0.025

71.04815

1050.241

X4 0.0232382 0.003308

7.03

0

0.0166396

0.0298369

X5 0.1061664 0.041329

2.57

0.012

0.0237167

0.1886162

-6072.098 2549.337
-2.38
0.02
-2651.217 2461.628
-1.08
0.285
5977.1485
1735.5054
0.922248 (fraction of variance due to u_i)

-11157.89
-7562.031

-986.3096
2259.597

X6
_cons
sigma u
sigma e
rho

When individual effects (cross-section effects) are taken into account, the results
show that housing prices(Y) are significantly affected by GDP(X 1 ),Population(X 2 ),
M2(X 4 ) at 99% level, and Housing Policies(X 3 ) and RGG(X 6 ) at the 95% level.
The overall degree of fit (R2) is 0.3347, which is not as good as that of pooled
regression model because cross-sectional effects are taken into account. But the R-square
within groups is 0.7377, which is very good.
The coefficient for GDP(X 1 ), Population(X 2 ) and M2(X 4 ) are all positive. This is
consistent with economic fundamentals. When GDP, Population and Monetary supply
increases, housing prices will increases.
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The coefficient for Housing Policies(X 3 ) is positive. As pointed out above, this
result indicates housing policies have not stopped rapidly increasing housing prices in the
past 16 years. The reason why housing policies were mandated was because housing
prices increased very fast. Mandating housing policies is actually a reaction to rapidly
rising housing prices. In a contrast, when housing prices were very stable or decrease
slightly, housing policies were terminated or never came out. As a result, housing policies
are positively correlated with increasing housing prices, and the positive coefficient on
Housing Policies(X 3 ) makes better sense.
The coefficient of RGG（X6）is negative. As pointed out above, the reason is
because the relationship between RGG and income inequality is negative, that is, a lower
RGG means more severe income inequality. As a result, when the coefficient of RGG
（X6）is negative as shown by the results, it indicates more severe income inequality,
which will lead to higher housing prices.
The Fixed Effects Model takes individual features into accounts. So the model
must produce the data about for different individuals. The results with individual
intercepts are shown in table 8.2b.
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Table 8.2b Results of Fixed Effects Model (Complete)
Fixed-effects (Within) Regression
Number of Obs. = 4,690
R-sq:
Obs per group
within = 0.7377
min =67
between = 0.2979
avg =67.0
overall = 0.3347
max =67
F(6,69) =48.70
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.8411
Prob>F =0.000
Std. Err. Adjusted for 70 Cluster in Cities
Y Coef.

Robust
Std. Err.

t

P>ItI

[95% Conf. Interval]

X1

2.298844

0.528963

4.35

0 1.243592

3.354095

X2

12.52721

2.775459

4.51

0 6.990318

18.0641

X3

560.6446

245.4185

2.28

0.025 71.04815

1050.241

X4

0.023238

0.003308

7.03

X5

0.106166

0.041329

2.57

X6
_cons
_Icity_2
_Icity_3
_Icity_4
_Icity_5
_Icity_6
_Icity_7
_Icity_8
_Icity_9
_Icity_10
_Icity_11
_Icity_12
_Icity_13
_Icity_14
_Icity_15
_Icity_16
_Icity_17
_Icity_18
_Icity_19
_Icity_20
_Icity_21
_Icity_22

-6072.1

2549.337

-2.38

0.02

-11157.9

-986.3096

2461.628 -1.08
689.1677 -4.29
237.696 11.41
285.8247 7.69
304.8157 8.46
330.411
9.8
206.5606 24.25
1434.74 8.14
776.0573 7.28
294.2159
6.4
2382.534 -2.49
242.1298 -4.39
176.4595 0.08
413.6772 -6.95
490.3047 3.02
914.9196 -6.16
762.306 5.34
435.8162 11.01
1524.682 6.81
1418.884 -5.73
891.8917 6.12
1129.507 -5.58

0.285
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.013
0
0.935
0
0.003
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

-7562.03
-4310.4
2247.281
1637.996
1980.649
2590.477
4604.241
8870.602
4125.366
1306.877
-10612.5
-1536.41
-331.412
-3686.97
519.8484
-7430.28
2578.343
3945.153
7400.579
-10904.2
3705.95
-8514.36

2259.597
-1608.911
3179.032
2758.409
3175.504
3885.665
5413.944
14494.68
7167.455
2460.182
-1273.094
-587.279
360.2966
-2065.389
2441.808
-3843.862
5566.528
5653.521
13377.22
-5342.312
7202.101
-4086.772

-2651.22
-2959.66
2713.157
2198.202
2578.076
3238.071
5009.093
11682.64
5646.411
1883.53
-5942.77
-1061.85
14.44229
-2876.18
1480.828
-5637.07
4072.436
4799.337
10388.9
-8123.27
5454.026
-6300.57

0

0.01664

0.0298369

0.012 0.023717

0.1886162
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_Icity_23
_Icity_24

2347.714
-25.7882

439.0404
189.7551

5.35
-0.14

0 1487.211
0.892 -397.701

3208.218
346.1249

_Icity_25

6250.709

1198.407

5.22

0 3901.874

8599.545

_Icity_26

8579.161

1453.989

5.9

0 5729.395

11428.93

_Icity_27

9555.047

1649.484

5.79

0 6322.118

12787.98

_Icity_28

6493.613

1294.702

5.02

0 3956.044

9031.183

_Icity_29

-811.335

159.6601

-5.08

_Icity_30

6582.845

1284.173

_Icity_31

7019.831

1358.077

_Icity_32
_Icity_33
_Icity_34
_Icity_35
_Icity_36
_Icity_37
_Icity_38
_Icity_39
_Icity_40
_Icity_41
_Icity_42
_Icity_43
_Icity_44
_Icity_45
_Icity_46
_Icity_47

0

-1124.26

-498.4073

5.13

0 4065.913

9099.777

5.17

0

4358.05

9681.613

7477.457
-10456.5
6699.721
4578.764
7748.982
1937.064
5015.829
-1469.09
4220.691
7001.899
6703.401
4112.546
-28005.5
-64.0113
4371.058
802.3604

1358.627
5.5
3123.494 -3.35
1154.487
5.8
818.8213 5.59
1238.692 6.26
574.4802 3.37
838.8169 5.98
319.7578 -4.59
292.217 14.44
661.1104 10.59
1150.463 5.83
547.7605 7.51
5746.184 -4.87
120.932 -0.53
755.56 5.79
320.3844
2.5

0
0.001
0
0
0
0.001
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.597
0
0.012

4814.597
-16578.5
4436.967
2973.903
5321.191
811.1038
3371.778
-2095.8
3647.956
5706.146
4448.535
3038.955
-39267.8
-301.034
2890.188
174.4185

10140.32
-4334.582
8962.475
6183.624
10176.77
3063.025
6659.879
-842.3745
4793.426
8297.652
8958.267
5186.137
-16743.18
173.0111
5851.929
1430.302

_Icity_48

376.1265

216.0455

1.74

0.082

-47.315

799.5679

_Icity_49

-567.983

205.876

-2.76

0.006

-971.493

-164.4739

_Icity_50

1940.324

309.7267

6.26

0 1333.271

2547.377

_Icity_51

4126.582

724.7792

5.69

0 2706.041

5547.124

_Icity_52

5322.184

925.1696

5.75

0 3508.885

7135.484

_Icity_53

4211.299

572.6927

7.35

0 3088.842

5333.757

_Icity_54

3819.372

603.572

6.33

0 2636.392

5002.351

_Icity_55
_Icity_56
_Icity_57
_Icity_58

-2561.55
3809.017
5762.778
2892.3

594.2437 -4.31
556.5121 6.84
922.1826 6.25
271.5237 10.65

0 -3726.25
0 2718.273
0 3955.333
0 2360.123

-1396.856
4899.76
7570.222
3424.476
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_Icity_59
_Icity_60
_Icity_61
_Icity_62
_Icity_63
_Icity_64
_Icity_65
_Icity_66
_Icity_67
_Icity_68
_Icity_69
_Icity_70
sigma u
sigma e
rho

6875.104
4546.444
9594.029
17095.64
6594.082
3354.896
2668.238
6203.781
8927.506
7373.742
-167.731
3467.986

1225.413
725.2232
1588.818
1901.657
865.489
351.1205
332.0981
1028.711
1975.752
1317.966
332.9335
463.4558

5.61
6.27
6.04
8.99
7.62
9.55
8.03
6.03
4.52
5.59
-0.5
7.48

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.614
0

4473.338
3125.033
6480.004
13368.46
4897.755
2666.712
2017.338
4187.544
5055.104
4790.577
-820.268
2559.629

9276.87
5967.855
12708.06
20822.82
8290.41
4043.079
3319.138
8220.018
12799.91
9956.908
484.8069
4376.342

5977.149
1735.505
0.49874484 (fraction of variance
due to u_i)

As shown from table 8.2b, the intercepts for all cities are significant except city
11, 13, 24, 45 and 69. Therefore, cross section effects do exist for most cities.
3. Random Effects Panel Data Model
As pointed out above, the Random Effects Panel Data Model is a regression model
with random intercepts and constant coefficients. Precisely, the intercept u i is assumed to
be a random variable in order to take random errors vi into account, that is, u i = β 0 + vi .
This error term should be uncorrelated with the independent variables because the
intercepts are not individual-specific. In addition, the residual ε i of the model is assumed
to have temporal effects, that is, it follows auto regression process.
Although cor (ε i , ε j ) = 0 for i ≠ j , but cor (ε i + vi , ε j + v j ) = σ v2 ≠ 0 , so Generalized
Least Squares(GLS) Regression, not Ordinary Least Squares should be taken. Moreover,
Maximum Likelihood Estimation is another widely used regression method that can be
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used with Random Effects Models.

So both Feasible Generalized Least Squares

Random-effects Model (FGLS) and Maximum Likelihood Random-effects Model (MLE)
are used to run the models.
(1) Feasible Generalized Least Squares Random-effects Model (FGLS)
Table 8.3 Results of Feasible Generalized Least Squares Random-effects Model (FGLS)
Random-effects GLS Regression
Number of Obs.
= 4,690
Group Variable: city
Number of Groups = 70
R-sq:
Obs per group
within = 0.7274
min =67
between = 0.4357
avg =67.0
overall = 0.5100
max =67
Wald chi2(6) = 284.13
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Std. Err. Adjusted for 70 Cluster in Cities
Y Coef.

Robust
Std. Err.

t

P>ItI

X1

3.018567

0.458382 6.59

0

X2

4.948447

1.996788 2.48

X3

714.3962

X4
X5
X6
_cons
sigma u
sigma e

[95% Conf.

Interval]

2.120155

3.916979

0.013

1.034814

8.86208

260.5309 2.74

0.006

203.765

1225.027

0.0249505

0.003351 7.45

0

0.0183824

0.0315186

0.0811522

0.041207 1.97
2504.919
2.52
2334.925 0.8

0.049

0.0003874

0.1619169

0.012

-11227.46

-1408.356

0.426

-2717.794

6434.946

-6317.907
1858.576

1731.1542
1735.5054
0.49874484(fraction of variance
rho due to u _i)

The results from the Feasible Generalized Least Squares Random-effects Model
show that housing prices(Y) is significantly affected by GDP(X 1 ), Housing Policies(X 3 ),
M2(X 4 ) at the 99% level and Population(X 2 ) and RGG(X 6 ) at the 95% level. Those
results are similar to those of the Fixed Effects Model.
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What is different from Fixed Effects Models is that the coefficient for the stock
market index X 5 is also significant at 95% level. The Fixed Effects Model emphasizes
individual differences, but the Random Effects Model emphasizes the temporal
correlation. On one hand, the stock market is not a “local” market but a “global” market
because the whole country shares one stock market. As a result, the stock market variable
will show the impact of global financial market effects on all cities. On the other hand, as
many studies shows, China’s stock market does not follow a “random walk”, that is, the
times series effect or “unit root” can be detected in China’s stock market. Because the
Random Effects Model emphasizes the times series effects and “ignores” the cross
section effects, the stock market variable produces a significant effect to housing markets.
The overall degree (R2) is 0.5100, again not as good as pooled regression models.
But the R-square within groups is 0.7274, which is very good.
The coefficients of GDP(X 1 ), Population(X 2 ) and M2(X 4 ) are all positive. This is
consistent with economic fundamentals. When GDP, Population and Monetary supply
increases, housing prices will increases.
The coefficient of Housing Policies（X 3 ）is positive and the coefficient of RGG
（X6）is negative. The reason is the same as previously stated for the pooled regression
model and fixed effects model.
(2) Maximum-likelihood Random-effects Model (MLE)
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8.4 Results of Maximum-likelihood Random-effects Model (MLE)
Random-effects ML Regression
Number of Obs.
= 4,690
Group Variable: city
Number of Groups = 70
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian
Obs per group
min =67
Log likelihood = -41864.844
avg =67.0
max =67
LR chi2(6)
= 6090.40
Log likelihood = -41864.844
Prob > chi2
= 0.0000
Std. Err. Adjusted for 70 Cluster in Cities
Y Coef.

Robust Std.
Err.

T

P>ItI

[95% Conf.

Interval]

X1

2.437899

0.080379

30.33

0

2.280359

2.59544

X2

11.06521

0.586528

18.87

0

9.915639

12.21479

X3

590.1132

69.77953

8.46

0

453.3479

726.8786

X4

0.0235747

0.00194

12.15

0

0.0197717

0.0273776

X5

0.101413

0.032474

3.12

0.002

0.0377647

0.1650612

-6115.956
414.7444 -14.75
X6
-1783.762
791.142
-2.25
_cons
sigma u
5394.321
503.6986
1735.677
18.08617
sigma e
0.9061832
0.016018
rho
LR test of sigma_u=0 : chibar2(01) = 3002.25

0

-6928.84

-5303.072

0.024

-3334.372

-233.1522

4492.16
1700.588
0.8707912

6477.663
1771.49
0.9338489

Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000

The results for the Maximum-likelihood Random-effects Model show that
Housing Prices(Y) is significantly affected by all independent variables at the 99% level.
Those effects are much stronger than the Feasible Generalized Least Squares Randomeffects Model.
The coefficients of GDP(X 1 ), Population(X 2 ) and M2(X 4 ) are all positive. This is
consistent with economic fundamentals. Also, similar to previous models, the coefficient
for Housing Policies（X 3 ）is positive and the coefficient for RGG（X6）is negative.
4. Models Selection
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Three panel date models have been used to estimate the models. Which one is the
best? Which one has best fit? To compare the models, a model selection test was done.
1) Choose Pooled Regression Model or Fixed Effects Model
H o ：all u i = 0
H a ：at least one u i ≠ 0
Table 8.5 Selection between Pooled Regression Model and Fixed Effects Model
Fixed-effects (Within) Regression
Number of Obs.
= 4,690
Group Variable: city
Number of Groups = 70
R-sq:
Obs per group:
min =67
within = 0.7274
avg =67.0
between = 0.4357
max =67
overall = 0.5100
F(6,4614)=2162.52
Prob > F
= 0.0000
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.8411
Std. Err. Adjusted for 70 Cluster in Cities
Y Coef.

Robust Std.
Err.

T

P>ItI

[95% Conf.

Interval]

X1

2.298844

0.078638

29.23

0

2.144676

2.453012

X2

12.52721

0.55952

22.39

0

11.43028

13.62413

X3

560.6446

69.68425

8.05

0

424.0301

697.259

X4

0.0232382

0.001941

11.97

0

0.0194335

0.027043

X5

0.1061664

0.03247

3.27

0.001

0.0425101

0.1698228

-6072.098
415.3957 -14.62
X6
-2651.217
446.7416
-5.93
_cons
sigma u
5977.1485
1735.5054
sigma e
0.922248
rho
F test that all u_i=0: F(69, 4614) = 75.16

0
0

-6886.473
-3527.045

-5257.724
-1775.39

Prob > F = 0.0000

The test results show that the null hypothesis is refused and the fixed effects model is
obvious better than pooled regression model. Thus, using a panel data approach is better
than pooling the data.
2) Choose Pooled Regression Model or Random Effects Model
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H o : There is no random effect
H a : There exists random effect
Table 8.6 Selection between Pooled Regression Model and Random
Effects Model
Breusch and Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test for Random Effects
Y[city,t]=Xb+u[city]+e[City,t]
Estimated Results
Var
sd=sqrt(Var)
1.99E+07
4465.691
Y
3011979
1735.505
e
2996895
1731.154
u
test var(u)=0
chibar2(01)=31268.14
Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000

The Lagrangian multiplier test shows that the null hypothesis is rejected, and that the
Random Effects Model is better than pooled regression model. Again, using a panel data
approach is better than pooling the data.
3) Choose Fixed Effects Model or Random Effects Model
H o : Difference in coefficients is not systematic
H a : Difference in coefficients is systematic
Table 8.7 Selection between Fixed Effects Model and Random Effects Model
——coefficient——

Y

(b)
FE

(B)
RE

(b-B)
Difference

sqrt(Diag(v_bv_B))
S.E.

X1

2.298844

3.018567

-0.7197235

0.0396886

X2

12.52721

4.948447

7.57876

0.4130498

X3

560.6446

714.3962

-153.7516

8.540647

X4

0.0232382

0.024951

-0.0017123

0.0002218

X5

0.1061664

0.081152

0.0250143

0.002096

X6
_cons

-6072.098
-2651.217

-6317.907
245.809
78.75582
1858.576
-4509.793
129.3131
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
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chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
=337.89
Prob>chi2 =0.0000
(v_b-v_B is not positive definite)

The test results show that the null hypothesis is refused, and that it is statistically
better to use fixed effects model rather than random effects model.
8.4.2 Grouped by Size of GDP
The variable “Income inequality” is a “relative value”, but the variable “Housing
Price” is an “absolute value”. So Income Inequality might have a different influence on
Housing Price in different cities with different Characteristics. In order to test the
correlation between Income Inequality and Housing Price, 70 cities are divided into 5
groups by GDP. Next, a model selection test is done between the Fixed Effects Model
and the Random Effects Model. The result shows that it is better to use the Random
Effects Model than the Fixed Effects Model for all 5 GDP-Ranked groups. Since the
Random Effects Model does not emphasize individual-specific effects, this result
confirms that the cities with similar GDP do not have statistically significant intercepts.
Precisely, Income Inequality might have a similar influence on Housing Price in the cities
with similar GDP.
1. The Highest-GDP Group (Random Effects Model)
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Table 8.8 Results of Random Effects Model on the Highest-GDP Group
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 t panels(cor) corr(ar1)
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: Generalize least Squares
Panels : Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation
Correlation: Common AR(1) coefficient for all
panels(0.7704)
Estimated Covariance= 21
Estimated Autocorrelations= 1
Estimated Coefficient= 8

Y Coef.

Number of Obs.
Number of Groups
Time Period
Wald Chi2(14)
Prob > Chi2

Std. Err.

Z

P>IzI

= 402
= 6
=67
=443.94
=0

[95% Conf.

Interval]

X1

0.2885488

0.082079

3.52

0

0.1276779

0.4494197

X2

-1.107709

0.164165

-6.75

0

-1.429466

-0.7859513

X3

636.9573

160.1565

3.98

0

323.0564

950.8582

X4

-0.0035042

0.006129

-0.57

0.567

-0.0155165

0.008508

X5

-0.0377956

0.219047

-0.17

0.863

-0.4671192

0.3915281

X6
t
_cons

-1066.834
290.7348
2477.769

340.0649
19.4241
824.4764

-3.14
14.97
3.01

0.002
0
0.003

-1733.349
252.6643
861.8253

-400.3194
328.8054
4093.713

The results show that Housing Prices(Y) is significantly affected by GDP(X 1 ),
Population(X 2 ), Housing Policies(X 3 ), and RGG(X 6 ) at the 99% level. The effect of
M2(X 4 ) and Stock Market(X 5 ) are not significant.
It is very confusing here that the coefficient of Population(X 2 ) is negative, which is
opposite to our intuition. Although the high population is positively correlated with high
housing prices for 70 cities as a whole sample, the correlation is negative for some of
those 70 cities. For example, in the first group, although the population of Beijing was
less than Shanghai, but the housing prices of Beijing are higher than those of Shanghai.
2. The Second-Highest Group (Random Effects Model)
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Table 8.9 Results of Random Effects Model on the Second Group
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 t panels(cor) corr(ar1)
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: Generalize least Squares
Panels :Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation
Correlation: Common AR(1) coefficient for all
panels(0.9078)
Estimated covariance =36
Number of obs =536
Estimated autocorrelations =1
Number of groups =8
Estimated coefficients=8
Time periods=67
Wald chi2(7)=438.03
Prob > chi2 =0
Y Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

P>IzI

[95% Conf.

Interval]

X1

-0.0058556

0.011137

-0.53

0.599

-0.0276844

0.0159731

X2

-1.029399

0.141333

-7.28

0

-1.306406

-0.7523923

X3

51.20238

24.96223

2.05

0.04

2.277301

100.1275

X4

-0.0012469

0.001068

-1.17

0.243

-0.0033395

0.0008457

X5

0.0607393

0.040958

1.48

0.138

-0.0195375

0.141016

X6
t
_cons

-213.3064
124.8402
1133.242

104.4187
6.45917
320.2413

-2.04
19.33
3.54

0.041
0
0

-417.9634
112.1805
505.5805

-8.649514
137.4999
1760.903

The results show that Housing Prices(Y) is significantly affected by Population(X 2 ),
Housing Policies(X 3 ), and RGG(X 6 ) at the 99% level or 95% level. The effect of
GDP(X 1 ), M2(X 4 ) and Stock Market(X 5 ) are not significant.
Why is GDP insignificant? Although the correlation between GDP and housing prices is
significant for all 70 cities as a whole sample, the correlation is not significant for some
cities. For example, in group 2, although Wuhan’s GDP was much higher than
Zhengzhou in 2016, the housing prices in Wuhan was much lower than Zhengzhou.
3. The Middle-GDP Group (Random Effects Model)
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Table 8.10 Results of Random Effects Model on the Third Group
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 t panels(cor) corr(ar1)
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: Generalize least Squares
Panels :Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation
Correlation: Common AR(1) coefficient for all panels
(0.9200)
Estimated covariance =105
Number of obs =936
Estimated autocorrelations =1
Number of groups =14
Estimated coefficients=8
Time periods=67
Wald chi2(7)=520.33
Prob > chi2 =0
Y Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>IzI

[95% Conf.

Interval]

X1

0.0069128

0.005091

1.36

0.174

-0.0030645

0.01689

X2

-1.568134

0.18426

-8.51

0

-1.929278

-1.206991

X3

39.32095

10.63348

3.7

0

18.47971

60.16218

X4

-0.0013157

0.00066

-1.99

0.046

-0.0026093

-0.000022

X5

0.0586522

0.025371

2.31

0.021

0.0089269

0.1083774

X6
t
_cons

56.12087
93.64965
1539.668

39.85236
4.411629
244.4701

1.41
21.23
6.3

0.089
0
0

-21.98832
85.00301
1060.515

134.2301
102.2963
2018.82

The results show that housing prices(Y) is significantly affected by Population(X 2 ),
Housing Policies(X 3 ), and RGG(X 6 ) at the 99% level or 90% level. The effect of
GDP(X 1 ), M2(X 4 ) and Stock Market(X 5 ) are not significant. The reason why the
coefficient of GDP(X 1 ) is not significant is the same to that for Group 2.
4. The Fourth Group (Random Effects Model)
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Table 8.11 Results of Random Effects Model on the Fourth Group
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 t panels(cor) corr(ar1)
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: Generalize least Squares
Panels : Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation
Correlation: common AR(1) coefficient for all panels
(0.8077)
Estimated covariance =190
Estimated autocorrelations =1
Estimated coefficients=8

Y Coef.

Number of obs =1273
Number of groups =19
Time periods=67
Wald chi2(7)=1373.21
Prob > chi2 =0

Std. Err.

z

P>IzI

[95% Conf.

Interval]

X1

0.0402989

0.022324

1.81

0.071

-0.0034545

0.0840523

X2

0.9847672

0.068921

14.29

0

0.8496845

1.11985

X3

53.11829

19.93798

2.66

0.008

14.04057

92.19601

X4

-0.0008077

0.000817

-0.99

0.323

-0.0024098

0.0007943

X5

0.0372898

0.029861

1.25

0.212

-0.0212368

0.0958164

X6
t
_cons

-810.3798
88.24315
619.2786

82.06169
2.759474
123.5382

-9.88
31.98
5.01

0
0
0

-971.2177
82.83468
377.1482

-649.5418
93.65162
861.409

The results show that housing prices(Y) is significantly affected by GDP(X 1 ),
Population(X 2 ), Housing Policies(X 3 ), and RGG(X 6 ) at the 99% or 90% level. The effect
of M2(X 4 ) and Stock Market(X 5 ) are not significant.
5. The fifth group （Random effects model）
Table 8.12 Results of Random Effects Model on the Fifth Group
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 t panels(cor) corr(ar1)
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: Generalize least Squares
Panels :Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation
Correlation: common AR(1) coefficient for all panels
(0.8910)
Estimated covariance =276
Number of obs =1541
Estimated autocorrelations =1
Number of groups =23
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Estimated coefficients=8

Y Coef.

Time periods=67
Wald chi2(7)=999.79
Prob > chi2 =0
Std. Err.

z

P>IzI

[95% Conf.

Interval]

X1

-0.0368613

0.012919

-2.85

0.004

-0.0621814

-0.0115412

X2

-1.712392

0.101712

-16.84

0

-1.911743

-1.513041

X3

74.34254

9.903108

7.51

0

54.9328

93.75227

X4

-0.0001497

0.000534

-0.28

0.779

-0.001197

0.0008977

X5

0.0335428

0.020506

1.64

0.102

-0.0066482

0.0737339

X6
t
_cons

-275.5787
71.13436
1340.761

32.42964
2.873862
130.6088

-8.5
24.75
10.27

0
0
0

-339.1397
65.50169
1084.773

-212.0178
76.76702
1596.75

The results show that housing prices(Y) is significantly affected by GDP(X 1 ),
Population(X 2 ), Housing Policies(X 3 ), and RGG(X 6 ) at the 99% level. The effect of
M2(X 4 ) and Stock Market(X 5 ) are not significant.
8.4.3 Grouped by Regions
Theoretically, housing prices are spatially correlated, which means that the housing prices
of neighboring cities might be closely related even though they have differences in GDP,
Population and other economic characteristics. In order to prove this argument, 70 cities
are divided into 9 groups according to their geographic location. Next, the model
selection test is conducted. The results show that the Fixed Effects Model is statistically
more supportive than the Random Effects Model for seven of the nine groups. Since the
Fixed Effects Model emphasizes the individual-specific effects (different intercepts), the
results confirm the arguments that individual-specific effects cannot be ignored within the
same geographic group despite economic differences. Interestingly, it is better to use the
Random Effects Model for two groups, Southwest Region and Northwest Region.
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However, it is not hard to understand because the cities in those two group not only have
the close location but also have the similar GDPs.
1. Northeast China Region (Fixed Effects Model)
Table 8.13 Results of Fixed Effects Model on North-China Region
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 city2-city8 t panels(cor) corr(ar1)
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: Generalize least Squares
Panels :Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation
Correlation: common AR(1) coefficient for all panels
(0.8627)
Estimated covariance =36
Number of obs =536
Estimated autocorrelations =1
Number of groups =8
Estimated coefficients=15
Time periods=67
Wald chi2(7)=889.43
Prob > chi2 =0
Y Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

P>IzI

[95% Conf.

Interval]

X1

0.0096496

0.0166

0.58

0.561

-0.0228851

0.0421843

X2

8.258907

0.743194

11.11

0

6.802274

9.71554

X3

23.23013

14.88306

1.56

0.119

-5.940119

52.40039

X4

-0.0006726

0.000639

-1.05

0.292

-0.0019244

0.0005792

X5

0.0366375

0.024187

1.51

0.13

-0.0107674

0.0840425

X6
City2
City3
City4
City5
City6
City7
City8
t
_cons

-106.8699
-1712.943
3687.2
3340.777
2210.036
4011.578
104.9652
3749.913
63.77763
-5520.148

114.8008
190.5855
388.042
335.2248
240.4507
366.2576
104.1366
265.0876
2.965946
613.885

-0.93
-8.99
9.5
9.97
9.19
10.95
1.01
14.15
21.5
-8.99

0.042
0
0
0
0
0
0.313
0
0
0

-331.8753
-2086.483
2926.651
2683.748
1738.761
3293.726
-99.13875
3230.351
57.96448
-6723.34

118.1355
-1339.402
4447.748
3997.805
2681.311
4729.429
309.0692
4269.475
69.59078
-4316.955

The results show that Housing Prices(Y) is significantly affected by
Population(X 2 ), and RGG(X 6 ) at the 99% or 90% level. The effect of GDP(X 1 ), Housing
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Policies(X 3 ), M2(X 4 ) and Stock Market(X 5 ) are not significant.
Why is the coefficient of housing policies not significant? Northeast China
Region has been experiencing recession since 2000. When the housing prices in other
regions increased very quickly, the housing prices here increased very slowly. As a result,
when housing policies came out, the local governments in this region often refuse those
policies. As a result, many policies had no influence on housing prices.
Why is GDP insignificant? Although the correlation between GDP and housing
prices is significant for all 70 cities as a whole sample, the correlation is not significant
for the cities in this region.
2.Bohai Rim Region (Fixed Effects Model)
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Table 8.14 Results of Fixed Effects Model on Bohai Rim Region
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 city2-city9 t panels(cor) corr(ar1)
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: Generalize least Squares
Panels :Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation
Correlation: common AR(1) coefficient for all panels
(0.8416)
Estimated covariance =45
Number of obs =603
Estimated autocorrelations =1
Number of groups =9
Estimated coefficients=16
Time periods=67
Wald chi2(7)=2498.73
Prob > chi2 =0
Y Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>IzI

[95% Conf.

Interval]

X1

0.0062424

0.009105

0.69

0.493

-0.0116039

0.0240887

X2

19.32339

0.677258

28.53

0

17.99599

20.65079

X3

53.94223

16.21

3.33

0.001

22.17121

85.71325

X4

0.0000228

0.000668

0.03

0.973

-0.0012856

0.0013313

X5

-0.0141827

0.025003

-0.57

0.571

-0.0631868

0.0348213

X6
City2
City3
City4
City5
City6
City7
City8
City9
T
_cons

41.40309
-6958.897
-3067.813
-8833.393
-2863.58
6130.576
-1553.838
-4118.655
-6936.951
52.03886
-10601.95

92.49603
1259.905
153.5812
508.6521
129.4978
254.6431
57.40124
164.4756
275.8434
2.75288
489.8593

0.45
-5.52
-19.98
-17.37
-22.11
24.08
-27.07
-25.04
-25.15
18.9
-21.64

0.084
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

-139.8858
-9428.266
-3368.826
-9830.333
-3117.391
5631.485
-1666.342
-4441.021
-7477.595
46.64332
-11562.06

222.692
-4489.529
-2766.799
-7836.453
-2609.769
6629.668
-1441.334
-3796.289
-6396.308
57.43441
-9641.843

The results show that Housing Prices(Y) is significantly affected by Population(X 2 ),
Housing Policies(X 3 ), and RGG(X 6 ) at the 99% level or 90% level. The effect of
GDP(X 1 ), M2(X 4 ) and Stock Market(X 5 ) are not significant.
Why is GDP insignificant? The reason is the same to Northeast China: although the
correlation between GDP and housing prices is significant for all 70 cities as a whole
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sample, the correlation is not significant for the cities in this region.

3. Central China Region (Fixed Effects Model)
Table 8.15 Results of Fixed Effects Model on Central-China Region
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 city2-city5 t panels(cor) corr(ar1)
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: Generalize least Squares
Panels : Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation
Correlation: common AR(1) coefficient for all panels
(0.9050)
Estimated covariance =15
Estimated autocorrelations =1
Estimated coefficients=12

Y Coef.

Number of obs =335
Number of groups =5
Time periods=67
Wald chi2(7)=717.92
Prob > chi2 =0

Std. Err.

z

P>IzI

[95% Conf.

Interval]

X1

0.0403399

0.025822

1.56

0.118

-0.0102703

0.0909501

X2

8.740203

0.900536

9.71

0

6.975185

10.50522

X3

59.47196

21.16744

2.81

0.005

17.98454

100.9594

X4

-0.0001368

0.000525

-0.26

0.794

-0.001166

0.0008924

X5

0.0257744

0.020224

1.27

0.202

-0.0138631

0.0654119

X6
City2
City3
City4
City5
t
_cons

-141.0427
-1011.843
-519.9831
777.4406
2963.271
55.12822
-4475.581

144.4678
152.7115
211.9454
321.7971
397.0344
3.135208
730.2388

-0.98
-6.63
-2.45
2.42
7.46
17.58
-6.13

0.059
0
0.014
0.016
0
0
0

-424.1944
-1311.152
-935.3885
146.73
2185.098
48.98333
-5906.823

142.109
-712.5343
-104.5778
1408.151
3741.445
61.27312
-3044.34

The results show that Housing Prices(Y) is significantly affected by Population(X 2 ),
Housing Policies(X 3 ), and RGG(X 6 ) at the 99% level or 90% level. The effect of
GDP(X 1 ), M2(X 4 ) and Stock Market(X 5 ) are not significant.
Why is GDP insignificant? The reason is the same to Northeast China Region: although
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the correlation between GDP and housing prices is significant for all 70 cities as a whole
sample, the correlation is not significant for the cities in this region.
4.South-central China Region (Fixed Effects Model)
Table 8.16 Results of Fixed Effects Model on South-Central China Region
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 city2-city12 t panels(cor) corr(ar1)
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: Generalize least Squares
Panels : Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation
Correlation: common AR(1) coefficient for all panels
(0.9050)
Estimated covariance =78
Number of obs =804
Estimated autocorrelations =1
Number of groups =12
Estimated coefficients=19
Time periods=67
Wald chi2(7)=1187.80
Prob > chi2 =0
Y Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

P>IzI

[95% Conf.

Interval]

X1

0.073261

0.011226

6.53

0

0.0512591

0.0952628

X2

4.090371

0.296835

13.78

0

3.508585

4.672157

X3

39.5198

15.35664

2.57

0.01

9.421336

69.61826

X4

-0.0002011

0.000432

-0.47

0.642

-0.0010484

0.0006462

X5

0.0131587

0.016611

0.79

0.428

-0.0193988

0.0457163

X6
City2
City3
City4
City5
City6
City7
City8
City9
City10
City11
City12
t
_cons

-15.7822
759.3354
-1501.096
-1538.112
-496.83
-1550.883
-1228.698
-2041.198
-800.4689
-1156.2
-1883.007
-1814.633
60.85082
-279.7389

46.12885
261.9904
287.8496
335.8615
361.9137
337.0973
360.1125
320.8708
361.3635
334.2462
382.0034
370.6143
2.396773
405.8353

-0.34
2.9
-5.21
-4.58
-1.37
-4.6
-3.41
-6.36
-2.22
-3.46
-4.93
-4.9
25.39
-0.69

0.01
0.004
0
0
0.17
0
0.001
0
0.027
0.001
0
0
0
0.491

-106.1931
245.8436
-2065.271
-2196.389
-1206.168
-2211.581
-1934.506
-2670.093
-1508.728
-1811.31
-2631.72
-2541.024
56.15323
-1075.162

74.62868
1272.827
-936.9208
-879.8358
212.5077
-890.1841
-522.8907
-1412.303
-92.2095
-501.0895
-1134.294
-1088.243
65.54841
515.6837

The results show that Housing Prices(Y) is significantly affected by GDP(X 1 ),
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Population(X 2 ), Housing Policies(X 3 ), and RGG(X 6 ) at the 99% level or 90% level. The
effect of M2(X 4 ) and Stock Market(X 5 ) are not significant.
5.Yangtze River Delta Region (Fixed Effects Model)
Table 8.17 Results of Fixed Effects Model on Yangtze River Delta Region
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 city2-city9 t panels(cor) corr(ar1)
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: Generalize least Squares
Panels :Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation
Correlation: common AR(1) coefficient for all panels
(0.9414)
Estimated covariance =45
Number of obs =603
Estimated autocorrelations =1
Number of groups =9
Estimated coefficients=16
Time periods=67
Wald chi2(7)=432.90
Prob > chi2 =0
Y Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>IzI

[95% Conf.

Interval]

X1

-0.0059841

0.025813

-0.23

0.817

-0.0565771

0.044609

X2

9.370445

1.233205

7.6

0

6.953407

11.78748

X3

169.2337

26.76105

6.32

0

116.783

221.6844

X4

-0.0008751

0.001051

-0.83

0.405

-0.0029348

0.0011847

X5

0.0501175

0.040817

1.23

0.22

-0.0298827

0.1301178

X6
City2
City3
City4
City5
City6
City7
City8
City9
t
_cons

-46.38316
625.5107
-286.9426
-338.9069
-1921.951
-857.5475
-5662.358
131.9307
524.8131
100.7989
-3234.729

63.43359
258.0649
384.9912
2048.749
452.7781
593.0024
572.1185
515.8666
497.1092
8.335147
1063.741

-0.73
2.42
-0.75
-0.17
-4.24
-1.45
-9.9
0.26
1.06
12.09
-3.04

0.045
0.015
0.456
0.869
0
0.148
0
0.798
0.291
0
0.002

-170.7107
119.7127
-1041.512
-4354.381
-2809.38
-2019.811
-6783.689
-879.1493
-449.5031
84.46236
-5319.624

77.94439
1131.309
467.6263
3676.568
-1034.522
304.7158
-4541.026
1143.011
1499.129
117.1355
-1149.834

The results show that housing prices(Y) is significantly affected by Population(X 2 ),
Housing Policies(X 3 ), and RGG(X 6 ) at the 99% level or 95% level. The effect of
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GDP(X 1 ), M2(X 4 ) and Stock Market(X 5 ) are not significant. Why is GDP insignificant?
The reason is the same to Northeast China Region.
6．Pearl River Delta Region (Fixed Effects Model)
Fixed effects model
Table 8.18 Results of Fixed Effects Model on Pearl River Delta Region
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 city2-city9 t panels(cor) corr(ar1)
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: Generalize least Squares
Panels : Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation
Correlation: common AR(1) coefficient for all panels
(0.9189)
Estimated covariance =55
Number of obs =670
Estimated autocorrelations =1
Number of groups =10
Estimated coefficients=17
Time periods=67
Wald chi2(7)=696.77
Prob > chi2 =0
Y Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>IzI

[95% Conf.

Interval]

X1

0.0422698

0.019314

2.19

0.029

0.0044149

0.0801248

X2

16.17982

1.304728

12.4

0

13.6226

18.73704

X3

24.95064

47.93793

0.52

0.603

-69.00597

118.9073

X4

-0.0002828

0.000695

-0.41

0.684

-0.0016451

0.0010795

X5

-0.0148077

0.026961

-0.55

0.583

-0.0676495

0.038034

X6
City2
City3
City4
City5
City6
City7
City8
City9
City10
t
_cons

-134.3716
9230.084
-6751.855
5880.967
5423.464
-5690.886
163.2946
-4335.688
1230.816
13289.38
87.31964
-6439.606

71.4994
782.442
857.2399
1423.78
830.2201
555.6391
710.6658
560.029
739.464
1075.96
5.172923
1080.928

-1.88
11.8
-7.88
4.13
6.53
-10.24
0.23
-7.74
1.66
12.35
16.88
-5.96

0.06
0
0
0
0
0
0.818
0
0.096
0
0
0

-274.5078
7696.525
-8432.015
3090.41
3796.262
-6779.919
-1229.585
-5433.324
-218.5068
11180.53
77.18089
-8558.187

5.764662
10763.64
-5071.696
8671.524
7050.665
-4601.853
1556.174
-3238.051
2680.139
15398.22
97.45838
-4321.026

The results show that Housing Prices(Y) is significantly affected by GDP(X 1 ),
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Population(X 2 ), and RGG(X 6 ) at 99% or 90% level. The effect of Housing Policies(X 3 ),
M2(X 4 ) and Stock Market(X 5 ) are not significant.
Why is the coefficient of housing policies not significant? Pearl River Delta
Region is a highly developed area China. Hence, the housing prices in many cities in this
region are supported by the demand to live, not demand to invest. No matter if the
housing policies came out, the demand to live can always support the housing prices.
This is the reason why housing policies cannot affect housing prices significantly.
7. Sichuan-Chongqing Region (Fixed effects model)
Table 8.20 Results of Random Effects Model on Sichuan-Chongqing Region
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 city2-city4 t panels(cor) corr(ar1)
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: Generalize least Squares
Panels :Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation
Correlation: common AR(1) coefficient for all panels
(0.8516)
Estimated covariance =10
Number of obs =268
Estimated autocorrelations =1
Number of groups =4
Estimated coefficients=11
Time periods=67
Wald chi2(7)=709.10
Prob > chi2 =0
Y Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

P>IzI

[95% Conf.

Interval]

X1

0.0145608

0.008702

1.67

0.094

-0.002495

0.0316166

X2

0.2523392

0.133047

1.9

0.058

-0.0084281

0.5131065

X3

9.390067

29.4467

0.32

0.75

-48.3244

67.10453

X4

-0.0004591

0.000778

-0.59

0.555

-0.0019843

0.0010661

X5

0.0637867

0.029297

2.18

0.029

0.0063663

0.1212072

X6
City2
City3
City4
T
_cons

19.08068
-312.6817
305.9166
-255.5238
79.99652
32.14095

72.38976
214.1167
124.7611
113.4953
3.370833
254.2044

0.26
-1.46
2.45
-2.25
23.73
0.13

0.085
0.144
0.014
0.024
0
0.899

-122.8006
-732.3427
61.38928
-477.9704
73.38981
-466.0906

160.962
106.9793
550.4439
-33.07715
86.60323
530.3725
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The results show that Housing Prices(Y) is significantly affected by GDP(X 1 ),
Population(X 2 ), Stock Market(X 5 ) and RGG(X 6 ) at 99% or 95% level. The effect of
Housing Policies(X 3 ), M2(X 4 ) are not significant.
In all 9 group divided by regions, Sichuan-Chongqing Region is the only one
where the coefficient of Stock Market is significant. Furthermore, the coefficient is
positive. Chongqing and Sichuan is the most developed area in West China. The medium
and big cities in this area are characteristic by a great number of list companies. And the
economy of the cities in this area is driven mainly by those list companies. When the
stock prices go up, the economy in this area will be very good, then the housing prices
will go up. That is the reason why the correlation between stock market and housing
market are positive.
8. Southwest China Region (Random effects model)
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Table 8.19 Results of Random Effects Model on Southwest-China Region
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 t panels(cor) corr(ar1)
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: Generalize least Squares
Panels :Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation
Correlation: common AR(1) coefficient for all panels
(0.8245)
Estimated covariance =28
Number of obs =469
Estimated autocorrelations =1
Number of groups =7
Estimated coefficients=8
Time periods=67
Wald chi2(7)=618.92
Prob > chi2 =0
Y Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>IzI

[95% Conf.

Interval]

X1

0.1527708

0.038357

3.98

0

0.0775924

0.2279493

X2

0.6451201

0.084733

7.61

0

0.4790458

0.8111945

X3

4.945682

21.73405

0.23

0.82

-37.65227

47.54363

X4

-0.0001595

0.000903

-0.18

0.86

-0.0019293

0.0016102

X5

0.0112436

0.033473

0.34

0.737

-0.054362

0.0768491

X6
t
_cons

-85.77822
73.01279
134.1225

59.87018
3.368942
148.3822

-1.43
21.67
0.9

0.019
0
0.366

-203.1216
66.40978
-156.7013

31.56518
79.61579
424.9462

The results show that housing prices(Y) is significantly affected by GDP(X 1 ),
Population(X 2 ), and RGG(X 6 ) at 99% or 95% level. The effect of Housing Policies(X 3 ),
M2(X 4 ) and Stock Market(X 5 ) are not significant.
Why is the coefficient of housing policies not significant? The reason is the same
to Northeast China Region. Southwest China Region is an underdeveloped area in China.
When the housing prices in other regions increased very quickly, the housing prices here
increased very slowly. As a result, when some housing policies came out, the local
governments in this area often refuse to take those policies. As a result, many policies had
no influences on housing prices.
9. Northwest China Region (Random effects model)
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Table 8.21 Results of Fixed Effects Model on Northwest-China Region
xtgls Y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 t panels(cor) corr(ar1)
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
Coefficients: Generalize least Squares
Panels :Heteroskedastic with Cross-sectional correlation
Correlation: common AR(1) coefficient for all panels
(0.9322)
Estimated covariance =21
Number of obs =402
Estimated autocorrelations =1
Number of groups =6
Estimated coefficients=8
Time periods=67
Wald chi2(7)=271.22
Prob > chi2 =0
Y Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>IzI

[95% Conf.

Interval]

X1

0.0050757

0.026292

0.19

0.847

-0.046455

0.0566064

X2

0.8143479

0.264642

3.08

0.002

0.2956586

1.333037

X3

35.73762

15.47377

2.31

0.021

5.409577

66.06566

X4

-0.0001573

0.000566

-0.28

0.781

-0.0012657

0.0009511

X5

0.0229022

0.021836

1.05

0.294

-0.0198952

0.0656995

X6
t
_cons

-290.2001
62.49739
472.9708

109.6357
4.112732
207.3314

-2.65
15.2
2.28

0.008
0
0.023

-505.0821
54.43658
66.60871

-75.31808
70.5582
879.333

The results show that housing prices(Y) is significantly affected by
Population(X 2 ), and RGG(X 6 ) at 99% or 95% level. The effect of GDP(X 1 ), Housing
Policies(X 3 ), M2(X 4 ) and Stock Market(X 5 ) are not significant.
Why is the coefficient of housing policies not significant? The reason is the same
to South China Region. Why is GDP insignificant? The reason is the same to Northeast
China Region.
8.4.4 R-Square Comparison
In order to show how important income inequality is to housing prices, the fitting degree
(R2) is checked after the independent variable is removed one by one.
1. Pooled Regression Analysis
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Table 8.24a R2 Reduction When One Variable is Removed in Pooled Regression
Model

By the table above，we could draw another table.
Table 8.24b R2 Reduction When One Variable is Removed in Pooled Regression Model

X1

X2

X3

X4

X5

X6

2

0.684 0.684 0.684 0.684 0.684 0.684

2

0.51 0.665 0.677 0.677 0.684 0.453

R before this variable is removed
R after this variable is removed
How much R2 drops

0.174 0.019 0.007 0.007

0 0.231

Table 8.24b shows R2 drops most when RGG is removed(X 6 ).
2. Fixed Effect Panel Data Analysis
Table 8.25a R2 Reduction When One Variable is Removed in Fixed Effects Model
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By the table above，we could draw another table.
Table 8.25b R2 Reduction When One Variable is Removed in Fixed Effects Model

X1

X2

X3

X4

X5

X6

2

0.3347 0.3347 0.3347 0.3347 0.3347 0.3347

2

0.3024 0.6566 0.3215

R before this variable is removed
R after this variable is removed
How much R2 drops

0.0323

0.326 0.3278 0.1967

-0.322 0.0132 0.0087 0.0069

0.138

Table 8.25b shows R2 drops most when RGG(X 6 ) is removed.
3. Random Effect Panel Data Analysis

Table 8.26a R2 Reduction When One Variable is Removed in Random Effects Model
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By the table above，we could draw another table.
Table 8.26b R2 Reduction When One Variable is Removed in Random Effects Model

X1
R2 before this variable is removed
2

R after this variable is removed
How much R2 drops

X2
0.51

X3
0.51

X4
0.51

X5
0.51

X6
0.51 0.51

0.4588 0.6571 0.4921 0.4136 0.4125 0.25
0.0512

-0.147 0.0179 0.0964 0.0975 0.26

Table 8.26b shows R2 drops most when RGG(X 6 ) is removed
In all three models, we find that the fitting degree drops the most when RGG is removed.
This shows that income inequality plays the most import role in housing prices.

8.5 Results Summary
To sum up, we have the following results.
No matter the model and no matter the grouping of the 70 cities, the coefficient of
RGG, the measure for income inequality, is consistently negative. Since a high RGG
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implies severe income inequality, the negative coefficient shows that the correlation
between income inequality and housing prices is positive. Precisely, more severe income
inequality leads to higher housing prices.
Furthermore, no matter the model and no matter the grouping of the 70 cities,
housing prices are always significantly affected by RGG. The positive correlation
between income inequality and housing prices is confirmed statistically, which is exactly
what is intended to show in this study.
Also, in order to show how important income inequality is to the determination of
housing prices, the degree of fit (R2) is checked after the independent variables are
removed one by one. In all models, we find that the goodness of fit drops the most when
RGG is removed. This again shows that income inequality plays the most important role
in housing prices.
Next, when the 70 cities are grouped by their GDPs, model selection testing
shows that it is better to use the Random Effects Model than the Fixed Effects Model.
When the 70 cities are grouped by region, model selection testing shows that it is better
to use the Fixed Effects Model than the Random Effects Model. Since the Fixed Effects
Model emphasizes individual features but the Random Effects Model assumes that the
individual features are important, the results imply that the individual features are
insignificant when the cities with similar GDP are put together. That further implies that
the GDP of one city is the unique feature of this city and income inequality might
influence housing prices of this city through its GDP. Those results are consistent to our
intuition that the same level of income inequality will cause much higher savings in a city
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with high GDP than a city with low GDP, and then will lead to much higher housing
prices in high-GDP cities compared to low-GDP cities.
Also, the coefficient of RGG is more significant when the 70 cities are grouped
by GDP than when 70 cities are grouped by region. The influence of income inequality
on housing prices will be similar, and is very evident within the group of cities with the
similar GDPs. For the group of different GDPs, the influence will decline as GDPs
decline. This is why the coefficient of RGG is more significant when 70 cities are
grouped by GDP than that when 70 cities are grouped by region.
Finally, the coefficient of Housing Policies（X3）is positive, which means the
enactment of housing policies is correlated with the high housing prices. This result is
counterintuitive because the purpose of the housing policies is to suppress housing prices.
But this result is reasonable. On one hand, it is the fact that all housing policies could
rarely suppress housing prices in past 16 years in China. On the other hand, releasing
housing policies was actually a reaction to the rapidly rising housing prices, and
terminating housing Policies is a response the stagnant or slightly decreasing housing
prices. In other words, when housing prices increased rapidly, the housing policies were
enacted but rarely serve to stop the increasing housing prices; when housing prices were
stagnant or decreasing slightly for some reason, the housing policies were not enacted or
were terminated. As a result, the relationship between housing prices and housing policies
is positive.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
9.1 Conclusion
The conclusion is that all the hypotheses put forward in Chapter 3 are confirmed.
First, at a certain point, a high-income family spends a lower proportion of its
income on consumption compared with a low-income family. In other words, the higher
the level of a family’s income in a society at a certain time point, the lower the proportion
of its consumption accounted for in its income.
As a result, severe income inequality will lead to overly-high aggregate savings rate
and over-low aggregate consumption rate.
Second, an overly-high aggregate savings rate and overly-low aggregate
consumption rate caused by severe income inequality will induce high investment
demand in the virtual sector and weak demand in the real sector. As a result, the virtual
sector will progress, whereas the real sector will decline.
Third, in the context of a declining real sector, investors prefer houses to other types
of assets in the virtual sector owing to unique the features of houses. Thus, housing prices
will increase despite the high vacancy rate, the high new construction and the quick sale
of houses. Those phenomena are “weird” but can be observed everywhere in current
China.

9.2 Discussion
In addition to the factors in the models in Chapter 7, there are also other reasons why
do Chinese people prefer houses so much.
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9.2.1 Cultural Factors
Several scholars attribute the rapidly rising housing prices to Chinese cultural
tradition. It is believed that Chinese people love owning houses more deeply than any
other nation in the world. Although there is no empirical evidence supporting this claim,
some Chinese traditions do play important roles in the housing market.
1. Parents remain central in the marriage decision-making process of their children.
In China, there is a current saying, “Mothers-in-law boost housing markets.” When a
boy wishes to marry a girl, the girl’s mother will tell the man, “No house, no marriage!”
A house becomes a necessary condition for marriage. Therefore, this tradition will drive
housing prices to speed up.
Before 1910, parents in China made the marriage decisions for their children. As the
Chinese saying goes, “Marriage is arranged by the order of the parents and the
matchmaker's word.” That situation has changed remarkably since 1910. Nowadays,
many people independently choose their spouses. However, a considerable proportion of
the youth still have marriages arranged by their parents. Furthermore, although many
young people independently decide on their marriage, parental suggestions are highly
vital to their decision.
As numerous studies have shown, factors that influence parents’ choice about their
children’s marriage entirely differ from those that influence their children’s decision
about their own marriage. When children make their own choices, they value the
potential spouse’s physical appearance, whether the prospect is genuinely in love with
them, and whether he/she has the unique capability, personality, potentials, or
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achievements they consider attractive. When parents decide for their children, they care if
the potential son-in-law or daughter-in-law is currently rich and if he/she has rich parents.
As housing prices are increasing, the number of houses owned becomes the signal
whether this person is rich or not. Hence, parents often consider houses as the most
important factor for their choice about their children’s marriage. Consequently, a boy and
his family have to try their utmost to buy a house in order to obtain a “wife” or a
“daughter-in-law.” Therefore, the cultural tradition of parents making marriage decisions
for their children is pushing the housing prices up.
Why do Chinese parents often want to make decisions about their children’s
marriage? Chinese parents make not only such choices about their children’s marriage,
but also about which university their children should attend, which major they should
study, what kinds of job they should pursue after graduation, when their children should
produce a grandchild, and how many grandchildren they should have. This is Chinese
culture, which rarely values independent will and personalities of children even when
they have become adults.
2. Owning a house in a city means settling down in that city.
There is an old saying in China, “Only upon having a comfortable house can you
start your enjoyable career!” Ancient China is an agricultural country. Therefore, land, as
the most important productive and living factor, has been given foremost value for
thousands of years. A family is deemed a settled family only if they own a piece of land
and a house. Although China is now a modern country with manufacturing and service
industries, Chinese continue to think that owning a house is the most important thing in
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life. Hence, a person will likely spend all his/her current savingss and future income (via
loans) to acquire a house. It is highly popular for many families to spend over 80% of
their monthly income on the monthly payment of home loans. That notion is incredible
for many families in western countries.
3. Homeownership has become a symbol of social status and social class
Owing to the rapid ascent of housing prices, the value of one regular condominium
is now equal to 60 years’ worth of income of a regular family in most cities in China.
This means that most regular families cannot afford a condominium in a city at all.
Correspondingly, a family owning such unit will belong to the upper class. Conversely, a
family without a condo unit will likely belong to the lower or middle class, no matter
how much income this family earns. In order to be a member of upper class, an individual
are always trying to buy houses as many as possible and as early as possible.
9.2.2 Non-cultural factors
1. Immature Housing Rental Market
China’s rental market is immature for the following two reasons.
First, Most condominiums are rented by individual owners. Very few companies own
numerous condominiums and lease them to tenants. Given that the demand for rental
services is sporadic, it is extremely difficult for an individual owner to provide good
rental services to tenants. As the purpose of renting a condominium unit for a tenant is to
enjoy satisfactory services from the owner, renting a house is not as good an option as
buying a house.
B. The rental right of a tenant is an obligation right, not a property right, according to
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current law in China. An obligation right is a relative right, whereas a property right is an
absolute one. When tenants only have a relative right, the owner has the privilege to
terminate the rental contract at any time before its expiration date. Consequently, it is
very possible for a tenant to be evicted from the rental condominiums at any time. Such
possibility will cause a tenant to feel extremely unsecure. In this situation, tenants will
not be allowed, also not motivated to redecorate and rearrange the space, and refurniture
the condo. (On the contrary, they would have decorated the condo, arranged the space,
and bought good furniture and equipment if they bought the condo.) Then the living
quality from a rental condo will be not as good as that from a self-occupied condo.
2. Marriage Law
According to the marriage law of the United States and of most European countries,
all properties of the husband and wife become common wealth after they get married.
Unlike those laws, China’s marriage law states that the pre-marriage property of the
husband or wife still belongs to the husband and the wife after marriage. Thus, the
husband will retain the pre-marriage property if they are divorced in the future. However,
it is challenging for the husband or the wife to prove that his/her pre-marriage money
belongs to him/her after marriage. Consequently, a reasonable way to prevent such
difficulty is to change “cash money” to houses before marriage. Under this law, the
parent will buy a house for their children before marriage even if their children already
own one or two condominiums and do not need more.
3. Continuous inflation
China has been experiencing persistent inflation since 2000. Economists inform us
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that real estate is the safest asset against inflation. Consequently, it is very reasonable for
a family to invest their money on a house. The more severe the inflation is, the stronger
the motivation of a family to buy houses.
4. Long-term persistent quickly rising of housing prices
We know that the strong preference for houses boosts housing prices. However,
housing prices also promote the preference for houses, thus continuing the increase in
housing prices. When the housing prices are rapidly ascending, the return from investing
in houses will be extremely high. Houses become the foremost assets among various
kinds of assets. When the house prices have been increasing persistently in the long term,
investors will deem houses as low-risk or risk-free assets. Consequently, they will
continue to spend much more money on houses, which will further boost housing prices.
5. Fake Divorce
As stated, the purchase constraint policy in Shanghai include the following.
1) One HUKOU family in Shanghai can buy a maximum of two new houses after
the policy came out on January 31, 2011. Such family cannot buy a third house.
“HUKOU” is a unique demographical or political term in China. Although some
scholars translate it to “registration” or “local citizenship,” it differs from both terms. An
individual or family with HUKOU of a specific city enjoys many privileges in that city,
which an individual or family without HUKOU does not. Those privileges include house
purchase, vehicle registration, school enrollment, and medical and pension insurance. A
family with HUKOU (HUKOU family) is the authentic resident family, while a family
without HUKOU (Non-HUKOU family) is always considered the floating family in the
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city.
According to the purchase constraint policy, “one family” is defined as “husband and
wife” or “husband, wife, and their children under 18 years.” If one young couple still
lives with the wife’s or husband’s parents in one condo, they will be seen as two families.
An adult who is unmarried, or divorced, or a widow or widower, will be seen as an
individual even if he/she lives with his/her children under 18 years. A couple living with
their adult child will be considered as a family and one individual. An individual living
with their adult child will be seen as two individuals.
2) A HUKOU individual can only buy one new house after the enactment of the
policy. He/she cannot buy a second house.
3) One non-HUKOU individual or one family that has worked and paid social
insurance in the city for five consecutive years or more can only buy one new house after
the policy came out. They cannot buy a second home.
It is not hard to find out the big loophole in this policy. Given that one HUKOU
individual can always buy a new house, one couple who already owns two houses can
develop a “strategy” to buy a third house. The strategy has three steps.
Step 1: The husband gives his house to his wife (or his wife gives her house to the
husband). According to the current law in China, this behavior is entirely tax free.
Afterwards, they can get divorced. Thus, the wife owns all the properties, but the husband
owns nothing.
Step 2: The man buys a new house because he eligible to do so.
Step 3: After the transaction is finished and the man acquires the property title, they
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get remarried. Then, they own a new house (the third house).
Notice that the strategy could be repeated if this couple wants a fourth house.
Furthermore, they could repeat the strategy to obtain a fifth house. In fact, we have the
following formula: One-time Divorce = One More House.
In reality, even if one HUKOU family only owns one house and is eligible for
buying a second one, the couple will still choose to divorce. The reason for that is
because the house they buy will be seen as the first home by government if they divorce.
Nevertheless, the house they buy will be the second one if they do not divorce. A major
difference exists between “the first house” and “the second house.” Compared with the
second houses, buyers will have the following advantages if the house he/she buys is the
FIRST house.
First, the contract tax will be reduced to 1.5% (3% for the second house).
Second, the down payment is 30% (70% for the second house).
Third, the interest rate of the loan will be reduced to 90% of the benchmark lending
rate (1.1 times the benchmark lending rate).
Fourth, no property tax will be charged. Thus, for the second house, annual property
tax = the appraisal value×70%×0.6%.
Consequently, the couple will choose to divorce in order to ensure that the house
they want to buy will be their first house. Then, they will save much from the contract
tax, interest rate, and property tax. They can also borrow much more money to buy the
house from the bank.
6. Fake marriage
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What should an single person with HUKOU do when he owns one house and wants
a second house? The only way that he could buy the second house is through a fake
marriage. The strategy is as follows:
Step 1: Find a woman who would like to enter into a fake marriage with him. After
they marry, their “family” owns one house, so this family is eligible to buy a second one.
Step 2: Buy the second house.
Step 3: Get divorced. Based on the marital settlement agreement, the man will keep
both houses. To thank the woman, the man will pay her a fee.

9.3 Consequences of Housing Bubble Caused by Income
Inequality
9.3.1 Consequences for Built Environment
1. Housing overdevelopment will cause loss and misallocation of resources,
including land, construction material, building equipment, labor, and capital.
Products can provide individuals with the utility/satisfaction only if they are
consumed by those individuals. Quickly rising housing prices result in housing
overdevelopment, suggesting that a considerable number of buildings are constructed but
never “consumed.” As a consequence, substantial resources such as land, construction
material, building equipment, labor, and capital are wasted. Those resources could have
been used to generate useful products or services that could have been used in other
economic sectors.
2. Housing overdevelopment will lead to low quality of properties, including
improper planning, unsound design in functions and arts, high energy consumption, and
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low construction quality. Furthermore, those problems are shared by both high-level or
expensive housing properties and low-level or cheap properties.
“The quality of buildings developed in [the] past 10 years is very worrying. Many
housing projects are severely short of supporting facilities, the design is improper, the
construction quality is very low, let alone the environment-friendly requirement. But it is
very weird that the quality is very low while the price is quickly rising up.” 118 “Due to the
erroneous planning and low quality, the average life of buildings in China is only 30
years,” claimed by Baoxing Qiu, the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Housing and
Urban-Rural Development of the People's Republic of China, in 2011 119.
It is a basic principle in economics that both low price and high-quality of products
inherently come from intense competition between firms, especially in a buyer’s market.
Skyrocketing housing prices indicate a strong demand for buildings and a seller’s market.
When buyers are scrambling for condominiums and new condominiums can always be
sold at a good price, whether the quality is good or bad, housing developers hardly have
incentives to improve the quality of the property.
3. Housing overdevelopment will lead to high economic cost and significant harm to
the environment. When low-quality buildings are removed, removing the buildings and
recovering the land use also require enormous amounts of labor and money. Moreover,
removing the buildings will generate considerable construction waste and dust, which are
extremely harmful to the environment.

118

119

http://house.ifeng.com/column/news/jianzhushouming/index.shtml
http://house.ifeng.com/column/news/jianzhushouming/index.shtml
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9.3.2 Consequences for the Economy
1. Housing bubbles will lead to the instability of the financial system.
2. Housing bubbles will not only make the funds not to enter the real economy, but
also stimulate the funds to escape from the weak economy. In the short run, weak real
economy will result in high unemployment and low economic growth. In the long run,
weak real economy will reduce the whole country's economic strength, innovation ability,
and will drive the country into recession and depression.
3. Housing Bubbles will result in “Income Distribution Trap”.
The trouble that developing countries encounter owing to the polarization of income
should be named “Income Distribution Trap.” It differs from “Middle Income Trap”
and “Inequality Trap,” although some connections exist among them.
In the history of development economics, various scholars have emphasized the
policy that upgrades capital accumulation on developing countries. However, when a
country falls into the “Income Distribution Trap,” greater capital accelerates the recessed
consumer market and further overheats the asset market. The same holds for foreign
exchange, which has been emphasized by certain scholars because it can be used to
purchase machinery and technology from foreign countries that developing countries
urgently need.
Some scholars value the policies with the purpose of offering credit and technology
support to enterprises in a substantial economy. However, these measurements not only
fail to help enterprises rise above the predicament, but also further deteriorate the
situation because only the productivity of the enterprises can be improved. The extreme
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shortage in enterprises in substantial economy involves strong market demand rather than
high productivity.
Certain scholars believed in the policy that cultivates human capital because such
capital is of importance to the progress of developing countries aside from its physical
capital. However, enterprises do not require high human capital and are unwilling to
conduct human capital investment because of the lack of market demand in the “income
distribution trap.” In this case, is it still useful to improve human capital?
Some scholars highlight policy that could accelerate the industrialization process in
developing countries. Industrialization is certainly an inevitable path for most of these
countries. However, if a country falls into the trap after stepping into industrialization, its
industrialization process can no longer continue because its consumer market would be
under persistent recession.
The policy of international trade advocated by other scholars is significant to
countries caught in the trap, because international trade, especially export, can effectively
support a consumer market in recession when domestic demand is insufficient. However,
international trade fails to alleviate the recession of the consumer market if the
consumption department lacks export competitiveness or the export competitiveness
disappears due to lost comparative advantage in international trade.
4. Housing Bubble will deepen income inequality.

Housing bubbles make the

demand for consumption goods and production factors further decline. The declining real
economy will reduce the income of the working class, and thus deepen income inequality.
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In summary, only the policy that could decrease income inequality will be crucial
to fix the problems faced by those countries. In other words, polarization of income and
wealth over-concentration are not only the results of existing economic problems in
developing countries, such as real estate overdevelopment and quickly rising real estate
prices, but also the main, probably the most, crucial causes of a host of new, complicated,
and dangerous economic problems. Therefore, the fair distribution of income is not only
the goal for national welfare, but also the imperative condition that guarantees the
development of a country.

9.4 Innovations
1. Finding an economic relationship between income level and propensity to consume.
2. Establishing a new measure as a substitute for Gini Coefficient.
3. Revealing a unique feature of houses and explaining why this feature makes houses be
a special asset preferred by high savings.

9.5 Contributions
9.5.1 Theoretical Level
1. Providing empirical evidences that soaring-up housing prices are positive related to
income inequality.
2. Adding a new explanation for housing bubbles by uncovering the linkage from income
inequality to the housing bubble
Three primary explanations for housing bubbles are extant in literature: rational
expectation, irrational or psychological factors, and stimulating housing policies. Very
few studies have connected housing bubbles with income inequality and examined the
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relation between them. This dissertation would uncover the inherent linkage between
income inequality and the housing bubble. As a result, a new reason for housing bubbles
might be identified, namely, income inequality.
3. Showing a novel channel through which income inequality will damage the
sustainability of economic growth in developing and developed countries, thus
highlighting the importance of income inequality in developing economics and economic
growth theories.
Apart from the overheated housing market, severe income inequality also results in a
weak consumption market and recessive real sector in a country. The risk of the financial
market accumulates while the productivity and the competitive capacity of such country
decrease. Finally, the economy would become more unstable and unsustainable. In my
opinion, the challenge that developing countries encounter because of the polarization of
income should be called “Income Distribution Trap.”
Numerous scholars emphasize the importance of industrialization, capital
accumulation, human capital, technological innovations, and international trade to the
economic growth of countries. However, all those will be rendered ineffective when a
country falls into the Income Distribution Trap. Therefore, this dissertation shows that the
fair distribution of income is not only the national welfare goal but also the imperative
condition that guarantees the healthy housing market, the stable finance market, and the
sustainable economic growth of a country.
Those listed items are possible theoretical innovations in the field of economics,
finance, and real estate development. Thus, this work has intellectual merit in those
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fields.
9.5.2 Practical Level
1. Highlighting the negative consequences for built environment and providing the
professionals in this field with original thoughts to deal with the issues
In addition, my project would also reveal the consequences of housing bubbles for
planning, design, and the built environment. In the field of economics and finance, the
instability in the finance system, the risk to the entire national economy, and the unfair
wealth redistribution are regarded as the entire aftermath caused by housing bubbles.
According to my studies, such aftermath should also include (a) loss and misallocation of
resources, including land, construction material, building equipment, labor, and capital;
(b) low quality of properties, including improper planning, unsound design in functions
and arts, high energy consumption, and low construction quality; and (c) substantial harm
to the environment. This is also a possible innovation in the field of PDBE, and thus has
intellectual merit in this field.
2. Offering developing countries the policy advice to avoid or emerge from the “Income
Inequality Trap” and warning developed nations of this problem.
Therefore, if this research is completely successful, it will deepen the understanding
in academic circles about income inequality and housing bubbles. It shall also add novel
ideas about housing overdevelopment and other problems in planning, design, and the
built environment to practitioners. Furthermore, it would remind the policy-makers to
consider income distribution when they draft policies tackling problems such as lowquality housing buildings, housing overdevelopment, housing bubble, finance market
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instability, and unsustainable economic growth in China. Given that numerous countries,
including the US, have been experiencing increasing income inequality and the housing
bubble, this research will also have a bearing on the policy-making process in other
countries.

9.6 Limitations
1. Correlation is not causation. I also faced this same problem encountered by
economics studies.
2. After income inequality is proved to be a crucial determinant for quickly rising
housing prices and housing overdevelopment, it remains unclear how important it is
compared with rational expectation, psychological factors, and relevant policies.
3. Similar to severe income inequality, perfect income equality and the efforts to
pursue the perfect income equality can also be very harmful to the entire economy. An
optimal state between absolute income inequality and perfect income equality must exist.
This research has not cast light on this optimal level.
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